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1 Executive Summary 
UAS Surveillance Criticality 
The integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the national airspace system (NAS) 
poses considerable challenges. Maintaining human safety is perhaps chief among these 
challenges as UAS remote pilots will need to interact with other UAS, piloted aircraft, and other 
conditions associated with flight. 
Aircraft detect and avoid (DAA) technology can assist all pilots in helping to avoid collisions 
and other circumstances that can threaten human safety in the NAS. A team of six universities 
associated through the Federal Aviation Association’s (FAA) UAS Center of Excellence (COE) 
ASSURE team researched DAA-related technology to better understand potential DAA UAS 
integration. University members included North Carolina State University, Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, Mississippi State University, University of North Dakota, Ohio State 
University, and Oregon State University. The university team was joined by seven industrial 
partners: Adaptive Aerospace Group, CGH Technologies, Harris Corporation, L-3 
Communications, Precision Hawk, Rockwell Collins, and Simulyze. The combined group 
formed the ASSURE Surveillance Criticality research team.  
Our research team interactions included two stakeholder workshops, monthly teleconferences 
with FAA representatives, and a regular teleconference schedule among team members. Our 
initial efforts included a literature review to examine previous DAA-related research and to help 
refine our research approach. The review included product descriptions for surveillance 
equipment and solutions, published standards, technical standard orders (TSOs), and Advisory 
Circulars (ACs) for transponders, ADS-B, traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) II 
integration, and related technologies. Evaluations of in-field installed performance and in-field 
monitoring, maintenance/recertification requirements, including effectiveness of controller 
procedures for altitude/position/speed verification, pilot procedural altitude/position/speed 
verification were also included in the literature review.   
To respond to surveillance criticality research questions, five analysis tools were selected 
following the literature review to evaluate airborne surveillance technology performance. The 
analysis tools included: Fault Trees, Monte Carlo Simulations, Hazard Analysis, Design of 
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Experiments (DOE), and Human-in-the-Loop Simulations. Our Surveillance Criticality research 
team used results from these analyses to address three primary research questions. The questions 
and our executive findings for each are presented below.     
1. For a cooperative DAA solution based on Automatic dependent surveillance 
broadcast (ADS-B) and/or transponders, how should the current operational or 
technical performance requirements for ADS-B Out and/or transponders be 
changed (if at all) for UAS DAA functions? 
Transponder technologies show inherent deficiency for their expected use and are seen as 
high risk failures in all airspace and equipage scenarios. ADS-B and TCAS systems are 
designed to a performance standard that is appropriate in well controlled airspaces (A, B, 
and C) but experience encounter issues as air traffic control is decreased. This is a direct 
result of the equipage requirements and the ATC procedures within these airspaces.  
However, ADS-B failures are shown to have the largest influence on failure likelihood 
when compared with TCAS. Real world data has given indications that significant ADS-
B loss is present in fielded technologies. Our recommendations for transponder and ADS-
B design assurance level improvements aim to increase the level of safety in UAS DAA 
systems. For the UAS DAA system, transponders need a more conservative failure 
characteristic in all applications to be deemed safe in our analysis. ADS-B systems in 
UAS DAA applications show acceptable risk levels in controlled airspaces A, B, and C. 
In order for use in lower airspace classes where VFR and non-cooperative traffic 
becomes possible, ADS-B will also need to be designed to a greater assurance level. 
2. Do current surveillance equipment technologies meet the design assurance 
criteria to provide UAS DAA functions? 
While the current requirements of UAS DAA are not explicit and are in transition, our 
analytical tool is structured to evaluate such standards as they become available. Using 
the assurance criteria from FAA TSO documents for manned implementation of these 
technologies, our findings are mixed. The surveillance equipment is able to provide DAA 
functionality in certain airspace and equipage combinations, but is not a whole solution.  
Transponder failures cause a significant loss in DAA operations in all airspaces. While 
ATC interactions provide mitigation to these faults when available, there are still high 
12 
 
risk scenarios present in the current DAA equipages. In addition to new DAA 
requirements, the design of our work allows changes to each piece of surveillance 
technology, should greater levels of design assurance be required for UAS DAA use. Our 
product also has the capacity to address the needs of future DAA technologies in design 
assurance as they are incorporated into UAS.     
3. What are the criteria for evaluating “equivalent level of safety” of UAS against 
piloted-aircraft for DAA functions? 
The analysis was performed with the design assurance levels from piloted-aircraft 
technology in order to determine if these criteria provided UAS the same situational 
safety as piloted-aircraft. Using the piloted-aircraft standards allows our UAS encounters 
to be evaluated to the same specifications as a manned aircraft to manned aircraft 
encounter would be, except that the ownship has an air-to-air radar in place of the pilot’s 
see and avoid ability. This difference is the most important factor in low equipage and 
uncontrolled airspace comparisons, but has less of an impact when in airspace that has 
minimum equipment rules and provides ATC separation services to IFR aircraft (UAS). 
When other visual or electronic acquisition technologies become available to UAS DAA 
systems, our evaluation analysis can be adjusted to support them. 
Research Results 
The Surveillance Criticality research team has completed a set of analyses using a formalized 
structure that enables the ASSURE team to offer further research into DAA surveillance 
criticality analysis. This structures provides the team the tools to work with industry partners to 
evaluate technology performance against standards and other systems, while also providing the 
FAA, RTCA, and others with a research methodology for expanding into new operating 




2 Introduction   
As unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) continue to expand operations in the National Airspace 
System (NAS), the requirements aviation safety and airspace integrity must be maintained. UAS 
integration demands separation assurance from manned and other unmanned aircraft. Manned 
aviation has driven the development of technologies for airborne traffic surveillance to support 
pilot-in-the-aircraft operational concepts. These technologies, such as transponders, TCAS, and 
ADS-B, provide collision avoidance functions and separation alerts to the onboard pilot for in-
flight decision making based on the pilot’s situational assessment, training, experience, and 
aircraft capabilities. Maintaining separation by sensing and avoiding other air traffic is ultimately 
still the pilot’s responsibility. 
Many UAS integration strategies are built on the availability and performance of these airborne 
surveillance technologies, and new, emerging technologies, to continue providing separation 
assurance. The Detect and Avoid (DAA) function in a UAS-integrated airspace system 
transitions from the pilot with eyes, to technologies providing traffic data and separation 
recommendations. One of the largest challenges facing the UAS industry today is that there is no 
known research that examines the performance of these airborne surveillance technologies for 
maintaining separation assurance when the pilot is not actually in the aircraft. Surveillance 
equipment performance standards are established and separation requirements are defined, such 
as the definition for “well clear,” but the analysis of the impacts of these technologies in various 
equipage configurations and flight scenarios is missing. DAA systems have significant issues in 
obtaining operational and airworthiness approval for UAS because these systems are new and 
novel and their intended function performance needs to be defined in the context of the DAA 
system of a specific UAS.   
The analysis of airborne traffic surveillance equipment for achieving UAS DAA requirements is 
critical to continued UAS integration and expansion into the NAS. The comprehensive analysis 
evaluates the sensitivities of various systems and components for achieving separation; the 
analysis determines the impacts of failures and degraded operations of systems and components; 
and the analysis assesses the hazards resulting from reduced performance within the NAS. 
Research that covers this analysis will include performance of surveillance technologies on 
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manned and unmanned aircraft, large and small aircraft, operations in multiple types of airspace, 
with air traffic at different levels of density. This research must answer the primary three 
questions: 
1. For a cooperative DAA solution based on ADS-B and/or transponders, how should the 
current operational or technical performance requirements for ADS-B Out and/or 
transponders be changed (if at all) for UAS DAA functions? 
2. Do current surveillance equipment technologies meet the design assurance criteria to 
provide UAS DAA functions? 
3. What are the criteria for evaluating 
“equivalent level of safety” of UAS against 
piloted-aircraft for DAA functions? 
A research team of six universities was formed under 
the FAA’s UAS Center of Excellence program, 
ASSURE, to answer these questions and provide the 
analysis of airborne traffic surveillance technologies in 
the context of UAS DAA operations. This team 
consists of North Carolina State University, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University, Mississippi State 
University, University of North Dakota, Ohio State 
University, and Oregon State University. The research 
team developed a methodology and toolset for 
evaluating the criticality of DAA technologies using 
available performance analysis processes, simulation 
environments, and equipment characterizations (Figure 
2.1). The team utilized industry partner knowledge and 
resources, established UAS Integration Concept of 
Operations (ConOps) (from RTCA SC-228) 
evaluation scenarios, and a team of researchers to conduct a three-phase iterative criticality 
analysis.      
Figure 2.1. Analysis approach 
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The Industry Partners on this research project are Adaptive Aerospace Group, CGH 
Technologies, Harris Corp., L-3 Communications, Precision Hawk, Rockwell Collins, and 
Simulyze. These partners were invited participants in the two Stakeholder Workshops in addition 
to regular technical exchange teleconferences.   
The research team made several assumptions to scope the research effort for the criticality 
analysis. 
1. The initial research focuses on large UAS, not small UAS flying at very low altitudes 
(below 500’ AGL).   
2. All aircraft operating in the scenarios meet at least Part 23 equipage requirements, 
including ADS-B Out functionality, in a 2020 future flight environment.  
3. DAA systems must serve as a means of compliance with 14 CFR 91.113 right-of-way 
rules, but also may be required to comply with 14 CFR 91.111 (Operating near other 
aircraft) and 14 CFR 91.119 (Minimum safe altitudes: General).   
4. DAA system behavior must also comply with 14 CFR 91.123 (Compliance with ATC 




3 Systems Overview 
Detect and avoid (DAA) systems as researched in this report are complex systems consisting of 
several independent components used throughout the aviation industry. Each of these 
components is assumed to be an integral portion of an overarching DAA system. The system 
consists of an ADS-B module, a TCAS, a radar, a Mode S transponder, a GPS, and an altimeter. 
All of the listed parts of the DAA system have extensive history and use in manned aircraft 
systems. A detailed description of each component used in a DAA system for UAS. 
3.1 ADS-B 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a system by which aircraft and fixed 
ground locations can share position, velocity, and other information with one another. ADS-B 
periodically transmits its state vector, which includes horizontal and vertical position, and 
velocity. The system is broken down into two separate components, ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. 
The transponder mode is the ADS-B Out portion which broadcasts all state vector information. 
The receiving part of the system is ADS-B In which receives communication from other aircraft 
as well as ADS-B messages from ground locations. With state vector information available from 
other proximate aircraft as well as information re-broadcasted from ground locations, it is 
possible to establish the relative position and movement of those proximate aircraft with 
reference to the ownship aircraft. 
ADS-B is automatic in the sense that no pilot or controller action is required for the information 
to be broadcast. It is a dependent surveillance because it requires that the aircraft state vector and 
additional information be derived from the on-board navigation equipment. The aircraft 
originating the broadcast may or may not have knowledge of which users are receiving its 
broadcast. 
The overall system could be used to replace secondary radar as the primary surveillance method 
for air traffic control. The ADS-B system is currently used in the United States as a component 
of the NextGen national airspace strategy for upgrading and enhancing the overall aviation 
infrastructure. ADS-B increases air traffic safety by making aircraft visible in real time to Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) and to other appropriately equipped aircraft. The system allows for the 
possibility of increased situational awareness, improved visibility, weather reporting, flight 
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information broadcasts, traffic capacity improvement, cockpit display of traffic information 
(CDTI) and airborne collision avoidance.
 
Figure 3.1. ADS-B block diagram 
3.2 TCAS 
The Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) was developed as a back-up airborne 
collision avoidance system. The system provides pilots with vertical maneuvering guidance to 
increase vertical separation between two or more aircraft that the system determines to be a 
possible collision threat. The TCAS system is composed of a Mode S transponder that 
interrogates other air traffic transponders and a computer system that analyzes the transponder 
interrogations. The system includes a traffic display designed to warn pilots of potentially 
conflicting airborne traffic.   
TCAS is capable of providing two classes of advisories. Resolution advisories (RA’s) indicate 
vertical maneuvers that are predicted to either increase or maintain the existing vertical 
separation from threatening aircraft. Resolution advisories do not provide horizontal maneuver 
guidance as the algorithm for TCAS is based upon vertical separation. Traffic advisories (TA’s) 
indicate the positions of intruding aircraft that may later cause resolution advisories to be 
displayed. Traffic advisories display range, range rate, altitude, altitude rate and bearing (if 
available) for intruding aircraft relative to the ownship aircraft.   
18 
 
The best method for understanding the operation of TCAS is by visualizing its operation in 
flight. When airborne, the TCAS equipment periodically transmits interrogation signals, these 
interrogations are received by the Air Traffic 
Control Radar Beacon System (ATCBRS) or 
Mode S transponders. In reply to the 
interrogations, the transponder transmits a signal 
which reports its altitude. The TCAS system 
computes the range of the intruding aircraft by 
using the round-trip time between the 
transmission of the interrogation and the reply. 
Altitude, altitude rate, range, and range rate, 
range acceleration, and bearing are all 
determined by tracking the reply information 
from the ATCBRS or Mode S transponder. This 
data, together with the current TCAS sensitivity 
level, are used to determine the threat level of 
the intruding aircraft. Each intruding aircraft is 
processed individually to permit the selection of 
the minimum safe resolution advisory based on 
track data and in coordination with other TCAS 
equipped aircraft. 
 
Figure 3.2. TCAS block diagram as it applies to UAS  
  
3.3 RADAR 
Detect and avoid radar is an air-to-air radar that is being developed in order to provide an 
additional layer of collision avoidance and separation for manned and unmanned aircraft in the 
national airspace. The system will have one or more antenna elements in order to cover the radar 
field. The electronics of the radar provide all transmit, receive, control, status, and tracking 




Mode S transponders are cooperative surveillance and communication systems for air traffic 
control.  They employ ground and airborne sensors, and an airborne transponder. Ground-air-
ground data link communications can be accommodated integrally with the surveillance 
interrogations and replies. Mode S has been designed as an evolutionary addition to the ATCRBS 
to provide the enhanced surveillance and communication capability required for air traffic 
control automation. Mode S transponders provide surveillance of ATCRBS-equipped aircraft, 
and Mode S transponders will reply to ATCRBS interrogations as well as all other Mode S 
communications. In addition, the datalink potential of Mode S permits use of the transponder for 
a number of ATC and aircraft separation assurance functions.   
Mode S transponders communicate both on the 1030 and 1090 MHz frequencies. This allows for 
interrogations of Mode S transponders, 1090 ADS-B, TCAS, and Mode A/C transponders.  The 
Mode S frequencies were chosen to reduce the interference between ATCRBS and Mode S. 
A principal feature of Mode S that differs from ATCRBS is that each aircraft is assigned a unique 
address code. Using this unique code, interrogations can be directed to a particular aircraft and 
replies unambiguously identified. Chanel interference is minimized because a sensor can limit its 
interrogations to targets of interest. In addition, by proper timing of interrogations, replies from 
closely-spaced aircraft can be received without mutual interference.   
Overall, Mode S transponders are designed to increase the awareness of aircraft in the national 
airspace by providing location and altitude data over a 1030 and 1090 MHz broadcast. The Mode 
S transponder integrates seamlessly with both TCAS and ADS-B. 
3.5 GPS 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a United States Department of Defense owned and 
maintained utility that provides users with worldwide positioning, navigation, and timing 
services. GPS consists of three segments: the space segment, the control segment, and the user 
segment. The space segment consists of satellites that transmit one-way signals that give current 
GPS satellite position and time.  The control segment consists of monitoring and control stations 
that ensure the GPS satellites in their proper orbits in order to provide constant GPS around the 
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globe. The user segment is the GPS receiver equipment, which receives signals from the 
satellites and uses that information to calculate the users’ position and time.   
Manned and unmanned aircraft use GPS to determine altitude, location, and navigation.  The 
GPS system feeds into ADS-B and TCAS, and is used by those DAA systems for location data. 
This reliance on GPS for DAA as well as basic location and navigation services makes GPS a 
critical system for aviation. 
The basic GPS service provides users with approximately 8-meter accuracy, 95% of the time 
anywhere on or near the surface of the earth. This is accomplished each of the GPS satellites 
emits signals to receivers that determine the user location by computing the difference between 
the time that the signal is sent and the time it is received. The time information is placed in the 
codes transmitted by the satellites so that the receivers can constantly determine the time a signal 
was broadcast. The signal also contains data that a receiver can use to compute the locations of 
the satellites as well as make adjustments to maintain accuracy.  With a minimum of four 
separate satellite transmissions, a GPS receiver can triangulate its own three dimensional 
position by determining the distance (referred to as a range) from each of the satellites.   
3.6 ALTIMETERS 
In aircraft, altimeters are a system used to measure the atmospheric pressure from a static port 
outside the aircraft. In principle as altitude increases, pressure decreases. An aneroid barometer is 
calibrated on aircraft to show pressure directly as an altitude above mean seal level (MSL). The 
altimeter system takes a barometric pressure reading from the Pitot-Static tube on the outside of 
the aircraft and uses a vacuum system to display the altitude above MSL.  Modern aircraft use a 
sensitive type altimeter in which the actual MSL value can be adjusted based on current weather 
conditions.  
Altimeters are used by both manned and unmanned aircraft as a primary means of determining 
aircraft altitude. The barometric altitude is used in all systems of the aircraft from navigation to 
DAA. ADS-B, TCAS, and transponders all rely on altimeters to provide aircraft altitude. 
Additionally, GPS altitude as well as ground radar altitude readings can be used as an accuracy 
check of barometric altitude or in the case of a barometric altimeter failure as the primary means 
of altitude information. 
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4 Airspace Overview  
Airspace in the United States is decomposed into six distinct classes. These classes are indicative 
of the different equipment and pilot requirements, as well as the level of air traffic control 
present therein. Many flight communication and equipment tools that are mandatory in the 
higher classes are related to collision avoidance, and are assigned to improve the level of safety. 
We evaluated some of the major collision avoidance technologies in order to better understand 
how these technologies might be employed by UAS. In our analysis, all airspace is assumed to 
have the equipage requirements of the 2020 ADS-B mandate. 
 
For the purposes of our preliminary hazard assessment, four different equipage classes were 
defined. In accordance with the latest DAA MOPS, the ownship UAS may only take the top two 
equipages. The highest level of equipage, Class 2, is defined as having TCAS, ADS-B, 
transponder, and, for the UAS, an air-to-air radar. For the most conservative evaluation it is 
assumed that the TCAS and ADS-B systems are utilizing the same onboard transponder system, 
not redundant, independent systems. This introduces a greater significance of transponder 
failures, but is indeed an option to manufacturers and therefore an important consideration. A 
Class 1 system keeps ADS-B, transponder, and radar, but does not have TCAS. These are the 
same for the intruder aircraft, except there is no air-to-air radar present in the intruder systems. 
The final two, intruder only equipages are: Class 1A, having only a transponder, and Class 0, 
completely unequipped. In airspace classes A through C, as well as E above 10,000 feet MSL, 
only equipages one and two are present for both aircraft. In the rest, the intruder may take all 
four equipages. All combinations of equipage encounters were analyzed and are represented with 
their own hazard table. 
4.1 CLASS A: AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services  
In Class A airspace, all aircraft must be on an IFR flight plan, regardless of 
weather conditions. This requirement gives ATC complete separation 
responsibility over all aircraft flying in Class A. While the ownship UAS will 
always be on an IFR flight plan and therefore controlled by ATC, the barring of 
any VFR traffic from operating in Class A airspace significantly improves the 
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safety therein. Essentially, the UAS’s DAA technology is secondary to ATC 
guidance and instructions, and there are indeed limitations on when a pilot can 
respond to the DAA system’s recommendations.   
 Flight Altitudes 
Class A airspace exists everywhere in the continental United States from 18,000 
Feet MSL to flight level (FL) 600.   
4.2 CLASS B: AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
Class B airspace is the most heavily controlled airport airspace in the US. The 
equipment requirements are very similar to those in Class A, however Class B 
does not carry the same IFR mandate. While VFR traffic is present in Class B, all 
traffic must receive specific authorization to enter the airspace and will receive 
ATC flight separation while operating within its bounds. Additionally, for 
improved situational awareness for the local ATC, all aircraft are required to be 
operating at least a Mode C transponder with altitude encoding when flying 
within 30 nautical miles of a Class B airport. This mode C veil encompasses all 
Class B airspace, as well as that airspace below the outer tiers.  
 Flight Altitudes 
Class B airspace is often highly complex, consisting of several segments with 
their own altitude floors and ceilings based on the requirements of the area. In 
general, the shape is described as an upside down wedding cake, having multiple 
tiers with different radii. The first tier is always a column from the surface to 
10,000 feet MSL, usually 10 miles across. All subsequent tiers extend farther 
from the center point of the primary airport, but are uniquely tailored to 
accommodate the specific needs of each location, such as other airports and 
airspace routes.   
4.3 CLASS C: AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
Control within Class C is slightly less comprehensive than Class A and B in 
several ways. First and foremost, entering into class C requires the establishment 
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of two way communications between each aircraft and ATC, however, there is no 
requirement for clearance or authorization. Additionally, while within Class C, 
VFR traffic may not be receiving separation services from ATC.  
 Flight Altitudes 
Class C airspace is usually a two tiered system, with an inside column from the 
surface to 4,000 feet above the surface and a 5 nautical mile radius and an outside 
shelf, extending 10 nautical miles out with a floor no lower than 1,200 feet and a 
ceiling of 4,000 feet above the surface. When the specific requirements of the 
local airspace dictate, the dimensions of the class C airspace are adjusted to 
accommodate these needs. 
4.4 CLASS D: AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
Similar to Class C in entrance requirements, all traffic must make radio contact, 
but do not require authorization, to enter Class D airspace. Additionally, the 
equipage of transponders and ADS-B systems is not required in class D airspace. 
In some cases, the only means of separation the controller may have is visual 
acquisition from the tower. 
 Flight Altitudes 
In general, class D airspace is a simple column from the surface to 2,500 feet 
above the surface of the runway with a typical radius of 5 nautical miles although 
the radius may vary. In some cases, there may be additional airspace enclosed in 
the Class D area to encompass an instrument approach, or other airport related 
flight service.  
4.5 CLASS E (ABOVE 10,000 MSL): AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
The most common airspace in the United States is Class E. While there are Class 
E airports, the majority of Class E airspace spans the gap from low level Class G 
to the floor of Class A at FL 180. The equipage requirements of Class E airspace 
change at 10,000 feet MSL, therefore it was necessary to split our analysis into 
two distinct sections. That airspace designated as Class E and above 10,000 feet 
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MSL carry similar transponder and ADS-B requirements to the controlled 
airspaces of A, B, and C. Though there is no requirement for VFR traffic to 
communicate with ATC, the presence of this technology significantly improves 
the available ATC separation services for cooperating aircraft. 
 Flight Altitudes 
This portion of Class E airspace extends everywhere between 10,000 feet MSL 
and FL 180 at the bottom of Class A airspace. Additionally, Class E airspace 
resumes above the ceiling of Class A at FL 600. 
4.6 CLASS E (BELOW 10,000 MSL): AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
In contrast to its higher altitude equivalent, Class E airspace below 10,000 feet 
MSL has very little mandatory equipment. VFR traffic in this airspace is not 
required to talk to ATC except when in the vicinity of an airport with a control 
tower.  
 Flight Altitudes 
Class E airspace extends below 10,000 feet MSL to 700 feet AGL in most cases. 
There are airports designated as Class E, which extend to the surface, and there 
are other areas where the Class E floor is elevated to 1,200 feet AGL. 
4.7 CLASS G: AIRSPACE DESCRIPTION 
 ATC Services 
Class G airspace is the low lying airspace from the surface to the floor of the local 
Class E, except when another airports higher class airspace extends to the surface. 
There are some airports within class G airspace, but these are the lowest traffic 
public and private airports. Class G is entirely uncontrolled airspace: ATC offers 
no separation services and there are no communication or equipage requirements. 
Around airports, general aviation follows one-in one-out procedures and are 
recommended to call out their intentions on the local radio frequency.  
 Flight Altitudes 











5.1 FUNCTIONS AND METHODS 
5.1.1 Introduction 
Five analysis tools were selected to provide the framework and data for evaluating 
airborne surveillance technology performance. The combined results of these analysis 
techniques provided the research team a repeatable process for comparing performance 
across different scenarios and equipage configurations, while providing statistically 
sufficient data sets. The five analysis techniques that were selected are Fault Trees, 
Hazard Analysis, Design of Experiments, Human-in-the-Loop Simulations, and Monte 
Carlo simulations. The Fault Tree analysis provides a quantitative assessment of the 
impact of specific component failures within the surveillance equipment on either 
ownship or the encounter aircraft in the scenarios. The Design of Experiments 
methodology provides the sensitivity analysis for understanding which equipment 
components are most critical for achieving separation requirements in different equipage 
configurations. The Functional Hazard Analysis characterizes the criticality of the failure 
impacts against the performance of the system. The simulation environment is used to 
visualize the combined results of the other three analysis processes using the same 
component characterizations, operational parameters, and scenario designs.   Collectively 
these analysis tools provide the data, correlations, and evidence to assess the criticality of 
each airborne traffic surveillance technology tested. 
5.1.2 Fault Trees 
Fault tree analysis is designed to present a graphical representation of the failures within 
the system. This method of visualization confirms that all dependencies and interactions 
between technologies are incorporated in the cumulative likelihood of failure. Due to the 
multiple equipage possibilities for both ownship UAS and intruder, some branches of the 
tree were built to toggle on and off so that all configurations could be tested within the 
same structure. In doing so, however, conditions had to be created that would correctly 
exclude certain failure rates from the calculations when the technology required for 
operation was not present on the opposite aircraft. For example, a fully equipped ownship 
does not receive an improved level of safety from its systems when the intruder is non-
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cooperative. Failure rates are assigned to each root level cause, which in our case come 
from the technical standards on each component. When calculating failure probability in 
this manner, it is important to note which systems within the tree a failure will propagate 
to, and which are still fully functioning. In this style of implementation, the cumulative 
failure is an indicator of the safety and reliability of system as a whole, as well as the 
residual level of safety when a failure does occur. We provide this data alongside the risk 
assessment in the hazard assessment to fully understand how the system reacts to a 
failure. 
5.1.3 Hazard Analysis  
Hazard Analysis (HA) is a method for interpreting the outcome of a specific failure given 
a set of operational and environmental assumptions. Our task was to evaluate the system 
failures throughout the NAS, therefore a HA was an excellent analytical fit for exploring 
the failure modes indicated in the fault tree. The HA allowed the team to judge the 
failures based airspace class and equipage combination, providing a consistent procedure 
and enabling comparison between different states. This tailored approach allows the 
presence of air traffic control, when applicable, to influence the overall level of safety of 
the system. 
5.1.4 Design of Experiments 
A systematic approach using a statistical Design of Experiments (DOE) technique was 
implemented to evaluate the Fault Tree and Hazard Analysis. This data analysis provides 
critical information on operational and technical performance requirements for the DAA 
technologies. In this fashion the various inputs into the system can all be evaluated to 
assess their contribution to the overall results. The process results in an unbiased 
numerical comparison of each of the parameters studied as well as the interaction 
between the parameters. The technique is especially valuable when dealing with complex 
systems where multiple parameters have influence on the results. The results are also 
unbiased due to any predisposed opinions or expectations. It is also valuable in 
identifying interactions between the input parameters that may otherwise have been 
undetected. Several classic texts on the use of DOE in other subject areas and its 
development are available (Lawson and Erjavec 2001, Box and Draper 1987, Box et al. 




The specific DOE used in this study is a two-level factorial design where each of the 
identified parameters is evaluated at the high and low setting (systems on or off) in the 
design space of interest. In addition, the resulting analyses serve as a predicting tool to 
evaluate cases between the limits on the settings of each parameter. For example, the 
DOE provides a prediction of the outcome if one of the parameters is working at less than 
its full capacity, but still providing partial information. The DOE tool not only predicts 
the relative importance of each parameter, but can also identify when there is not a strong 
correlation between the input parameters and the resulting output. This is valuable in 
systems where there is not direct impact from an input, but rather a random or 
undetermined outcome. Conversely, identifying strong influence provides great impact on 
determining the inputs that have the greatest influence. This can result in the more 
efficient and effective decision making, as efforts in the places that have the most impact 
can be targeted. The focus can be on making the most change in these areas or 
establishing the appropriate requirements. In addition, the factors with less impact can be 
given more freedom and/or less restrictions. Both of these situations result in placing 
resources where they best fit while not over restricting others with costly requirements. 
 
Our DOE included parameters representing Ownship TCAS, Intruder TCAS, and Intruder 
ADS-B. It is assumed that each of these systems would be either operational or not. Our 
results indicated that the Intruder ADS-B has five times more influence on the level of 
safety than any other parameter on interaction. The Ownship TCAS, Intruder TCAS, 
Ownship TCAS and Intruder ADS-B Interaction, and Intruder TCAS and Intruder ADS-B 
Interaction also have impact on the output, while the rest of the interactions have an 
insignificant influence on the results. These systems can be broken down into the 
individual components and subsystems to gain a more thorough understanding of the 
impact of each. 
 
The DOE can also be used to evaluate simulation data to correlate the data found with the 
fault tree findings. One approach was to use pilots to fly simulated encounters with 
various systems turned off and on and record their performance. The cases with higher 
29 
 
risks identified should result in flight simulations with higher likelihood of unsafe flight 
operations. The closest point of approach was calculated and it was found to be most 
influenced most by Mode S availability and the individual pilot tendencies. Simulations 
create a larger set of encounters to evaluate than would ever be possible through actual 
flight testing. 
 
Other areas of system evaluation that we conducted were in the data mining of radar and 
ADS-B archives available to us. Both of these systems are identified as crucial 
components to future safety in the NAS. In both systems, the loss of data and the transfer 
of incorrect or misleading data was observed and evaluated. While only a relatively short 
snapshot of time was studied, several interesting phenomena were observed. Both 
systems have loss of data occurring in a relatively large percent of aircraft interrogated. 
Some of the data losses are single events while others have significant time periods 
without data being captured. The other key observation is that there are a small 
percentage, but still meaningful number, of cases where incorrect or corrupt data are 
observed. This is in the form of altitude readings that alternate by hundreds of feet 
periodically at each scan, or barometric and geometric altitude transmissions with large 
discrepancies. In addition, instances of multiple aircraft with the same identifier have 
been observed as well as isolated cases of large location jumps. A summary of the 
preliminary findings with the relative percentage of aircraft involved is presented below. 
This data is instrumental in updating the reliability and performance specifications for the 
systems involved. 
 
Lastly, initial preliminary studies were conducted on alternate separation techniques that 
have been identified as prospective contributors to safe NAS integration. Optical and 
thermal detection systems have been identified by many as potential candidates. After the 
initial studies are complete, these systems can be evaluated using the same DOE 
techniques developed to assess the TCAS and ADS-B systems. In this manner, the true 
influence and likelihood of failure can be introduced in a variety of ways to ascertain the 




5.1.5 Monte Carlo Simulations 
A Monte Carlo simulation methodology was developed for assessing the correlated 
uncertainties occurring in the failure tree. In this case utilization of the Monte Carlo 
method referrers specifically to randomly sampling either accuracy or failure statistics 
from known or modeled component and system failure distributions.  
 
The sample probability distribution functions (PDFs) for individual component failures 
were modeled based on widely published failure modes for common components. For the 
majority of the cases considered in this work, accuracy statistics tended to follow a 
Weibull distribution with scaling proportional to the design assurance level of the 
individual component. A representative distribution for GPS latitude and longitude errors 
is shown below in Figure 5.1.  
 
Failure modes were treated as bimodal failure statistics proportional to the component 
design assurance level. For the baseline testing presented in subsequent sections, the 
residual failure probabilities were based entirely on the bimodal distributions used in the 
individual component characterizations outlined in Section 3. 
 
Additional computational tools were developed to assess correlated errors based on 
individual component accuracy requirements, but were not used in the residual failure 
rate characterizations. These tools are viewed as key follow-on capabilities which can be 




Figure 5.1. 2D GPS error distribution 
 
5.2 EVALUATION PROCESS 
5.2.1 FAA SRM Procedure 
A safety evaluation is essential to determine the feasibility, practicality, and potential 
impact on the NAS of each component of unmanned aircraft detect and avoid systems.  
To ensure a comprehensive and robust evaluation is performed, the evaluation process 
was aligned with the FAA’s Safety Risk Management (SRM) process. The SRM process 
is a part of the overall Safety Management System (SMS) established by the FAA. It is a 
systematic and comprehensive analytical approach for managing safety risk at all levels. 
The SRM process is a means to: 
 
1. Document proposed NAS changes regardless of their anticipated safety impact 
2. Identify hazards associated with a proposed change 
3. Assess and analyze the safety risk of identified hazards 
4. Mitigate unacceptable safety risk and reduce the identified risks to the lowest possible 
level 
5. Accept residual risk prior to change implementation 
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6. Implement the change and track hazards to resolution 
7. Assess and monitor the effectiveness of the risk mitigation strategies throughout the 
lifecycle of the change 
8. Reassess change based on the effectiveness of the mitigations 
 
The SRM begins through hazard identification, with associated risks being analyzed, 
assessed, and prioritized. This process and the results are documented in order to support 
decision making. The continuous loop process provides validation of decisions and 
evaluation of desired results and the need for further action, if necessary. The results of 
the SRM process provide a viable means upon which decisions for acceptance of each 
component can be based.   
The System Safety process 
steps are depicted graphically 
in the Figure 5.2. It is a formal 
and flexible process that 
generally follows the steps of 
the SRM. Risk Management 
has been defined as the 
process by which Risk 
Assessment results are 
integrated with political, 
social, economic, and 
engineering considerations for 
decisions and approaches for 
risk reduction. 
 




5.2.2 RTCA DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards  
At the time of the project, the team used the August 19, 2016 revision of the DAA MOPs 
document produced by RTCA-SC 228. The MOPs covers the nominal DAA system 
architecture, alert computations, display configuration, equipment classes, and several 
other technical details regarding the system. The scope of the document is the DAA 
systems used in UAS transitioning to and from Class A or special use airspace (above 
500’AGL), and traversing Class D, E, and G airspace in the NAS. It does not apply to 
small UAS (sUAS) operating in low level environments (below 500’) or other segmented 
areas. Likewise, it does not apply to operations in the Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic 
pattern of an airport.  
 
 The MOPs assumes that cooperative intruders carry equipment that allows the ownship 
to receive state information about the intruder, while non-cooperative intruder are “silent” 
and all state data must be determined by sensors onboard the ownship. Two classes of 
DAA are defined. Class 1 is the basic DAA that is a standalone system that include all of 
the required collision avoidance capabilities. Class 2 relies on TCAS II system and 
incorporates TCAS tracks and alerts. Class 2 systems can have automatic collision 
avoidance maneuver execution. The TCAS II Resolution Advisory (RA) will be used to 
execute the RA, which is called “Auto-RA”. If the UAS is unable to follow a TCAS II 
RA (e.g. due to reduced climb ability at high altitudes or failures), the operational mode 
of DAA may need to be changed to “RA Off” since TCAS II behavior onboard an 
intruder may change based on whether the UAS is advertised to be TCAS II equipped or 
not.  
 
TCAS II RA Mode of Operation (from PIC) – Equipment Class 2 systems are listed as 
• RA Off 
• RA Manual 
• RA Auto (automatically maneuver the UA to avoid danger) 
 
The Equipment Class 1 and Class 2 air-to-air radar system is mainly used to detect 
aircraft that have no surveillance equipage onboard. It uses reflections from the intruder 
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to determine if it is a traffic issue. The onboard radar will be the sole surveillance sensor 
for all aircraft that do not carry transponders or ADS B equipment. The DAA system also 
makes use of radar data to validate ADS-B data. Equipment Class 1 active airborne 
surveillance uses 1030/1090 MHz frequencies to detect aircraft with surveillance 
equipage. Active surveillance equipment relies on an intruder aircraft having an installed 
and operating Mode S transponder designed to RTCA 2195 DO-181E, respectively.  
 
Active surveillance uses a 1030 MHz transmitter to interrogate transponders within a 
defined range of the ownship, and a 1090 MHz receiver to process replies. This enables 
measurement of the relative aircraft position and reception of the intruder’s barometric 
pressure altitude via the reply.  
 
In general, DAA system produces three alerts when the well clear definition is violated 
by an intruder aircraft. Preventative alert is intended to capture aircraft separated by 500ft 
when both aircraft are level, but is specified such that it could capture additional 
geometries as well. The DAA corrective alert is intended to get the Pilot In Command’s 
(PIC) attention, get the PIC to determine a needed maneuver, and start PIC coordination 
with ATC. It is the earliest point at which the PIC is expected to begin maneuvering, per 
their judgment, to remain well clear. The corrective alert necessitates immediate 
awareness of the PIC and subsequent PIC response. The DAA warning alert is intended 
to inform the PIC that immediate action is required to remain well clear. The warning 
alert necessitates immediate awareness of the PIC and a prompt ownship maneuver. 
5.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research team divided the technical process into three phases to build the analysis tool, 
populate the data, and assess the results for determining criticality. These three phases provided 
an iterative development process allowing the team to refine results as complexity and depth 
were added to the analysis tool based on further research, recommendations from FAA and 
industry partners, and results of early analysis. Each phase is described below (Figure 5.3) for a 
summary of the research task plan.    
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Initial Tool Design and Testing (Nov 2016 – June 2016) 
This research phase was the longest phase of the project. The research team members required 
extended time to prepare the Literature Review that included previous related research, published 
standards, and aviation circulars, while also characterizing the baseline surveillance technologies 
ADS-B, TCAS, and Mode-S. The simulation environment for testing and visualizing the 
scenarios and criticality analysis was built. The initial Design of Experiments and Fault tree 
analysis structures were designed, built, reviewed, and modified many times as the depth the of 
analysis and dependencies within the models were discovered.  Although the data analysis 
minimal in the first phase, the analysis structures were robust and the overall team understanding 
of the complexities was significantly stronger than when the project started.   
 
Stakeholder Workshop #1 (June 2016) 
The team met with the FAA Stakeholders and industry partners CGH Technologies, Adaptive 
Aerospace Group, and Rockwell Collins at Embry Riddle in June 2016 to review the progress of 
the tool design and analysis. The surveillance system characterizations, sensitivity analysis, and 
scenario models were reviewed. A demonstration of the simulation environment indicated how 
Figure 5.3. Research approach 
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the analysis results would be visualized (Figure 5.45.4). The initial fault tree designs were 
reviewed expecting significant expansion and stakeholder recommendations for refinement.   
 
 
Figure 5.4. Simulation environment displays during testing 
 
The first workshop was successful as it was the first time the entire team was together in one 
location. Feedback from the workshop was constructive and directional, with noted concerns 
about meeting research objectives. More attention was needed on failures and hazards analysis 
activities, while also needing to show the connection with the sensitivity analysis. Additional 
data sources were identified and industry participation was critical for providing historical 
context. An Interim Report detailing the first phase of technical research was delivered to the 
FAA.    
 
Revised Tool Design and Testing (July 2016 – September 2016) 
Based on the feedback from the first workshop and further research into previous related 
research, the research team completed the robust failure trees, hazard analysis, and sensitivity 
analysis tools for determining surveillance criticality in the summer of 2016. Sample data sets 
from industry partners and reference data sets for expected component failures were used to test 
the analysis and generate comparable results. Going into the second workshop, the research team 
had the complete structure built for analyzing criticality in all scenarios including different 
equipage configurations and different classes of airspace for operations. Not all permutations and 
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combinations were tested, but the structure was built and test cases were generating results for 
analysis.    
 
Stakeholder Workshop #2 (September 2016) 
The second Stakeholder Workshop was hosted at North Carolina State University in September 
2016. This workshop was attended by FAA and industry partners CGH Technologies, Adaptive 
Aerospace Group, and Precision Hawk. The research team presented the analysis updates from 
the first workshop, highlighting the advances in the failure trees and functional hazards analysis 
for evaluating criticality. The simulation engine was [remotely] used to demonstrate updates and 
examples of scenarios run through the data analysis tools. At the conclusion of the workshop, the 
research team was on track to deliver the research objectives of the project using the analysis 
tools and data sources identified through the first two technical phases of research.    
 
Final Revisions and Analysis (October 2016 – November 2016) 
The research team used the scenarios presented at the second workshop to complete the 
surveillance criticality analysis for large UAS DAA technologies including ADS-B, TCAS, and 
Mode-S transponders. The results of this analysis are presented after the detailed descriptions of 
the analysis tools below. 
 
5.4 BOWTIE AND COLLISSION PROCESS DESIGN 
5.4.1 Bowtie Flow  
The bowtie method visually correlates failure modes to actual outcomes of each scenario. 
A single hazard is selected, with the potential causes expanded on one side, and the 
environment specific outcomes on the other. With the complexity and number of 
scenarios being examined, a traditional bowtie structure was not practical to use, 
however, the underlying ideas are preserved. On one side there are the failure trees, 
separated by equipage to only include the appropriate linkages; and, on the other, the 




5.4.2 Collision Process 
Our analysis evaluates how often these technologies fail, and attempts to grade those 
failures in an objective manner, however, the failure rates only show us part of the story. 
Our analytical team’s discussions revealed that while such failures may produce 
dangerous outcomes, the underlying probability of an encounter scenario was missing. To 
understand the total impact these failures have, traffic density and encounter likelihood 
need to be included in the analysis. In contrast, however, it was important to note that a 
system is not safe simply because it is not needed frequently. It was unacceptable to the 
team to argue that “big sky” was an effective mitigation to potential collisions, but that if 
an encounter occurred during a failure, collisions were expected. The final output 
includes both considerations, with and without an encounter probability, but the hazard 
severity is assessed without it. This is an effort to present both sides of the argument, the 
system in an encounter as well as the system in a true fielded environment. 
Once an encounter has occurred, it must be evaluated in terms of safety. In our case, this 
meant determining the expected minimum separation that would exist. This separation 
expectation was applied based on the status of the DAA system overall, after the failure, 
in order to remain subjective and consistent across all airspaces. Our event criticality 
explanations are detailed later in Figure 5.12.  
5.5 HAZARD ASSESSMENT DESIGN 
5.5.1 Fault Tree 
The failure trees included below (Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10) depict the 
technology requirements and dependencies of the highest equipage cases of both ownship 
and intruder aircraft. All the DAA systems are able to be toggled on and off when 
evaluating less equipped scenarios. Flat bottomed gates indicate AND functions, whereas 
arched bottoms gates are OR functions. Circles indicate root level events or failures. A 
triangle gate indicates that there is collapsed information beneath that particular level. 
The failure rates are included below each event, but are fully referenced later in the 
hazard tables.  
The top level in the failure tree shows the relationship between ownship and intruder 
equipment. This is also where the probability of having an encounter scenario was 
implemented. There are many interpretations of what a reasonable expectation of having 
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an encounter scenario may be, and in most cases this would depend on the airspace of the 
encounter. As previously discussed, consideration of encounter probability was excluded 
from the final safety assessment to focus results on the equipage influence. However, a 
residual likelihood determined with a realistic encounter probability was still included in 
the hazard tables using a probability of one in ten thousand. We chose this probability 
threshold as it was the most conservative (highest likelihood) order of magnitude that we 
saw in other related research. 
The next two segments depict the equipage of each aircraft. They are very similar, as 
class 2 DAA requires both aircraft have TCAS and ADS-B onboard. The ownship UAS 
has the air-to-air radar present, while the intruder aircraft’s equivalent is the see-and-
avoid capability of the pilot. The TCAS and ADS-B trees are used for both aircraft. The 
barometric altimeter was reduced from each tree and included on its own for clarity.   
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. 10. Barometer altimeter failure tree 
 
5.5.2 Hazard Assessment 
Our task was primarily focused on examining the DAA systems in an objective, 
standards-based manner. Due to a myriad of options in the marketplace, our DAA 
system failure rates were drawn from the technical order minimums for each piece 
of equipment, rather than from data provided by fielded equipment. We do not 
suggest that all equipment in the fleet achieves these minimums, nor would we 
imply that none go above and beyond them. However, as an unbiased 
measurement, the standards provide an assessment value for evaluation. Most of 
























Classification; these design requirements and the risk matrix chart (Figure 5.11) 
provide a maximum likelihood of failure. The likelihood for the appropriate 
severity level with the maximum value associated with the first medium risk event 
was used. Except in the case of minor failures, a limitation of probable was 
implemented because frequent has an uncapped likelihood. This chart is used 
again in the final stage of analysis to combine likelihood and failure criticality 
into a risk assessment. 
The next step in the hazard analysis was to evaluate what impact each failure had 
on the DAA system as a whole. We then determined which pieces were still 
operating and to what extent they may still provide improved situational 
awareness for the pilot. To answer these questions as objectively as possible, we 
crafted our own criticality assessment chart. Figure 5.12 shows the breakdown of 
each level of criticality as defined by the working state of the DAA system, and 
our analysis of what level of separation such a system would be capable of 
providing. It is important to note that for the purposes of this chart, ATC services 
were included as a DAA benefit. This was done so that ATC mitigation was 
included in the analysis directly and not used as a post process severity limiter. 
With a failure likelihood and event criticality, the analysis returns to the risk 
matrix to determine the risk level for each mode of failure. This is the basis of our 














Remaining DAA Technologies Expected 
Result of an  
Encounter  
Hazard Criticality 
Only intruder capable of see-
and-avoid (eyes) 
MAC Catastrophic 
Both aircraft capable of see-and-
avoid (eyes and radar) or 
misleading information provided 
to pilot 
NMAC Hazardous 
Some level of DAA operations 
(partial function of ADS-B OR 











Full DAA operations of all 












6 Analysis  
6.1 HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
This section presents the summary of all hazard analyses considered based on the equipage and 
airspace categories outlined in sections 3-5. This analysis focuses on high-risk scenarios resulting 
from DAA system and/or component failures on the ownship aircraft. Trends in the high-risk 
scenarios were primarily influenced by airspace and the allowable equipages therein. High-risk 
scenarios present in controlled airspace (A, B, and C) were similarly present in less controlled 
airspace. The overlap in high-risk scenarios allows the hazard analysis to be segmented by 
airspace, with a discussion of the influence of equipage and unique scenarios therein.  
The hazard analyses presented below provide the quantitative data necessary to address the 
research questions posed in the initial research proposal. A discussion of the influence of these 




Controlled Airspace (Class A, B, and C) 
Equipage – Controlled airspace (Class A, B, and C) has two separate equipage cases. The first is 
Class 2, the fully equipped case with TCAS, ADS-B, and radar. The second equipage case is 
Class 1, ADS-B, Mode S transponder, and Radar. The above equipage cases represent the 
minimum equipage cases for UAS operations on an IFR flight plan in controlled airspace as of 
2020. For the encounter cases considered in this analysis, the intruder aircraft will not be 
equipped with radar, but may take on either Class 2 (with TCAS) or Class 1 (without TCAS) 
surveillance capabilities.  
Criticality of each High risk case – Three failures in controlled airspace result in a high risk 
severity classification.  
1. The total loss of function of the transponder results in a worst case scenario of the loss of 
separation of the ownship and intruder aircraft, which we define as a major failure event. 
This is a probable failure mode, and when combined with its criticality results in a high 
risk case on the risk matrix.  
2. A hazardously misleading malfunction of the transponder also results in a possible loss of 
separation and is therefore classified as a major criticality. Corrupt transmissions are 
slightly less likely than failures and assigned the remote designation, however, the risk 
matrix still outputs this failure as a high risk case. Both of these failures occur in all three 
equipage combinations present in controlled A, B, and C airspace.  
3. The final high risk failure occurs only when a Class 1 ownship encounters a Class 1 
intruder and is the result of a GPS failure. This is another major failure classification with 
a remote likelihood.  
All other system failures in controlled airspace are categorized as low or medium risk. 
Discussion of High Risk – This analysis demonstrates that the transponder system is the 
component with the highest associated risk in these encounters. The transponder system acts as a 
single point failure as it affects multiple other DAA systems. These transponder failures would 
result in the DAA system becoming reliant solely on the ownship radar. The loss of all three 
major DAA systems results in a greater possibility of loss of separation and as such unsafe flying 
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conditions. In the event of a transponder failure, ATC would continue to provide separation 
services in these airspaces, limiting the criticality of the failure to major.  
The transmission of hazardously misleading information presents a scenario where the DAA 
system may display multiple aircraft tracks, or display the incorrect altitude and location track. 
With incorrect altitude and location information being transmitted, ATC would rely on primary 
radar to provide separation information of aircraft in controlled airspace. This would cause an 
increased workload on the ATC to provide separation services as the only reliable information 
would be location and not altitude. Increased ATC workload as well as the possibility of detect 
and avoid being inoperable results in reliance on ATC and radar, resulting in a potential loss of 
separation.   
The GPS failure will result in a loss of ADS-B functionality. This loss, without the presence of a 
TCAS system as in Class 1 equipage results in a DAA system limited to just a radar and ATC 
services. In a manner similar to the transponder events, this is a major failure. However, both 
aircraft maintain Mode-S operability and therefore ATC separation services are unaffected by 




Class D airspace 
Equipage – Class D airspace allows for consideration of additional intruder equipage cases. 
These include operation with only a Mode-S transponder, and an entirely unequipped case 
(following the post-2020 rule set forth in 14 CFR § 91.225 and 91.227). It should be noted that 
the unequipped case is still assumed to have two-way radio contact with ATC as per the 
requirements set forth in 14 CFR § 91.129. This allows the local tower ATC to enforce separation 
standards for arriving and departing traffic.  
Criticality of each high-risk case – The high-risk failures for equipages 2v2, 1v2, and 1v1 in 
class D airspace are equivalent to those found in class A, B, and C airspaces and will not be 
repeated here. Additionally, the high-risk cases for equipages 2v1A and 1v1A are similar to those 
found in the higher equipage cases. Class D airspace allows for the presence of unequipped 
aircraft (equipage case 0) which implies that the primary means of deconfliction between 
ownship and intruder aircraft is the ownship radar system and the DAA capabilities of the 
intruder. Ownship radar failure is assumed binary in nature and therefore results in only a total 
loss of function (no misleading information cases are considered for this system). Failure of the 
ownship radar for equipage cases 2v0 and 1v0 results in a hazardous criticality and possible 
NMAC, given the lack of remaining onboard DAA systems. The lack of any remaining DAA 
systems, combined with the high probability of failure outlined in the SC-228 radar MOPS, 
results in a high-risk severity. All other failures for higher equipage cases result in a low or 
medium-risk severity as outlined in the class A, B, and C airspace discussions.  
Discussion of high-risk cases – An ownship radar failure in class D airspace against an 
unequipped intruder results in a unique high-risk incident. In a manner similar to the transponder 
failure outlined in the discussion of class A, B, and C airspaces, the radar functions as a single-
point failure. However, operations inside class D airspace occur under local ATC control, which 
may provide deconfliction in a manner not available in uncontrolled airspace. This reduces the 
possible effects from a MAC to a possible NMAC, given the only remaining DAA systems 




Class E airspace above 10,000 feet 
Equipage – Class E above 10,000 feet follows the same equipage cases as listed above in 
controlled airspace. These equipage cases are discussed in detail in the Airspace Overview 
section earlier in the report. The equipage cases listed above represent the minimum equipage 
cases for UAS operations as of 2020. For the encounter cases considered in this analysis, the 
intruder aircraft will not be equipped with radar. 
Criticality of each High Risk Case – The high risk failures for equipages 2v2, 1v2, and 1v1 in 
class E airspace above 10,000 feet are equivalent to those found in class A, B, C, and D 
airspaces. The total loss of function of the transponder results in a worst case scenario of the loss 
of separation of the ownship and intruder aircraft. A loss of separation results in a criticality that 
is classified as major. A hazardously misleading malfunction of the transponder also results in a 
possible loss of separation and is therefore classified as a major criticality. The combination of a 
major criticality as a result of the two transponder failure modes and a probable/remote 
probability of failure, respectively, results in a high risk scenario according to the FAA SMS risk 
matrix. The two failures listed above are present in all equipage cases for Class E airspace above 
10,000 feet. A third and final high risk failure is identified in the equipage case of Class 1 
ownship and Class 1 intruder. GPS horizontal failure results in a possible loss of separation and 
is therefore classified as a major criticality. This failure is classified as a remote probability, thus 
the combination of a major criticality and remote probability results in a high risk case. 
Discussion of High Risk - This analysis demonstrates that the transponder system and horizontal 
GPS are the components with the highest associated risk. The transponder system acts as a single 
point failure because it affects multiple other systems that rely on the transmission and 
coordination of position data. The failure analysis assumes that a single transponder is linked to 
both the TCAS and ADS-B systems. Therefore, a transponder failure would result in a DAA 
system being entirely reliant on the ownship’s radar. The loss of three major DAA systems 
results in a greater possibility of loss of separation and as such unsafe flying conditions. In the 
event of a transponder failure, ATC would continue to provide separation services, reducing the 
criticality of the failure. ATC services combined with DAA capabilities of the intruder and 
ownship radar is an adequate mitigation to lower the failure criticality to major. However, the 
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probable likelihood of a total loss of function in the transponder system is enough to warrant a 
high risk case scenario. 
The transmission of hazardously misleading information presents a scenario where the DAA 
system would display multiple aircraft tracks, or display the incorrect altitude and location track. 
With incorrect altitude and location information being transmitted, ATC would rely on primary 
radar to provide lateral separation information of aircraft in class E airspace. This would cause an 
increased workload on the ATC to provide separation services as the only reliable information 
would be location and not altitude. Increased ATC workload and the possibility of DAA being 
inoperable results in reliance on ATC and radar, and a potential loss of separation. The loss of 
separation in association with a remote likelihood of a transponder transmitting hazardously 
misleading information results in a high risk situation. 
The failure of horizontal GPS causes the failure of the ADS-B system because ADS-B is no 
longer able to determine position. Unlike vertical GPS, horizontal GPS is the primary means of 
determining aircraft location. In the equipage case without TCAS, GPS location is no longer 
being transmitted. The loss of horizontal GPS transmission results in an inability for either the 
ownship or intruder aircraft to determine location relative to each other. This failure causes ATC 
to rely on primary radar to provide separation services to aircraft flying in Class E airspace above 
10,000 feet. ATC providing the only reliable separation services would result in an increased 
work load for ATC. This increased workload combined with inoperable DAA systems results in a 
reliance on ATC and radar, and a potential loss of separation. Horizontal GPS has a remote 
likelihood of failure which causes a loss of separation, leading to a combination that results in a 




Class E airspace below 10,000 feet 
Equipage – Class E below 10,000 feet follows the same equipage cases as Class D airspace 
described above. These equipage cases are discussed in detail in the Airspace Overview section 
earlier in the report. Of the above equipage cases, UAS’s as of 2020 will be equipped with a 
minimum of ADS-B, Mode S, and Radar. The intruder can be equipped any of the four possible 
equipage cases. For the encounter cases considered in this analysis, the intruder aircraft will not 
be equipped with radar. 
Criticality of each High Risk Case – The high risk failures for equipages 2v2, 1v2, 1v1, 2v1a, 
and 1v1a are similar to those found in class D airspace. The total loss of function of the 
transponder results in a worst case scenario of a NMAC of the ownship and intruder aircraft. A 
NMAC results in a criticality that is classified as hazardous. A hazardously misleading 
malfunction of the transponder also results in a possible NMAC and is therefore classified as a 
hazardous criticality. The combination of a hazardous criticality as a result of the two 
transponder failure modes and a probable/remote probability of failure, respectively, results in a 
high risk scenario according to the FAA SMS risk matrix. The two failures listed above are 
present in all equipage cases for Class E airspace below 10,000 feet except for the unequipped 
case. A third high risk failure is identified in the equipage case of Class 1 ownship and Class 1 
intruder as well as Class 1 ownship and Class 1a intruder. Horizontal GPS failure results in a 
possible NMAC and therefor classified as a hazardous criticality. This failure is classified as a 
remote probability, therefore the combination of a major criticality and remote probability results 
in a high risk case. The final failure only occurs in the unequipped intruder cases and is the 
failure of the Radar system which could result in a Mid Air Collision of the ownship and intruder 
aircraft. As such this is a catastrophic criticality. This criticality combined with a probable 
likelihood of failure results in a high risk failure.  
Discussion of High Risk - This analysis demonstrates that the transponder system, horizontal 
GPS, and radar are the components with the highest associated risk. The transponder system acts 
as a single point failure because it affects multiple other systems that rely on the transmission 
and coordination of position data. The failure analysis assumes that a single transponder is linked 
to both the TCAS and ADS-B systems. Therefore, a transponder failure would result in a DAA 
entirely reliant on the ownship’s radar. The loss of three major DAA systems results in a greater 
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possibility of NMAC and as such unsafe flying conditions. In the event of a transponder failure, 
ATC would not provide separation services in Class E airspace below 10,000 feet. Without ATC 
services and the sole reliance on see and avoid of the intruder and ownship radar there is no 
mitigation to lower the failure criticality resulting in a hazardous criticality. Additionally, the 
probable likelihood of a total loss of function in the transponder system is enough to warrant a 
high risk case scenario. 
The transmission of hazardously misleading information presents a scenario where the DAA 
system would display multiple aircraft tracks, or display the incorrect altitude and location track. 
With incorrect altitude and location information being transmitted, and without ATC providing 
lateral separation information of aircraft in class E airspace below 10,000 feet, the only 
operational DAA systems are those on the intruder and the ownship’s radar. This would result in 
the possibility of a near mid-air collision because of reliance on see and avoid or radar as well as 
the loss of other DAA systems. A NMAC in association with a remote likelihood of a 
transponder transmitting hazardously misleading information results in a high risk situation. 
The failure of horizontal GPS causes the failure of the ADS-B system because ADS-B is no 
longer able to determine position. Unlike vertical GPS, horizontal GPS is the primary means of 
determining aircraft location. In any of the equipage cases without TCAS, GPS location is no 
longer being transmitted. The loss of horizontal GPS transmission results in an inability for 
either the ownship or intruder to determine location relative to each other. ATC does not provide 
separation services to aircraft flying in Class E airspace below 10,000 feet. The lack of ATC 
services as well as a reliance on see and avoid or radar due to the loss of other DAA systems 
results in a potential NMAC between the ownship and intruder aircraft. Horizontal GPS has a 
remote likelihood of failure which hazardous failure condition, this combination results in a high 
risk scenario. 
In Class E below 10,000 feet the Class 0 intruder cases have one failure. The ownship radar 
failure when the intruder is unequipped results in relying only on the intruder’s DAA 
capabilities. As such, any situation where the intruder is unable to see the ownship aircraft could 
result in a mid-air collision. This is a catastrophic failure. The combination of a catastrophic 




Class G airspace 
Equipage – Class G airspace incorporates all four equipage classes and seven combinations just 
like Class D and E below 10k. Class G has no ATC involvement or contact requirements, and 
ATC radars do not have consistent coverage in the low altitudes of class G. This means that even 
IFR traffic present in class G will not be receiving separation services or ATC guidance. In 
general IFR traffic is expected to use class G airspace in transition to controlled airspace, gaining 
separation services upon entering class E or greater airspace. 
Criticality of each high-risk case – Class G airspace is the lowest controlled and equipped 
airspace, and expectedly presents the most high risk failures. As before, both failure of the 
transponder and misleading information from it are high risk events in all equipage cases except 
when the intruder is unequipped. Additionally, in Class 1 ownship and Class 1 or 1a intruder 
scenarios, failure of horizontal GPS results in a high risk condition. In both situations where the 
intruder is Class 1a, the altimeter failure becomes a major failure and therefore a high risk event. 
This is a new high risk event unique to class G airspace, as in all other airspaces, ATC presence 
moderates such a failure. Finally, both unequipped intruder encounters’ radar failure modes 
remain high risk. Without ATC presence, many of these failures are a higher criticality than in the 
previous airspaces, meaning that class G airspace has many more hazardous failures. This hazard 
level does not make high risk events more severe, but do increase the number of medium risk 
events. Though still not critical in our analysis, this is another indication of the decreased safety 
of flying in class G airspace. 
Discussion of high-risk cases – An altimeter failure in the presence of a Class 1a intruder results 
in no active DAA systems being operable. Because of the lack of control in class G airspace, this 
presents a significant hazard not found in other airspaces. With no other system ensuring 
separation, it is left to the air to air radar and the intruder pilot to avoid one another. This major 





6.2 SEVERITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
 
Failure Tree Design of Experiments 
To provide a sensitivity study and to understand the interaction between different DAA 
technologies on the failure tree, a DOE was chosen. This data is used to determine the 
operational and performance requirements for the DAA technologies. Using a DOE in 
conjunction with the failure tree allows the permutations of failure combinations to be 
understood. The failure tree provides a good picture of the total likelihood of failure of the DAA 
system, but the DOE illustrates which factors or systems have the largest impact on total failure. 
In other words, the DOE provides the sensitivity of various systems, or combinations or systems 
failing. Ownship TCAS, intruder TCAS, and intruder ADS-B were chosen to provide a 
generalized overview of how this type of analysis works. It was assumed that Mode S would 
always be turned on both the ownship and intruder aircraft, so by investigating two of the major 
DAA systems used today, a thorough understanding of the sensitives of these systems could be 
understood.   
A DOE two-level factorial design with three different factors resulted in eight different 
runs/scenarios. All possible scenarios are provided in Table 6.1 along with the associated factor 
labels (A, B, and C) which we used in subsequent analysis described later in this section. The 
“on” indicates the system is working properly. The “off” represents either a total failure of the 
system(s) or the system(s) was/were not installed on the aircraft. Later in this section, high level 
refers to the “on” label, and low level refers to the “off” label. The total likelihood column is the 
information obtained from the failure tree result and indicates the likelihood of failure for the 




Table 6.1. Summary of the eight scenarios analyzed with the DOE. The left three columns 
indicate whether those systems were on or off (either from total failure or not having the 
systems on the aircraft), and the far right column lists the total likelihood of failure from 







Total Likelihood of Failure 
off off on 1.17E-14 
on off on 1.75E-14 
off on on 1.75E-14 
on on on 2.61E-14 
off off off 5.74E-12 
off on off 8.60E-12 
on off off 8.60E-12 
on on off 1.29E-11 
 
One noticeable result from the failure interactions is when either ownship TCAS or the intruder 
TCAS were turned off, and ADS-B was on (Note: TCAS refers to the TCAS algorithm, not the 
equipment used for the TCAS system), the total likelihood was the same. This can be seen in 
rows 2 and 3 of Table 6.1. Both the ownship and intruder Mode-S transponders were still on, so 
this is a result one would expect. As long as one of the TCAS algorithms is still active, the total 
likelihood of failure of the entire DAA system remains the same, regardless of whether the 
ownship or intruder has the working algorithm. Another behavior to point out is that having all 
three parameters turned off does not result in the highest total likelihood of failure, and having all 
three parameters turned on does not result in the lowest total likelihood of failure. This is because 
as systems are added to the overall DAA system, new failure methods are introduced and 
potentially increase the likelihood of failure of the overall DAA system. Another major 
observation that can be drawn from this analysis is that ADS-B appears to play the largest effect 
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on the total likelihood of failure. When ADS-B is turned off, the total likelihood of failure is 10-12 
or less, when ADS-B is on the total likelihood is 10-14. 
A useful approach to analyze results from a factorial design is to interpret factorial plots of 
effects. There are two types of effects, main effects and interaction effects. Main effects represent 
the individual factor effects (parameters that are turned on and off), where interaction effects 
illustrate the connected effects/interactions of two or more factors. Normal probability plots and 
Pareto charts are used to demonstrate the overall effects of different combinations. The normal 
probability plot correlates the magnitude and statistical significance of main and interaction 
effects, while the Pareto chart compares the importance of standardized effects.   
In the initial analysis, the interaction effects of ownship TCAS and Intruder TCAS (factor AB in 
our analysis) and ownship TCAS, Intruder TCAS, and Intruder ADS-B (factor ABC) had very 
small values which could be neglected. After discarding these two terms, the final results were 
established. The following figures and equation only contain the significant effects and 
interactions. Total failure likelihood can be expressed by Equation 1. While the primary DOE 
results considered total failures of the systems, the equation can help interpolate between those 
results, providing insight into partial failures of various systems to consider the sensitivity those 
partial failures have as well. The coefficients were found from analysis of variance, with a p 
value of less than 0.05 for the significant factors found. Each variable in the equation 
corresponds to the equipment main effect or interaction between multiple pieces of equipment. A 
value between -1 and 1 could be entered to simulate a partial failure of each variable. A value of 
1 indicates a fully operational system, while a value of -1 indicates a full system failure. 
Therefore, to determine the percentage of failure for a partially operating system the value can be 
normalized to fall between -1 to 1. For example, for a failure of 50% the value used for the factor 
in the equation is 0, halfway between the end points. 
Equation 1: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 =  4.50 ∗ 10−12 +  8.36 ∗ 10−13 ∗  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆 +  8.36 ∗ 10−13 ∗
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆 −  4.50 ∗ 10−12  ∗  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐵 − 8.90 ∗ 10−13  ∗  𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆 ∗
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐵 − 8.90 ∗ 10−13  ∗  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆 ∗  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐵    
The normal plot of effects for the analysis is shown in Figure 6.1. The horizontal axis represents 
the significance of the factor. Red blocks represent factors with significance. The blue line is the 
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zero effect line, so any point that falls closer to the blue line has less effect and those farther 
away have more effect. The vertical axis represents the percentile of the cumulative probability 
distribution. A larger percent specifies a greater probability of impacting the outcome of 
experiment. For example, the effect of ownship TCAS is most likely to impact the outcome, but 
does not have the largest effect. The negative effects are displayed on the left side, and positive 
effects on right side of the zero effect line. A negative effect means the likelihood response is 
reduced as the factors goes to a high level. Intruder ADS-B is negative, which means the total 
likelihood is reduced when the intruder aircraft is ADS-B equipped and functional. While a 
positive effect means the response is reduced when factor goes to a low level. So from the figure 
it is revealed that likelihood is reduced when either the ownship or intruder TCAS is 
unequipped/not functional. This can be seen from our data in Table 6.1. The magnitude of the 
either TCAS effect are significantly less than the magnitude of the effect of intruder ADS-B. 
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Figure 6.1. Normal Plot of standardized effects showing factors that had a 
significant effect on likelihood. The horizontal axis represents the significance 




Figure 6.2 illustrates the quantitative effects of the three different factors and their interactions on 
total likelihood. The red reference line is the quantile t-distribution; any values that extend 
beyond this reference line are potentially significant. The bar showing the effect of Intruder 
ADS-B is extended most beyond the reference line which depicts that it has the most significant 
effect, and is approximately five times more than other effects. It is clear from both Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 that an ADS-B equipped/functional intruder remarkably reduces the total likelihood of 
failures, which would likely reduce the number of near mid-air collisions.  
 
Figure 6.2. Pareto chart of standardized effects, a quantitative 
representation of significant factors. The red line denotes 
statistical significance. 
The effect of one factor influenced by the level of other factors can be visualized from the 
interaction plot. In our analysis, the interaction between ownship TCAS and Intruder ADS-B, 
and the interaction between Intruder TCAS and Intruder ADS-B were statistically significant. 
Figure 6.3 is the interaction plot between ownship/Intruder TCAS and Intruder ADS-B indicates 
the change in mean likelihood. The red dashed line is for equipped/functional ADS-B and black 







Figure 6.3. Interaction plots depicting how total likelihood varies simultaneously depending 
on two factors: Ownship TCAS and Intruder ADS-B (a) and Intruder TCAS and Intruder 
ADS-B (b). In both cases, while intruder ADS-B (red dashed line) is on, failure likelihood 
doesn’t change when TCAS turned on, but in the case of Intruder ADS-B off (black solid 
line), likelihood increases when TCAS turned on. 
 
From both figures, it can be summarized that if the intruder is ADS-B equipped (ADS-B 
functional), failure likelihood does not change whether the intruder/ownship has TCAS or not. 
But, if the intruder doesn’t have ADS-B the increase in likelihood is prominent. The likelihood is 
highest with an unequipped/not functional ADS-B and equipped/functional TCAS.  
Live Simulation DOE 
Similarly to the DOE performed on the failure tree, we conducted a DOE using live failure 
simulations. This approach allows interactions and sensitivities of failures of various DAA 
systems to be analyzed, and results can be compared to the findings from the failure DOE as 
well. The live simulations allowed individual components of various DAA components to be 
turned on or off. These were chosen due to the configuration of the simulation engine. The 
components selected are those used by aircraft having both ADS-B and TCAS systems on board: 
Mode S transponder, barometric altimeter, and global positioning system (GPS). These 
components were exclusively turned on or off on the intruder aircraft while the ownship 
remained fully equipped. This analysis provided further detail into how individual pieces of 
equipment can affect the entire DAA as a whole, and provides validation to the failure DOE as 
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well. The simulation where these failures were tested was modeled after Scenario A.5.10 
Intruder Maneuvers after DAA Maneuver Has Begun and Causes Change in the DAA Maneuver 
outlined in SC-228 (2015). 
A DOE two-level factorial design with three different factors resulted in eight different 
runs/scenarios (6.2). The “on” indicates the component is working properly. The “off” represents 
a total failure of the component(s) on the aircraft. The one primary difference from the failure 
tree DOE is that each simulation was run twice, using two different licensed commercial pilots. 
The pilots were asked to fly the same simulation, with various DAA systems turned on or off. 
They had to make the best possible judgment with the information they had available to them. 
The closest point of approach (CPA), listed in feet, was provided from the output of the 
simulation engine. The first eight values listed under the CPA column are from Pilot 1 and 
second 8 listed are from Pilot 2. As expected, the CPA varies by pilot and even on what 
components were on or off. Anytime humans are introduced to a study, large variations are 
possible but our inclusion of human pilots potentially provides a set of more realistic results. 
Mode S appeared to have one of the largest impacts on the CPA (Table 6.2) because when it was 
turned off, the scenarios produced some of the smallest CPAs from the simulations.   
In order to provide a better analysis to assess both pilot’s reactions to the scenarios, a replicate 
design was used. Replicate designs are used to analyze data if more than one trial was performed. 
After the DOE analysis was performed, it was evident that Mode S had the largest significant 
effect on CPA, followed by the effect of the pilot. The current study only evaluated the 




Table 6.2. Summary of the eight analyzed Pilot 1 and Pilot 2 DOE scenarios. The left three 
columns indicate which component was on or off (either from total failure or not having the 
systems on the aircraft), and the far right column lists the closest point of approach 
between the UAS and plane from the scenario.  
Mode S GPS Altimeter CPA (ft)   






off on on 1213.2 
off off off 1643.0 
off on off 2879.0 
on off on 4156.1 
on on on 6254.0 
on off off 11131.8 
on on off 12799.3 






on off off 1596.3 
off off on 1812.2 
off on on 1852.7 
on off on 2033.6 
off off off 2054.2 
on on on 2061.1 
on on off 2679.9 
 
Just like the failure tree analysis DOE, an equation can be produced to interpolate between these 
primary failures tested, and may be used to predict the effect of partial failures. Equation 2, 
which is only valid for this set of data and considers the Mode S and the pilot contribution. The 
coefficients were found from analysis of variance, with a p value of less than 0.05 for the 
significant factors found. Each variable in the equation corresponds to the either the Mode S 
effect or Pilot effect. Either the number 1 or 2 would be entered in to represent what Pilot flew 
the simulation. However, a value between -1 and 1 could be entered to simulate a partial failure 
of the Mode S system as was discussed in the previous DOE fault tree study.  
Equation 2: 
𝐶𝑃𝐴 = 3538.8 + 1800.2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑆 + 1589.7 ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑡  
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Between the failure tree and live simulation DOE, it can be stated that both ADS-B and, 
more specifically, the Mode S transponder have the largest sensitivity on the failure of a 
DAA system. Future studies could be done looking at other failure mechanisms and 
scenarios, investigating both total and partial failures. The DOE analysis of the failure 
tree and live simulations is an excellent tool to assess the sensitivity of parameters that 
could be heavily utilized in future studies with of DAA systems. A large number of 
simulations with many pilots could be conducted. 
 
6.3 DATA (RADAR/ADS-B) REPORT FLEET STUDY  
Radar 
Harris very generously gave UND access to data from its two local Grand Forks radar sites: 
Fargo and Finley. The amount of data accounted for hundreds of thousands of lines of logged 
information each day for each site. To better understand the data and what could be done with it, 
just altitude information was analyzed for one day (June 21, 2015). This date was chosen because 
of the Summer solstice, which provided the longest duration of daylight. This was particularly of 
interest, because many of the aircraft detected on the radar are student operated from the UND 
fleet during daylight hours. Dropout rates and unique behavior were looked at for both sites and 
categorized based on time. A dropout is identified if there is more time between two 
corresponding logged data points greater than the radar scan rate. The radar scan rate from Fargo 
is 4.8 seconds whereas Finley has a radar scan rate of 12 seconds. Unique behavior was 
identified by any unusual behavior other than a dropout. Cyclic behavior, multiple aircraft with 
the same ID number, and outliers (a deviation of more than 10% of the expected altitude based 
on the past and projected behavior of the aircraft) were the primary unique behavior spotted in 
this analysis. Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 show the three different types of unique behavior.  
The dropouts and unique behavior were classified into time intervals. Table 6.3 summarizes the 
dropout data, while Table 6.4 summarizes the unique behavior data (note: the multiple aircraft 
unique behavior was omitted from the data in the table). The average, minimum, and maximum 
dropout/unique behavior duration is listed, along with the categorized time intervals. As shown 
from the tables, the average dropout was approximately five radar scans (23.69 sec) for Fargo, 
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and just under three radar scans (32.41 sec) for Finley. The unique behavior statistics were much 
lower, with an average of about one radar scan (5.30 sec) for Fargo and approximately two radar 
scans (23.52 sec) for Finley. Fargo had 67% of its dropouts and 98% of its unique behavior occur 
for less than three radar scans. While Finley had 82% of its dropouts and 84% of its unique 
behavior for less than three radar scans. However, there are some dropouts that occur for a 
significant period of time, with some dropouts going for hundreds of seconds.   
 
 
Figure 6.4. Altitude [ft] vs. time [sec from June 21, 2015 12:00a.m.] plot showing cyclical 
unique behavior. Note the zoomed in view in the red box showing the altitude reading 





Figure 6.5. Altitude [ft] vs. time [sec from June 21, 2015 12:00a.m.] plot showing aircraft w/ 
the same aircraft ID number. There were many readings that occurred at the same time 
period, indicating that multiple planes had the same ID number.   
Figure 6.6. Altitude [ft] vs. time [sec from June 21, 2015 12:00a.m.] plot showing outliers. 
Note how the altitude readings jump from their nominal reading to 0ft back to the nominal 
value many times.   
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Table 6.3. Summary of dropout statistics for both the Fargo and Finley sites. The average, 
minimum, and maximum dropout time is noted. The dropouts are also ranked by time 
intervals, showing the number of dropouts for that time period and the percentage.  
Fargo Finley 
Dropout Duration     Dropout Duration    
Average (sec) 23.69    Average (sec) 32.41   
Minimum (sec) 9.00    Minimum (sec) 23.53   
Maximum (sec) 265.46    Maximum (sec) 336.27   
Categorized Data    Categorized Data   
Number of Dropouts 132    Number of Dropouts 352   
Less than 10 sec 65 49%  Less than 24 sec 146 41% 
10 -15 sec 24 18%  24 -36 sec 143 41% 
15 -20 sec 1 1%  36-48 sec 24 7% 
20 -25 sec 5 4%  48 - 60 sec 9 3% 
25 -30 sec 5 4%  60 -90 sec 19 5% 
30 -60 sec 26 20%  90 -120 sec 9 3% 




Table 6.4. Summary of unique behavior for the Fargo and Finley sites. The average, 
minimum, and maximum unique behavior time is noted. The unique behavior occurrences 
are also ranked by time intervals, showing the number of unique behavior instances for 
that time period and the percentage. 
Fargo Finley 
Unique Behavior    Unique Behavior   
Average (sec) 5.31    Average (sec) 23.52   
Minimum (sec) 4.66    Minimum (sec) 11.84   
Maximum (sec) 19.24    Maximum (sec) 108.16   
Categorized Data    Categorized Data   
Unique Behavior 52    Unique Behavior 25   
Less than 10 sec 51 98%  Less than 24 sec 19 76% 
10 -15 sec 0 0%  24 -36 sec 2 8% 
15 -20 sec 1 2%  36-48 sec 1 4% 
20 -25 sec 0 0%  48 - 60 sec 1 4% 
25 -30 sec 0 0%  60 -90 sec 0 0% 
30 -60 sec 0 0%  90 -120 sec 2 8% 
Greater than 60 sec 0 0%   Greater than 120 sec 0 0% 
 
Time and location were investigated to see if either demonstrated an influence on dropouts or 
unique behavior in system performance. Time did not appear to play a large role, however 
location had a large effect. This can be seen by Figures 6.7 and 6.8, which shows the dropouts 
and unique behavior, with the effective radar radius overlaid on top of the points. It can be seen 
that a significant number of the dropouts and unique behavior occurred either in the approach 




(a.)         (b.) 
Figure 6.7. The Finley Radar Map showing the effective radar radius (blue circle) and the 
location of each dropout or unique behavior (red dot): Dropouts (a.) and Unique Behavior 
(b.). 
 
(a.)        (b.) 
Figure 6.8. The Fargo Radar Map showing the effective radar radius (blue circle) and the 
location of each dropout or unique behavior (red dot): Dropouts (a.) and Unique Behavior 
(b.). 
 
An overlapping study was also done to determine if the dropouts and unique behavior were radar 
or transponder induced. Fargo’s radar radius fits entirely inside Finley’s, so theoretically, all of 
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Fargo’s planes should be detected by Finley (unless the planes are too low to be intercepted by 
Finley’s radar beam). It was found that only 2 of the 13 (15%) planes from Fargo showed unique 
behavior on both radars, and 1 out of the 64 (1.5%) planes from Fargo experienced dropouts on 
both radars. This indicates that in most cases of dropouts and unique behavior, it is a radar issue 
and not a transponder issue. However, transponder issues do still occur, which is shown from the 
overlapping analysis. The multiple aircraft unique behavior is also likely a transponder error, 
with either the wrong plane ID number being entered, or ATC assigning multiple of the same 
plane IDs. In conclusion, many dropouts and unique behavior phenomenon occur on a daily 
basis, which warrants future investigation. 
ADS-B 
Altitude data is the most crucial data for aircraft vertical separation. Currently, altitude data can 
be found from different equipment onboard each aircraft. The barometric altimeter is the oldest 
and most used device, other sources like radar altimeter and ADS-B are considered to be 
potential sources for reliable altitude. By 2020, having ADS-B onboard is mandatory, and 
altitude data found within ADS-B messages can be used for vertical separation. However, 
previous work (Taib and Busyairah 2016) showed that differences are found between the 
altitudes coming from different sources (barometric vs geometric altitude). A recent report by 
Simulyze also detected variation in aircraft reports by ADS-B (In) devices. We refer readers to 
this report in Appendix D. 
 Also, ADS-B message dropouts are a concern, which this study investigated. ADS-B should 
update and send its position status every second but we found this is not always the case. This 
analysis is split into two phases. The first phase discusses the dropout rates. This issue is 
explored through a closure examination of seven days of data mostly composed from the UND 
fleet collected from the Grand Forks Airport. The ADS-B unit at Grand Forks Airport is a GDL-
90 datalink transceiver. Aircraft altitude discrepancy was investigated in the second phase with 
the data collected from an open source website (ADS-B Exchange 2016) with world-wide 
coverage.  
 
ADS-B dropout rate investigation 
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ADS-B dropouts were analyzed utilizing the data of June 15th to June 21st (2015) from 
Grand Forks Airport. The data were archived in a GDL-90 raw pass-through format and 
parsed for interpretation. Dropout rates were counted as the number of times the data did 
not indicate a one second update period. A total of 642 aircraft data were analyzed 
including 534,736 data points/transmissions. Each data point contained the aircraft 
position (latitude, longitude), altitude, aircraft status (Ground/Air) and a few other 
messages. Dropouts occurred 35,063 times, but it should be noted that this number 
(35,063) doesn’t represent time. In other words, the ADS-B message was lost for at least 
1 second during transponding 35,063 times. The dropouts ranged from 2 seconds to over 
5 minutes in some cases. Table 6.5 summarizes these results.  
 
Table 6.5. Dropout statistics during 7 days (June 15th to June 21st, 2015). Dropouts are also 
categorized by duration interval including occurrences and interval percentages. 
Total data set Dropout % Dropout 
534736 35063 6.6% 
Categorized Data 
Total 35063  
Less Than 5 Secs 25066 71.5% 
Between 




























It was found that 71.5% dropouts are less than 5 seconds in duration, and approximately 
13% of total dropouts fall between 5 and 300 seconds. One unique finding was that 
15.6% of the total dropouts lasted greater than 300 seconds (5 minutes), which is quite 
significant. However, it might not be solely a transponder issue. This data includes 
UND’s training fleet, so there is a possibility that the aircraft piloted by students took a 
flight path that went out of range of the ADS-B receiver. To check this hypothesis, the 
dataset from June 21st, 2015 was considered because it had least number of aircraft. The 
aircraft showing dropouts more than 300 seconds were identified, and the position 
information was scrutinized. We did find that some (3 out of 5) of the aircraft were taking 
a route that went outside the range of the ground ADS-B and came back after several 
minutes and repeated that maneuver again. This is one of the potential reasons for the 
higher dropout time in this initial study. 
Altitude discrepancy investigation 
In the second phase of the ADS-B study, a representative sample of data starting from 
12:00 AM to 12:14 AM on October 20, 2016, was utilized. A total of 1282 aircraft were 
found, of which only 744 aircraft reported position, and both geometric altitude and 
barometric altitude. This means approximately 42% (538) missed at least some portion of 
the position or altitude data. In addition, only 1155 aircraft reported both barometric and 
geometric altitude, which means that 10% of aircraft missed at least one of the altitude 
measurements.  
Deviation is found between barometric and geometric altitudes ranging from 9 to 500 feet 
in the ADS-B data. Messages of 121 (10%) aircraft showed deviation in altitude data with 
approximately 48% of the aircraft having barometric altitude higher than geometric 
altitude. This trend was reversed in the remaining aircraft, comprising approximately 








No. of Aircraft Percentage  
Report Both Altitude 1155    -- 
No deviation found 1034 90% 
Discrepancy found  121 10% 
Out of 121 cases of 
altitude discrepancy 
Consistent Discrepancy 99 82% 
Fluctuating Discrepancy 22 18% 
 
Primary analysis revealed that the altitude discrepancy could be as high as 500 feet. Table 6.7 
indicates that 28% of discrepancies fall above 200 feet which might increase the likelihood of 
violation of the vertical separation threshold. A significant percentage of these cases could 
produce the possibility of a near mid-air collision condition. The discrepancies are nearly 
normally distributed above and below the actual altitude, so combinations where one is high and 
the other low can lead to dramatic vertical separation errors. 
 





Percentage (Out of 121 aircraft that 
showed altitude discrepancy) 
1 feet-50 feet 32 26%  
51 feet- 100 feet 23 19% 
101 feet-150 feet 16 13% 
151 feet-200 feet 16 13% 
201 feet-250 feet 17 14% 
251 feet- 350 feet 11 9% 
351 feet- 450 feet 04 3% 




It is important to recognize the characteristics of the discrepancy in order to resolve them. The 
initial study revealed that approximately 82% aircraft display consistent discrepancy, however 
there are cases (~18% of the aircrafts) where the deviation is not a constant value and fluctuates. 
Also, phase of flight appears to play an important role in the discrepancy. Level flight showed 
higher deviation than ascending/descending phases. Figure 6.9 represents an example of the 
deviation in two different flight phases. 
      
(a.)                   (b.) 
Figure 6.9.  Altitude [ft] vs time [sec from October 20, 2016 12:00am] plots showing 
discrepancies in ascending and level flight: (a.) Altitude discrepancy is small in ascending 
phase, (b.) Discrepancy range is higher in level flight.  
 
A unique anomaly is found from the analysis which can be called ‘altitude jump’ where the 
altitude data set jumps every other sample. This is similar to the cyclical behavior identified in 





Figure 6.10. Altitude [ft] vs Time [sec from October 20, 2016 12:00am] plot showing cyclic 
change in both geometric and barometric altitude data 
The analysis was done on a small sample of data; a more diverse and comprehensive study may 
provide more insight on the anomalies found in this preliminary study and lead to solutions to 
overcome these behaviors. 
 
6.4 EO/IR PRELIMINARY STUDY 
A very preliminary study was also done comparing optical and forward looking infrared (FLIR) 
thermal camera images. The image in Figure 6.11 is of a UND aircraft that recently landed sitting 
on the tarmac. Figure 6.12 shows three different varieties of images obtained with the FLIR 
camera of the same aircraft. It can be seen the engine bay is warm by the brighter colors. It is 
expected that an EO/thermal vision system could be a viable DAA system to be evaluated in the 
future studies. The team has performed an initial study evaluating the performance characteristics 






Figure 6.11. An optical image of a UND aircraft 




Figure 6.12. Three different color schemes on the FLIR thermal camera showing the same 
aircraft pictured in Figure KK. Note the bright area showing the warm engine in the front 
of the plane. By using false color representations, select characteristics may be highlighted 




7 Observations, Findings, and Conclusions 
7.1 OBSERVATIONS 
We chose and developed five analysis tools to help us to research our three primary research 
questions regarding airborne surveillance criticality. The analysis tools included: Fault Trees, 
Monte Carlo Simulations, Hazard Analysis, Design of Experiments (DOE), and Human-in-the-
Loop simulations. Potential DAA scenario failures were graphed through Fault Tree analysis and 
subsequent Monte Carlo simulations quantified correlated Fault Tree uncertainties. Hazard 
Analysis described failure impacts criticality against system performance. DOE created a 
sensitivity analysis for understanding significant equipage and functionality combinations in 
achieving separation. Our visualization scenarios allowed us to explore and validate analysis 
outcomes using the same component characterizations, operational parameters, and scenario 
designs. We present some of our significant observations below.  
Fault Tree DOE 
Fault Tree parameter criticality was evaluated using the DOE statistical factor analysis. 
ownship TCAS, intruder TCAS, and intruder ADS-B and whether each system was 
operational or not were the primary statistical factors resulting in eight possible 
combinations. The DOE results therefore represent the probability of a total DAA system 
failure. The DOE results indicate that the intruder ADS-B had five-times greater 
influence on the level of safety than any other system or interaction between systems. 
Ownship TCAS, intruder TCAS, the interaction of ownship TCAS and intruder ADS- B, 
and the interaction of TCAS and intruder ADS-B were the only other factors of statistical 
significance (assessed via Monte Carlo simulations). The total likelihood of failure was 
10-12 or below when ADS-B was off and 10-14 when ADS-B was on. Interestingly, the 
total likelihood of failure remained the same when either ownship TCAS or the intruder 
TCAS were off and ADS-B was on. The total likelihood of failure of the entire DAA 
system remained the same, regardless of whether the ownship or intruder had a working 
avoidance algorithm, as long as one of the TCAS systems was still active. Another 
interesting results was that having ownship TCAS, intruder TCAS, and intruder ADS-B 
off at the same time did not result in the highest total likelihood of failure. Conversely, 
having all three systems turned on did not result in the lowest total likelihood of failure. 
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An explanation for this result is that having all three systems creates additional failure 
modes in the DAA system due to increased complexity of the system. 
Hazard Analysis 
We performed a rigorous hazard analysis on surveillance criticality equipage in all air 
space classes. This resulted in analysis of ownship and intruder aircraft DAA interactions 
for the combination of class A, B, and C airspace, and separately for class D, E (above 
10,000 ft and also below), and G. Analysis in highly controlled airspace (A, B, and C) 
were grouped together due to the similar ATC requirements and procedure, and included 
two equipage classes. Class 2 represents a fully equipped aircraft with TCAS, ADS-B, 
and radar whereas Class 1 had ADS-B, Mode S transponder, and radar. Three failure 
scenarios resulted in a high-risk classification. In order of severity, these were 
transponder failure, transmission of hazardous or misleading information, and loss of 
ADS-B integrity. These results underscore the criticality of transponder functionality in 
highly controlled airspace. The transponder in this situation serves as a single point 
failure as it affects multiple other DAA systems.  
Class D airspace introduces additional intruder equipage scenarios that are not available 
in A, B, and C. The two new possibilities include intruder operation with only a Mode-S 
transponder and being completely unequipped. In terms of ownship and intruder 
interactions in class D airspace that were similarly equipped as those in A, B, and C 
airspace, the critical failure component was the transponder. This further validates the 
critical role of the transponder in aircraft interactions. Outside of the similar equipage 
scenarios, ownship radar failure in class D airspace against an unequipped intruder 
resulted in a unique high-risk incident. The role of radar in this scenario was akin to the 
transponder as a single-point failure node for the entire DAA system. ATC 
communications in class D provides an additional deconfliction service and could reduce 
this risk where available.   
Equipage criticality was assessed in class E airspace above 10,000 feet with the same 
equipage cases as class A airspace. Transponder failure was again identified as the critical 
component as in A, B, C, and D airspace. However, a combination of transponder system 
and horizontal GPS failure were identified as a third highest risk case (following 
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transponder failure and transmission of hazardous or misleading information 
malfunction).  
Criticality was also analyzed in class E airspace below 10,000 ft following the similar 
equipage classes used in class D airspace with intruder aircraft not having radar. In 
contrast to the four previous airspace analyses resulting in only three high-risk cases, a 
fourth high-risk failure case was identified with an unequipped intruder resulting from a 
radar failure leading to a potential MAC. Therefore, in this class of airspace, four 
elements were found to potentially result in a high-risk failure.  
Class G DAA criticality analysis considered the same equipage classes and aircraft 
scenarios as Class D and E below 10,000 ft. Class G presents a particularly challenging 
environment as it is the least controlled and has no ATC interaction or communication 
requirements. As with all other airspaces, failure of the transponder and transmission of 
hazardous or misleading information are the most critical failure points for all equipage 
classes except an unequipped intruder. Failure of the horizontal GPS data stream results 
in a high-risk scenario within class 1 ownship and class 1 or 1a intruder scenarios. 
Altimeter failure in class G leads to a high-risk event in both situations where the intruder 
is Class 1a. The criticality of the altimeter is unique to class G airspace because ATC is 
not available as a mitigation.  
Live Simulation DOE  
Live failure simulation data were used to create a DOE analysis for the closest point of 
approach (CPA) between two approaching aircraft. Two different licensed pilots were 
used to guide the simulated flights. The pilots were directed to fly the same missions but 
with three DAA factors being switched on or off during each flight simulation so that all 
component combinations could be considered. Analyzed components included Mode S 
transponder, barometric altimeter, and GPS. These components were chosen as they are 
used by aircraft that have both ADS-B and TCAS systems on board. We found that CPA 
was not only impacted by component functionality, but also by pilot decision-making, not 
surprisingly. We believe that these types of simulations that actively involve human 
interaction may provide a more meaningful output than simulations that rely solely on 
digital input. The smallest CPAs resulted when Mode-S was not functioning and 
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demonstrates the significance of this component among the three that were analyzed, a 
result that was validated through a replicate design study.   
Radar Live Data Analysis  
We sought to further explore DAA criticality through examination of live radar and ADS-
B that were made available from two radar sites in proximity to the University of North 
Dakota (UND). We examined hundreds of thousands of lines of code for these sites 
representing one day of observations at each site. We tallied dropout rates and unique 
behavior from the live data. We determined that when dropouts and unique behavior 
occur, it is usually radar that appears to be the driver and not the transponder. We did find 
that transponder functionality appeared to be responsible for some of the unique behavior 
cases. However, the results suggest that dropouts and unique behavior occur every day. 
This is concerning as the unique behavior included altitude readings that alternated by 
hundreds of feet at successive scans and large discrepancies between altitude readings. 
Further research should explore how pervasive and common these failures are over time 
periods that go beyond a single day, and at other radar locations.      
ADS-B Live Data Analysis 
We examined ADS-B dropout rates over one week of data from an airport located near 
UND, involving 642 aircraft and 534,736 data point transmissions. Data was lost 35,063 
times (6.6% of all transmissions) for a least one second during transponding. In some 
cases, dropouts lasted over five minutes but the vast majority of the dropouts (71.5%) 
were less than five seconds. These dropouts may not all be attributable to transponder 
failure as some of these dropouts were likely attributable to aircraft leaving the range of 
the ground ADS-B and later returning.    
To further examine ADS-B performance, we considered data from a world-wide database 
of 1282 aircraft operating over a brief time span. Only 744 (58%) of these aircraft 
reported position, geometric altitude, and barometric altitude. Only 1155 (90%) of these 
aircraft had both barometric and geometric altitude. Among the aircraft that reported both 
altitudes, elevation differences were present in 121 (10%). We found elevation variation 
as high as 500 feet when we compared barometric and geometric altitudes. 
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Approximately 28% (34) of the aircraft had elevation differences in excess of 200 feet, a 
level which could lead to a mid-air collision.  
These two ADS-B studies raise concerns about ADS-B reliability and functionality. 
Further study should examine whether the trends we observed are consistent over longer 
time spans and larger aircraft fleets. 
7.2 FINDINGS 
Our conclusions are drawn from the analyses and results presented in the earlier sections of this 
document. We present an overview of our conclusions as they relate to each of the research 
objectives below. 
  
1. For a cooperative DAA solution based on automatic dependent surveillance 
broadcast (ADS-B) and/or transponders, how should the current operational or 
technical performance requirements for ADS-B Out and/or transponders be 
changed (if at all) for UAS DAA functions? 
 
There are differences in how ADS-B and transponder technologies perform depending on 
airspace within the NAS and equipage combinations. However, we believe that there are 
inherent performance shortcomings for this technology application and that these 
shortcomings represent high risk failures in all airspace and equipage scenarios. ADS-B 
and TCAS systems are designed to a performance standard that is suitable in highly 
controlled and regulated airspaces (A, B, and C) but can experience encounter problems 
when ATC is reduced. Equipage requirements and the ATC procedures within these 
airspaces lead to this outcome. Our analytical comparison of ADS-B and TCAS failures 
revealed that ADS-B failures had the greatest impact on failure likelihood rates. We 
analyzed live transmission data and found significant ADS-B messaging loss in fielded 
technologies. Our recommendations for transponder and ADS-B design assurance level 
improvements are intended to elevate the level of safety in UAS DAA systems. 
Transponders need a more conservative failure characteristic in UAS DAA systems in 
order to be safely applied according to our analysis results. ADS-B systems in UAS DAA 
applications demonstrated acceptable risk levels in highly controlled airspace (A, B, and 
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C). ADS-B will also need to be designed to a greater assurance level for application in 
lower airspace classes where VFR and non-cooperative traffic becomes possible.  
 
2. Do current surveillance equipment technologies meet the design assurance 
criteria to provide UAS DAA functions? 
This is a challenging question as UAS DAA technologies are sometimes not only lacking 
in assurance criteria explicitness but are also in a transitive state. However, the analytical 
approaches and resulting evaluative products to assess the performance of UAS DAA 
functions that are described earlier in this report are designed to assess such standards 
when they become available. Our analytical approaches were also based on available 
assurance criteria from FAA TSO documents for manned implementation of DAA 
technologies. Our findings are mixed.  
DAA functionality varies depending on airspace and equipage capabilities but doesn’t 
currently offer a solution that is suitable for all airspace. We found evidence of significant 
loss of DAA performance in all airspaces. ATC communications can provide a solution to 
some failure scenarios when communications are possible, yet high risk scenarios in 
current DAA equipages remain. The DAA evaluative tools that were created in our 
research should be applicable to not only assessing any new DAA requirements or 
changes to surveillance technology, but should also be relevant if greater levels of design 
assurance become required for UAS DAA use. Our evaluative tools also have the ability 
to address design assurance needs of future DAA technologies as they are incorporated 
into UAS.     
 
3. What are the criteria for evaluating “equivalent level of safety” of UAS against 
piloted-aircraft for DAA functions? 
We applied design assurance levels from piloted-aircraft technology in our analysis to 
assess whether these criteria provided UAS the same situational safety scenarios as 
piloted-aircraft. The piloted-aircraft standards allowed our UAS encounters to be 
evaluated to the same specifications as manned aircraft to manned aircraft encounter 
would be with one exception. The exception was that the UAS ownship has an air-to-air 
radar in place of the pilot’s see and avoid ability. This difference is the most paramount 
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factor in low equipage and uncontrolled airspace comparisons but matters less in airspace 
that has minimum equipment rules that provides ATC separation services to IFR aircraft 
(UAS). All aircraft are operating as IFR and therefore the same as the UAS in Class A 
airspace. Aircraft operating in class B, C, and E above 10,000 feet MSL do not have the 
same requirements. VFR traffic in these airspaces will be separated by ATC and therefore 
present a similar state between all aircraft. Class D airspace will have a less substantial 
ATC presence but still imparts minimum service to IFR aircraft. Class E below 10,000 
feet MSL and class G airspace are not subject to any such requirements, and become 
dependent on the equivalence of manned aircraft see and avoid abilities to UAS air-to-air 
radar. This state remains for the current UAS equipage options. When other visual 
acquisition technologies become available to UAS DAA systems, our analytical 
approaches and resulting evaluative products can be applied for their assessment. 
 
7.3 MITIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
We provide mitigation recommendations as they relate to each of the primary research questions 
we considered. Our recommendations draw from the analyses and results presented earlier in this 
report. 
1. For a cooperative DAA solution based on automatic dependent surveillance 
broadcast (ADS-B) and/or transponders, how should the current operational or 
technical performance requirements for ADS-B Out and/or transponders be 
changed (if at all) for UAS DAA functions? 
 
Mitigation: We found that ADS-B systems in UAS DAA applications demonstrated 
acceptable risk levels in our analysis of highly controlled airspace (A, B, and C) so no 
mitigation is recommended for UAS operation within these airspaces. In less controlled 
airspace and when ATC is lacking, we recommend that performance requirements for 
ADS-B and transponders be elevated as they currently act as a single-point failure source. 
Redundant transponder systems, which separate the Mode-S and ADS-B functions, could 
also reduce the failure likelihood. We also recommend further investigation to understand 
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the source of the multiple ADS-B dropouts we observed when analyzing live 
transmission data.  
 
2. Do current surveillance equipment technologies meet the design assurance criteria 
to provide UAS DAA functions? 
Mitigation: We determined that while current surveillance equipment provides acceptable 
DAA functionality in certain airspace and equipage combinations, transponder failures 
can halt DAA operations in all airspaces. We recommend that elevated design criteria be 
considered for transponders such that failure rates are minimized. We also recommend 
that as new surveillance technologies become available, that they be evaluated for design 
criteria using a UAS-centric approach. We have proposed such a system with our research 
methods and demonstrated its application with our results and findings. 
 
3. What are the criteria for evaluating “equivalent level of safety” of UAS against 
piloted-aircraft for DAA functions? 
Mitigation: We observed that the primary difference in evaluating DAA equivalent level 
of safety factors between UAS and piloted aircraft was UAS ownship having to rely upon 
radar rather than a pilot’s see and avoid capacity. We recommend that the capacity of 
radar as a DAA tool for UAS be further investigated for its limitations in comparison to 
see and avoid, and the limitations involved in installing and operating radar on a small 
UAS. Namely, the MOPS for radar operations do not allow for a direct comparison of 
failure probabilities compared to other DAA technologies. We expect that as these 
systems are fielded, more data on their reliability will be available. Our current analysis 
framework can be rapidly updated to include this new information. We further 
recommend that other DAA sensor technologies that might be more affordable and 
applicable to a broader range of UAS, including small UAS, be investigated. If other 
DAA sensors can provide sufficient surveillance capacity, their adoption should be 
considered, if for nothing else to serve as another DAA system component redundancy. 




8 Follow on Work 
Overview 
The primary outcome of this project was the development of a tool to analyze DAA equipage 
performance in UAS integration scenarios. This product provides the capability to update, add, 
or eliminate systems as the equipage requirements change based on the current regulations and 
technology advancements for airborne traffic surveillance. Passive DAA systems such as EO/IR 
or LiDAR could be incorporated into both the failure tree and live simulations. Following the 
addition of those systems, a DOE would be done on the results to further understand the 
interactions and sensitivities of the various systems. There are many possibilities of various DAA 
systems that will need to be analyzed and evaluated. These possibilities include live testing of 
small UAS to determine their capacity for radar and other DAA-related sensors. In addition, 4-
Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) Based Operations (TBO) are a key component within the 
NextGen concept for Performance Based Navigation. 4DT concepts are particularly valuable for 
operating within constrained airspaces but have not yet been fully adopted for UAS.  
 
Radar and ADS-B data 
In addition to the DOE, further studies should be done on the radar and ADS-B data. 
Initially a larger dataset covering the spans of a week or more could be investigated. 
Climate and environmental conditions may also play a significant factor on the 
performance of these technologies. By obtaining data from different times of year and 
correlating that data to different weather conditions, a better understanding of the impact 
of climate and environmental conditions could be understood. Our current radar/ADS-B 
study focused on altitude data. Future studies could expand this to a positional analysis as 
well.  Following a complete analysis of the altitude and position data, an overlapping 
study could be performed on between radar and ADS-B to identify discrepancies between 
the respective systems. Also, ADS-B data from a ground station could be compared with 
onboard GPS data to research whether there is any discrepancy or mismatch. UND has 
large data sets from both radar and ADS-B archives. This includes a large fleet of 
equipped aircraft that UND owns and operates along with access to detailed installation, 
maintenance, and calibration records.  Industry partners are also prepared to share ADS-B 
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report data for evaluating reliability and functionality in multiple airspaces and equipage 
scenarios.   There is significant interest in validating ADS-B performance capabilities as 
BVLOS operations are explored for certain applications.  
The brief comparison of optical and forward looking infrared (FLIR) thermal camera 
images showed their ability as a potential DAA system. Preliminary results indicated that 
FLIR wavelengths and their sensitivity to emitted radiation may provide the ability to 
identify aircraft with active engines or recently active engines. This relatively low-cost 
remote sensing capability could potentially offer a less costly and intricate approach to 
DAA technology. Future work could continue to investigate the feasibility of FLIR 
cameras and how they could be incorporated into a DAA system with existing 
technologies such as ADS-B, TCAS, or radar. In addition, FLIR cameras and/or LiDAR 
systems could be compared to optical cameras on their ability to detect objects in various 
climate conditions, such as foggy, cloudy, sunny, or low light scenarios.   
The results from this future study could influence regulations and design assurance 
requirements for UAS. Understanding the sensitivities and interactions of various DAA 
systems is crucial for producing proper requirements and regulations. In addition, 
understanding and being able to detect and possibly correct issues in systems such as 
ADS-B and radar is vital for maintaining a well-functioning DAA system.  
 
Live UAS DAA Testing 
One aspect of integrating UAS into the NAS is that the presence of UAS in the air is 
likely to be greater than that of manned aircraft in the future, particularly in uncontrolled 
airspace. The ability of UAS in uncontrolled airspace to apply DAA technology for 
avoiding conflict will be essential for safe integration and the expected increase in UAS 
density. One of the most popular small UAS platforms for professional photogrammetry 
and other remote sensing applications is the DJI Phantom 4. The Phantom 4 employs 
both EO and sonar sensors for obstacle DAA. The EO and sonar sensors work in 
combination with the onboard GPS, barometer, and IMU to sense and avoid objects on 
the horizontal and vertical planes. EO images are managed on board through a vision 
processing unit (VPU) to discern approaching objects. When objects are sensed to be 
88 
 
within a certain threshold of the aircraft based on processed VPU output, the autopilot 
directs the Phantom 4 to divert away from the object. Given the current and expected 
increase in the future prevalence of the Phantom 4 and subsequent Phantom models in the 
NAS, live testing of the DAA capabilities could be helpful in mitigating both current and 
expected increasing future integration. These live scenarios would involve multiple 
Phantom 4 aircraft operating in proximity of one another. Testing would involve a set of 
repeatable scenarios that would involve remote pilots being directed along a flight path 
that involves potential airspace conflict with each other. The closest point of approach 
(CPA) resulting from aircraft interactions would be used to provide a hazard assessment. 
The diverted flight path vectors and their spatial deviation from pilot directed paths could 
be measured to quantify potential impact and hazards on surrounding airspace. Results 
from piloted UAS simulations involving airspace conflict could be augmented by 
autonomously flown mission scenarios. Autonomous missions could be created that result 
in conflict between multiple Phantoms 4s. The autonomous results could be contrasted to 
those from the remotely piloted scenarios to determine whether either scenario results in 
increased hazards or risks.  
These same scenarios could be applied to a single Phantom being operated with respect to 
objects on-the-ground, such as vehicles or structures. These on-the-ground testing 
scenarios would help discern what potential hazards exist for the public when UAS 
operations occur in near proximate areas. 
This proposed DAA research addresses two interests. The first is the identification of 
potential hazards between two or more commonly flown small UAS operating in close 
proximity. The second builds upon research suggested above for investigating lower-cost 
DAA solutions for UAS. Given that the vast majority of current UAS operations in the 
NAS are limited to line-of-site and visibility thresholds, EO DAA systems may have 
promise in NAS to enable UAS integration. 
4-Dimensional Trajectory Based Operations  
4-Dimensional Trajectory Based Operations is a key feature of the NextGen program (the 
technology pillar of the National Airspace (NAS) Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
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modernization program) requiring improvements to both the aircraft avionics and the 
ATM automation systems. A 4-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) is defined as “a precise 
description of an aircraft path in space and time” in other words a trajectory computed by 
the automation (ground and/or flight deck) that defines the flight path of an aircraft from 
one point (position) to another in four dimensions (latitude, longitude, altitude, and time). 
The 4DT covers both surface and airborne operations (gate-to-gate).  
4DT concepts have not yet been fully adopted for UAS and the associated automation 
technologies needed for UAS Air Traffic Control (ATC). There have been significant 
advancements in applying 4DT technologies and operations to commercial aviation that 
can be reused and adopted for UAS.  
A future work extension of this research project could include research and adoption of 
the concepts of 4DT information communication between the ground ATC and UAS 
aircraft utilizing the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) or Future Air 
Navigation System (FANS) data link system, supporting ground and air automations. 
UAS traffic automation will need to be integrated with the NAS automation systems, 
therefore, the capabilities to support performance-based navigation and flight object 
exchange are essential in this transition. Methods of implementing routes and flight paths 
rely on aircraft meeting a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specification and 
being equipped with a monitoring and alerting capability to alert when the aircraft system 
is unable to meet the performance specification required for the operation. Many 4DT 
procedure implementations require precise aircraft navigation conformance relative to a 
moving reference such as another aircraft, to form aggregate flows or a weather cell to 
allow flows to shift. Therefore, Dynamic-RNP (D-RNP) is an efficient and practical 
solution for UAS traffic management, enabling TBO in constraint airspace such as 
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10.1 APPENDIX A. DATA SOURCE ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Regulations for reporting systems 
In the NAS (and airspace worldwide), it is imperative that devices that inform the flight crew as 
well as advise ground based air traffic controllers or other aircraft of altitude and position be 
accurate. Part 121 aircraft (air carrier) and Part 135 aircraft (aircraft for hire) specify the details 
and regularity of altitude and transponder inspections in their approved maintenance programs. 
Aircraft that operate under Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) rules must have 
altitude and position reporting equipment inspected to higher standards, as they operate with 
1000-ft vertical separation in the flight-levels as opposed to the 2000-ft separations used by 
lower aircraft. Part 91 aircraft (small, non-commercial) must perform regular altimeter and 
transponder inspections every two years. The US Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.411 
addresses the certification of barometric altimeter systems, and FAR 91.413 is concerned with 
guaranteeing that the transponder system operates within specifications. 
Part 121 and Part 135 aircraft, including RVSM certified aircraft, are very often required to be 
equipped with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) to reduce the incidence of mid-air 
collisions between aircraft. TCAS is required for all aircraft with a maximum take-off weight 
(MTOW) over 12,600 lb, or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers. TCAS queries and 
monitors the nearby airspace for other aircraft independent of air traffic control. TCAS is based 
on secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder signals, and operates independently of 
ground-based radar systems to advise the pilot on aircraft that pose a collision hazard. In the 
event of two TCAS-equipped aircraft entering a conflict situation, the TCAS systems on the 
aircraft will coordinate to determine the appropriate action for each aircraft to de-escalate the 
conflict situation. 
TCAS operates via the aircraft transponder. TCAS-equipped aircraft interrogate, several times 
per second, via the 1030MHz transponder frequency all aircraft in the vicinity of their position. 
The vicinity around the TCAS-equipped aircraft is speed, altitude, and heading variable. All 
nearby aircraft then reply to the transponder interrogations on 1090 MHz. Using the transponder 
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returns, the TCAS constructs a map of all responding aircraft in the area. Information determined 
include: 
 range based on signal round-trip propagation time, 
 bearing based on the TCAS system’s directional antenna, and 
 altitude as reported by the interrogated aircraft’s transponder via mode C or mode S. 
 
Using this information, the TCAS system can determine whether any other aircraft pose a threat 
to the TCAS-equipped aircraft, will any other aircraft pose a future threat to the TCAS-equipped 
aircraft anticipated future values, and what actions should be taken to remove that threat. So as to 
avoid TCAS alerts and advisories regarding an intruding aircraft near the TCAS-equipped 
aircraft’s position, but at a dramatically different altitude (e.g. many thousands of feet above or 
below), the responding aircraft’s transponder reported altitude is of vital importance for TCAS 
operation. Reported transponder altitude is typically derived from air-data computer, encoding 
altimeter, or a blind encoder. 
As stated above, Part 121 and 135 aircraft have transponder and altitude inspections enshrined in 
their approved maintenance plans. Furthermore, these aircraft are often TCAS-equipped and 
certified for RVSM operations, and have location and altitude inspections are exacting and 
conducted often. These stringent requirements are derived from the fact that the location and 
altitude information due to the RVSM proximities and TCAS reliance on accurate altitude for 
TCAS conflict resolution. These larger, more-capable aircraft are also monitored via automated 
methods in the NAS as to ensure continued accuracy in their reported location and altitude..  
Smaller aircraft under Part 91 are numerous and typically operate below the flight-levels and at 
much lower speeds. The equipment performance standards and inspections for these aircraft are 
enumerated in FAR 91.411 and FAR 91.413. This report will look at each of these regulations in 






Transponders: Requirements and Inspections – FAR 91.413 
Modern aircraft transponders operate in one of three modes: 
 Mode A. Sometimes referred to as mode 3/A. Civil Mode A is identical to military Mode 
3. Mode A responds to an ATC interrogation signal with the transponder code set by the 
pilot. 
 Mode C. Refers to aircraft equipped with an altitude encoder and altimeter. With Mode C, 
ATC will actually see the flight level altitude on their radar screen if the transponder is 
operating in the Mode C or "ALT" (altitude) Mode. 
 Mode S. Mode S is a possible platform for a variety of other applications, such as Traffic 
Information Service (TIS), Graphic Weather Service, and Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Under ADS-B, each aircraft periodically broadcasts its 
identification, position, and altitude. Overall, Mode S provides improved surveillance 
quality, discrete aircraft addressing function, and digital capability. Mode S is not 
required for general aviation aircraft. 
The application of 91.413 would therefore apply to (i) aircraft operations airspaces where 
transponder use is required, and (ii) aircraft operations in an airframe in which the transponder is 
listed among the “minimum equipment list” (MEL). 
According to the AIM, Section 4-1-19: In all cases, while in controlled airspace, each pilot 
operating an aircraft equipped with an operable ATC transponder maintained in accordance with 
14 CFR section 91.413 shall operate the transponder, including Mode C if installed, on the 
appropriate code or as assigned by ATC.  Specific transponder operating requirements are spelled 
out in FAR 91.215: 
91.215 ATC transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use. 
(a) All airspace: U.S.-registered civil aircraft. For operations not conducted under part 121 or 
135 of this chapter, ATC transponder equipment installed must meet the performance and 
environmental requirements of any class of TSO-C74b (Mode A) or any class of TSO-C74c 




(b) All airspace. Unless otherwise authorized or directed by ATC, no person may operate an 
aircraft in the airspace described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section, unless that 
aircraft is equipped with an operable coded radar beacon transponder having either Mode 3/A 
4096 code capability, replying to Mode 3/A interrogations with the code specified by ATC, or a 
Mode S capability, replying to Mode 3/A interrogations with the code specified by ATC and 
intermode and Mode S interrogations in accordance with the applicable provisions specified in 
TSO C-112, and that aircraft is equipped with automatic pressure altitude reporting equipment 
having a Mode C capability that automatically replies to Mode C interrogations by transmitting 
pressure altitude information in 100-foot increments. This requirement applies - 
(1) All aircraft. In Class A, Class B, and Class C airspace areas; 
(2) All aircraft. In all airspace within 30 nautical miles of an airport listed in appendix D, 
section 1 of this part from the surface upward to 10,000 feet MSL; 
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2) of this section, any aircraft which was not originally 
certificated with an engine-driven electrical system or which has not subsequently been certified 
with such a system installed, balloon or glider may conduct operations in the airspace within 30 
nautical miles of an airport listed in appendix D, section 1 of this part provided such operations 
are conducted - 
(i) Outside any Class A, Class B, or Class C airspace area; and 
(ii) Below the altitude of the ceiling of a Class B or Class C airspace area designated for an 
airport or 10,000 feet MSL, whichever is lower; and 
(4) All aircraft in all airspace above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries of a Class B or 
Class C airspace area designated for an airport upward to 10,000 feet MSL; and 
(5) All aircraft except any aircraft which was not originally certificated with an engine-driven 
electrical system or which has not subsequently been certified with such a system installed, 
balloon, or glider - 
(i) In all airspace of the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia at and above 10,000 
feet MSL, excluding the airspace at and below 2,500 feet above the surface; and 
(ii) In the airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL within a 10-nautical-mile radius of any 
airport listed in appendix D, section 2 of this part, excluding the airspace below 1,200 feet 
outside of the lateral boundaries of the surface area of the airspace designated for that airport. 
(c) Transponder-on operation. While in the airspace as specified in paragraph (b) of this section 
or in all controlled airspace, each person operating an aircraft equipped with an operable ATC 
transponder maintained in accordance with § 91.413 of this part shall operate the transponder, 
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including Mode C equipment if installed, and shall reply on the appropriate code or as assigned 
by ATC. 
 
(d) ATC authorized deviations. Requests for ATC authorized deviations must be made to the ATC 
facility having jurisdiction over the concerned airspace within the time periods specified as 
follows: 
(1) For operation of an aircraft with an operating transponder but without operating automatic 
pressure altitude reporting equipment having a Mode C capability, the request may be made at 
any time. 
(2) For operation of an aircraft with an inoperative transponder to the airport of ultimate 
destination, including any intermediate stops, or to proceed to a place where suitable repairs can 
be made or both, the request may be made at any time. 
(3) For operation of an aircraft that is not equipped with a transponder, the request must be 
made at least one hour before the proposed operation. 
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 2120-0005) 
[Doc. No. 18334, 54 FR 34304, Aug. 18, 1989, as amended by Amdt. 91-221, 56 FR 469, Jan. 4, 
1991; Amdt. 91-227, 56 FR 65660, Dec. 17, 1991; Amdt. 91-227, 7 FR 328, Jan. 3, 1992; Amdt. 
91-229, 57 FR 34618, Aug. 5, 1992; Amdt. 91-267, 66 FR 21066, Apr. 27, 2001] 
In summary, the following areas require the operation of a Mode C transponder: 
 Operations within Class A, Class B, and Class C airspace. 
 Operations within 30 nautical miles of the primary airport within Class B airspace from 
the surface to 10,000 feet MSL (NOTE: There are approximately 35 Class B airports 
listed in the AIM with an associated “Mode C veil”) 
 Operations above the ceiling and within the lateral boundaries of Class B and C airspace. 
 Operations above 10,000 feet MSL in the contiguous 48 states, excluding the airspace at 
and below 2,500 feet AGL. 
 The AIM states in Section 4-1-19(a)(3) that for airborne operations in Class G airspace, 
the transponder should be operating unless otherwise requested by ATC. 
Notice that FAR 91.215(d) details the method by which an aircraft without a transponder can 




Furthermore, FAR 99.13 concerns security control of air traffic, and contains requirements for 
when aircraft containing transponders must use their transponders in flights into or out of the US 
airspace or operate in a specified Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). An ADIZ is an area 
surrounding much of North America – namely airspace surrounding the United States and 
Canada – in which the ready identification, location, and control of civil aircraft over land or 
water is required in the interest of national security.  The transponder requirements in FAR 99.13 
state: 
FAR 99.13 Transponder-on requirements. 
(a) Aircraft transponder-on operation. Each person operating an aircraft into or out of the 
United States into, within, or across an ADIZ designated in subpart B of this part, if that aircraft 
is equipped with an operable radar beacon transponder, shall operate the transponder, including 
altitude encoding equipment if installed, and shall reply on the appropriate code or as assigned 
by ATC. 
(b) ATC transponder equipment and use. Effective September 7, 1990, unless otherwise 
authorized by ATC, no person may operate a civil aircraft into or out of the United States into, 
within, or across the contiguous U.S. ADIZ designated in subpart B of this part unless that 
aircraft is equipped with a coded radar beacon transponder. 
(c) ATC transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use. Effective December 30, 1990, 
unless otherwise authorized by ATC, no person may operate a civil aircraft into or out of the 
United States into, within, or across the contiguous U.S. ADIZ unless that aircraft is equipped 
with a coded radar beacon transponder and automatic pressure altitude reporting equipment 
having altitude reporting capability that automatically replies to interrogations by transmitting 
pressure altitude information in 100-foot increments. 
(d) Paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section do not apply to the operation of an aircraft which was 
not originally certificated with an engine-driven electrical system and which has not 
subsequently been certified with such a system installed, a balloon, or a glider. 
[Doc. No. 24903, 55 FR 8395, Mar. 7, 1990. Redesignated at 69 FR 16756, Mar. 30, 2004] 
The required inspections for transponder performance in Part 91 aircraft are spelled out in FAR 
91.413.  The transponder tests may be conducted using a test bench or a portable test set. 
Transponder systems transmit on a frequency of 1090 MHz, the transponder is checked to verify 
that the transponder response frequency is within an acceptable limit, which allows a variation 
up 3 MHz, depending on the type and mode of transponder used, around 1090 MHz. The 
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transponder system must reply to more than 90% of interrogations. Transponder transmitter 
power output is also verified to be within prescribed limits. The transponder reported altitude 
(Mode C) data is verified to be within specification. Mode S transponders, common in TCAS-
equipped and ADSB-out-equipped aircraft, are further tested. 
Specifically, the requirements in FAR 91.413 are: 
91.413 ATC transponder tests and inspections 
(a) No persons may use an ATC transponder that is specified in 91.215(a), 121.345(c), or Sec. 
135.143(c) of this chapter unless, within the preceding 24 calendar months, the ATC transponder 
has been tested and inspected and found to comply with appendix F of part 43 of this chapter; 
and 
(b) Following any installation or maintenance on an ATC transponder where data 
correspondence error could be introduced, the integrated system has been tested, inspected, and 
found to comply with paragraph (c), appendix E, of part 43 of this chapter. 
(c) The tests and inspections specified in this section must be conducted by-- 
(1) A certificated repair station properly equipped to perform those functions and holding-- 
(i) A radio rating, Class III; 
(ii) A limited radio rating appropriate to the make and model transponder to be tested; 
(iii) A limited rating appropriate to the test to be performed; 
[(iv) deleted] 
(2) A holder of a continuous airworthiness maintenance program as provided in part 121 or Sec. 
135.411(a)(2) of this chapter; or 
(3) The manufacturer of the aircraft on which the transponder to be tested is installed, if the 
transponder was installed by that manufacturer. 
Amdt. 91-269, Eff. 1/31/2004 
The Appendix B of Part 43 referenced in this FAR is given in the appendix for the reader’s 
convenience. 
FAR 91.413 specifies that not only is transponder testing required every two years, but also when 
there is a chance of correspondence error. This could be a result of component replacement such 
as an encoding altimeter or air data computer. 
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A key point to recognize in FAR 91.413 is that all aircraft using transponders should be inspected 
every two years. This inspection requirement applies to aircraft under VFR and IFR. The only 
aircraft exempt from this requirement would be those called out in FAR 91.215.b.5 -- aircraft 
which were not originally certificated with an engine-driven electrical system or which has not 
subsequently been certified with such a system installed, to include balloons and gliders. 
Altitude Reporting Equipment: Requirements and Inspections 
FAR 91.205 provides guidance for the instrument and equipment requirements for powered civil 
aircraft with standard category in the US. Included in the list for both VFR, VFR night, and IFR 
flight is an altimeter. (Specifically, FAR 91.205 requires an altimeter for VFR day and night 
operations, and a “sensitive altimeter” for IFR flight. Apart from antique aircraft that are 
maintained in original or restored-to-original condition, most altimeters in the fleet are sensitive 
altimeters.) Accurate reporting of an aircraft’s altimeter is important for every flight, and 
especially so for VFR night and IFR flights.   
In order that aircraft altimeters are accurate enough for IFR enroute, terminal, and approach 
operations, regulations require biennial inspections of the pitot-static and altimeter systems. The 
requirements are listed in FAR 91.411: 
91.411  Altimeter system and altitude reporting equipment tests and inspections. 
(a) No person may operate an airplane, or helicopter, in controlled airspace under IFR unless-- 
(1) Within the preceding 24 calendar months, each static pressure system, each altimeter 
instrument, and each automatic pressure altitude  
reporting system has been tested and inspected and found to comply with appendices E and F of 
part 43 of this chapter; 
(2) Except for the use of system drain and alternate static pressure valves, following any opening 
and closing of the static pressure system, that system has been tested and inspected and found to 
comply with paragraph (a), appendix E, of part 43 of this chapter; and 
(3) Following installation or maintenance on the automatic pressure altitude reporting system of 
the ATC transponder where data correspondence error could be introduced, the integrated 
system has been tested, inspected, and found to comply with paragraph (c), appendix E, of part 
43 of this chapter. 
(b) The tests required by paragraph (a) of this section must be conducted by-- 
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(1) The manufacturer of the airplane, or helicopter, on which the tests and inspections are to be 
performed; 
(2) A certificated repair station properly equipped to perform those functions and holding-- 
(i) An instrument rating, Class I; 
(ii) A limited instrument rating appropriate to the make and model of appliance to be tested; 
(iii) A limited rating appropriate to the test to be performed; 
(iv) An airframe rating appropriate to the airplane, or helicopter, to be tested; or 
(v) deleted 
(3) A certificated mechanic with an airframe rating (static pressure system tests and inspections 
only). 
(c) Altimeter and altitude reporting equipment approved under Technical Standard Orders are 
considered to be tested and inspected as of the date of their manufacture. 
(d) No person may operate an airplane, or helicopter, in controlled airspace under IFR at an 
altitude above the maximum altitude at which all altimeters and the automatic altitude reporting 
system of that airplane, or helicopter, have been tested. 
Amdt. 91-294, Eff. 2/20/07 
The Appendix C of Part 43 referenced in this FAR is given in this report’s appendix for the 
reader’s convenience. 
Testing and certification of the Altimeter includes an inspection for scale error. All altimeter tests 
are performed with the altimeter barometric pressure readout set to 29.92 Inches of Mercury. 
Static system pressure is increased up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft, and the 
simulated rate of climb is not to exceed 20,000 feet per minute. Appendix E of Part 43 lists all of 
the required test points and allowable errors. Tolerances go from 20 feet at 1,000 feet below sea 
level to 280 feet at a scale reading of 50,000 feet. A Hysteresis test is performed next. Static 
system pressure is increased, simulating a rate of aircraft decent between 5,000 and 20,000 feet 
per minute down to within 3,000 feet of the first test point (50 percent of the maximum altitude ) 
and then within 3,000 feet per minute. After the reading is taken, static system pressure is again 
increased in the same manner as before until the second test point (40 percent of maximum 
altitude) is reached. After the reading is taken, static system pressure is again increased as before 
until atmospheric pressure is reached. Finally, another third reading is done and should be within 
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prescribed tolerance of the original altitude. Additionally, a friction test as well as a case leakage 
test round out the certification process. 
Part 43 Appendix E also requires additional inspections and test for equipment, if installed. 
These include static port heater, visual inspection of the static port and surrounding area to verify 
that no alteration or deformation of the airframe surface has occurred that would affect the 
airflow over the static sensor for any flight condition. In the event of multiple static pressure 
systems (pilot, co-pilot, and stand-by), all static systems employed by the flight deck instruments 
or that supply altitude data to an altitude reporting system are subject to the rules described here. 
In the event the aircraft is certified for Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM), the 
displayed flight deck altitude must meet an even tighter tolerance than those not RVSM 
compliant. As this program is designed to allow aircraft operating between 29,000 and 41,000 to 
fly with only 1,000 feet vertical division, the altitude indicating system must be very accurate. 
Altitude tolerance at FL290t is +/- 48 feet and +/-72 feet at FL410. 
ADS-B 
The Automated Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system consists of two services, 
"ADS-B Out" and "ADS-B In", ADS-B could replace radar as the primary surveillance method 
for controlling aircraft worldwide. ADS-B is an integral component of the NextGen national 
airspace strategy for upgrading and enhancing aviation infrastructure and operations. The ADS-B 
system can also provide traffic- (TIS-B) and government-generated graphical weather (FIS-B) 
information. ADS-B enhances safety by making an aircraft visible, realtime, to air traffic control 
(ATC) and to other appropriately equipped ADS-B aircraft with position and velocity data 
transmitted every second. ADS-B data can be recorded and downloaded for post-flight analysis. 
ADS-B also provides the data infrastructure for inexpensive flight tracking, planning, and 
dispatch. 
"ADS-B Out" periodically broadcasts information about each aircraft, such as identification, 
current position, altitude, and velocity, through an onboard transmitter. ADS-B Out provides air 
traffic controllers with real-time position information that is, in most cases, more accurate than 
the information available with current radar-based systems. With more accurate information, 




"ADS-B In" is the reception by aircraft of FIS-B and TIS-B data and other ADS-B data such as 
direct communication from nearby aircraft. The ground station broadcast data is typically only 
made available in the presence of an ADS-B Out broadcasting aircraft, limiting the usefulness of 
purely ADS-B In devices. FIS-B and TIS-B data streams are available to participating aircraft 
over the 978 MHz channel from a ground station network across the United States and in the 
Gulf of Mexico. ADS-B ground station range depends aircraft altitude and any terrain that might 
block line of sight between the aircraft and the ground station. There are also practical limits due 
to transmitter power and receiver sensitivity.  
As of 2014, the FAA declared ADS-B ground station network deployment complete. The FAA 
(through the ADS-B network contractor ITT) provides coverage maps for the US based on 
aircraft altitude. These coverage maps were created by radiation and terrain models and are only 
approximate. The ADS-B network coverage maps for 500’ AGL (upper-left), 1500’ AGL (upper-
right), 3000’ AGL (lower-left), and 5000’ AGL (lower-right) are shown below. At 5000’ AGL, 
nearly 100% of the contiguous US is able to access the ADB-B ground station network and avail 
itself of TIS-B and FIS-B data streams. The only significant areas without ADS-B coverage at 
5000’AGL are in the intermountain west (likely due to rugged terrain shadowing effects) and 
Alaska. It would be assumed that in the flight levels, ADS-B ground station contact would be 
nearly universally available. However, at lower altitudes, ADS-B coverage is more sporadic with 






   
   
Figure 10.1.  ADS-B ground station network coverage at 500 feet (upper-left), 1500 feet 
(upper-right), 3000 feet (lower-left), and 5000 feet (lower-right).  All altitudes are AGL. 
The ADS-B system in the aircraft relies on two avionics components—a high-integrity GPS 
navigation source and a datalink (ADS-B unit). The most common ones operate at 1090 MHz, 
essentially a modified Mode S transponder, or devices named Universal Access Transceivers 
(UATs) operating at 978 MHz. The UAT device for ADS-B is only certified for operation in the 
NAS in the US, and would employed by smaller, slower, lower flying general aviation aircraft. 
ADS-B out units operating at 1090 MHz are required in the flight levels.  While aircraft 
operating below FL180 and in the US NAS may use the 978 MHz link via UATs. 
A proposed system by Aireon for ADS-B reception by low earth orbit (LEO) satellites could 
improve the coverage of the ADS-B network, especially in more remote and inhospitable terrain. 
The proposal is to deploy 1090 MHz ADS-B receivers on the Iridium satellite network, a LEO 
satellite network that was originally created to deliver phone and data service anywhere on the 
planet. The rationale for using the Iridium satellite network for this new capability was due to: 
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 The Iridium satellites operate from LEO, and thus can receive the ADS-B out signals 
more reliably as the aircraft transponders and ADS-B system were originally designed for 
ground reception. 
 Iridium satellites are replaced relatively frequently due to the increased air friction at 
their lower altitude, and thus lower lifespan. Thus the system would be deployed on 
Iridium constellation faster than other existing or new satellite systems. 
 Iridium provides worldwide coverage, including the poles. 
By capturing ADS-B position data from aircraft flying below the satellite, the network will give 
the following capabilities: 
 Full air traffic control will be possible over water, in areas that radar does not currently 
cover. 
 As is currently possible in radar covered areas, a position history will be available for lost 
aircraft (think: Malaysia Airlines flight 370 lost on March 8, 2014 over the Indian 
Ocean). 
The system only receives ADS-B on aircraft broadcasting on the 1090 MHz frequency. This 
limits the system generally to airliners and business aircraft. Therefore, UAT equipped aircraft 
(typically general aviation flying below the flight levels) would not be detected by the proposed 
system. These lower flying aircraft are the aircraft that will most often be denied ADS-B ground 
station coverage and are not detected by ATCRBS surveillance radar due to terrain/mountain 
shadowing at low altitudes. Furthermore, even 1090 MHz extended squitter smaller, general 
aviation aircraft will likely not be served by the proposed Airoeon system. These lighter aircraft 
are often outfitted with single diversity ADS-B systems with exclusively belly mounted ADS-B 








The FAA Air Traffic Organization (ATO) uses the Safety Management System (SMS) for its 
approach to system safety. The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) SMS is an integrated collection of 
principles, policies, processes, procedures, and programs used to identify, analyze, assess, 
manage, and monitor safety risk in the provision of air traffic management and communication, 
navigation, and surveillance services. The ATO SMS describes the process of identifying safety 
hazards and mitigating risk in the NAS. 
Severity is the consequence or impact of a hazard’s effect or outcome in terms of degree of loss 
or harm. Severity is independent of likelihood and must be determined before likelihood. Assess 
all effects when determining severity. It is important to consider existing controls when 
determining severity. The two tables following are the severity table used by the ATO to assess 










Figure 10.3. Hazard Severity Classification (part 2) per FAA ATO SMS 
Likelihood is defined as the estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative or qualitative 
terms, of a hazard’s effect or outcome. More specifically, the concept of likelihood can be 
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separated into two components: likelihood/probability and frequency. Likelihood is a rate of how 
often a given effect is expected to occur. Frequency is how often a given effect occurs. 
Frequency is a known value, while likelihood is a prediction. The ATO SMS mandates that 
frequency of occurrence (known value) be used to assess the current or residual risk and 
likelihood (predicted value) when assessing initial and predicted residual risk. 
Likelihood is specifically defined as the expected number of times the credible effect will occur 
(i.e., the number of times that the hazard will occur in the system state that will expose the risk). 
Divided by the value by the number of ATO operations, flight hours, or operational hours in 
which the effect is exposed (i.e., the number of ATO operations, flight hours, or operational 
hours affected by the proposed NAS change or the existing hazard). This ratio is compared to 
ranges presented in table below to determine the likelihood rating. 
 
 
Figure 10.4. Likelihood of Effects Standard (Operations and Equipment) 
 
The figure below shows event likelihood as a continuum of event probabilities.  Currently, the 






Figure 10.5.  Likelihood of Effects: Continuum 
 
For some NAS changes, it is possible that data are not available. There may not be a similar 
enough change/procedure/situation in the NAS to provide similar data from which to estimate a 
rate of occurrence. In situations where modeling is not feasible, pure subject matter expertise is 
the only input available, providing a qualitative approach to determining likelihood. This 
approach is only recommended when all avenues of data collection have been exhausted or when 
the change proponent is attempting to implement a new operation for which no data exist. The 
table below presents calendar-based approximations of NAS-wide effect occurrences. 
 
Figure 10.6.  Likelihood of Effects Standards (Domain and Estimated) 
 
Once hazard severity and likelihood are determined, a risk matrix (Figure 5.11) is used to 
determine risk levels. The risk matrix helps to prioritize treatment and mitigation. The rows in 
the matrix reflect the likelihood categories, and the columns reflect the severity categories. If a 
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hazard severity-likelihood pair is plotted red, the risk associated with the hazard is high; if the 
hazard severity-likelihood pair is plotted yellow, the risk associated with the hazard is medium; 
and if the hazard severity-likelihood pair is plotted green, the risk associated with the hazard is 
low.  
A preliminary hazard event tree analysis by the MITRE Corporation in 2013 attempted to 
determine whether any malfunctions/inaccuracies in an altimeter or transponder would affect the 
safety of a flight involving UAS. Their work primarily dealt with a scenario in which both the 
UAS and the manned aircraft are large, well equipped, and operating in class A airspace. Their 
work ultimately determined that altitude reporting issues would not result in a significant 
increase in the hazard level of the flight scenarios reviewed in this document. ATC should not 
rely on vertical separation alone to separate traffic. Even though the conclusion made by The 
MITRE Corporation seems to indicate that inaccurate altimeters would not cause a significant 
increase in risk, it is important to note that this deals with Class A airspace. To date, it appears 
that lower altitudes, specifically Class E and G airspaces, containing much VFR (read: general 
aviation) aircraft has not been analyzed. 
In this study, eight scenarios, most with four subcases, were identified for further study based on 
possible static system and transponder reporting errors.  The actors in these scenarios are a well-
equipped medium to large UAS utilizing proposed DAA methods with both radar interrogations 
and ADS-B data processing.  The intruders take on four distinct classes of aircraft: 
 TCAS equipped large aircraft (Hazard 0, 1, & 2) 
 ADSB-out equipped aircraft (Hazards 3 & 4) 
 Mode C equipped aircraft (Hazards 5 & 6) 
 No transponder equipped aircraft (Hazard 7) 
The hazard event tree uses preliminary success/failure probabilities at each level. Further 
refinement will be necessary to obtain higher fidelity event tree results. However, the results here 
can be used in a comparative analysis to prioritize future research effort and investigations. 
Hazard 0 examines the conflict between two TCAS-equipped aircraft in the flight levels has been 
examined by multiple investigators and is included here for reference. The 2013 MITRE study 
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considered the case of a UAS (Citation Jet class) in twelve difference scenarios including an 
altimeter lost-link hazard. The observations from that study are summarized below. 
 Event tree analysis shows that unmanned (Citation: Jet) does have a slight increase in 
residual risk in Class A, but not to the point that additional mitigations are required 
 Detect and avoid in Class A for both ownship and other aircraft was assumed to be 
marginally effective in certain circumstances 
 Lost link scenarios considered non-credible under current ATC procedures as ATC would 
not rely solely on vertical separation 
 All information normally provided to manned aircraft crew in flight may need to be 
available over a UAS C2 link, e.g. pilot/co-pilot altimeter cross-check 
 Some UAS have operational profiles requiring constant climb/descent during ops in Class 
A airspace or underlying airspace. These operations could delay ATC’s ability to verify 
that encoder reported altitude agrees with cockpit indicated altitude which normally 
requires a level flight segment 
 There is a possible benefit from GPS altitude comparison in UAS control stations 
 ATC procedures, crew procedures, and altimetry and transponder certification standards 
provide effective safety controls for flight in Class A airspace 
 To effectively mitigate risk in Class A, public aircraft altimetry systems/transponders 
airworthiness standards should resemble those used for civil aircraft 
In the scenarios covered by Hazard 0, all aircraft are required to be operating on IFR flight plans 
and in constant communication with ATC. Furthermore, both would be expected to be FAR 
91.411 and 91.413 current, and transponder and static system errors would be minimal.  
Hazards 1-7 examine the conflict between a DAA (radar + ADS-B) equipped UASS and manned 
aircraft in various equipage states in the altitudes below the flight levels. Depending on the 
aircraft altitude and distance form an ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two 
aircraft in close proximity in this hazard can take on four subcases: 
1. Both aircraft have ATCRBS and ADS-B TIS coverage 
2. Both aircraft have ATCRBS (but no ADS-B TIS coverage) 
3. Both aircraft have ADS-B TIS (but no ATCRBS coverage) 
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4. Both aircraft are operating in areas without either ATCRBS and ADS-B coverage 
Subcase (a) corresponds roughly to the higher altitudes (see the ADS-B network coverage maps) 
and locations in the NAS near ATC surveillance radar sites. Using a simple approximation line-
of-sight model, an aircraft at an altitude of h feet above an assumed spherical earth can be seen 
visually by a ground-based observer √ℎ nautical miles away. This simple approximation is 
correct within 1%. For radar, wave diffraction bending the wave downwards can occur in the 
earth’s atmosphere due to atmospheric density (water vapor and pressure) variations with 
altitude. A simple approximation line-of-sight model accounting for beam diffraction due to 
atmospheric density changes, an aircraft at an altitude of h feet above an assumed spherical earth 
can be seen by a ground-based radar at a distance of √
8ℎ𝑅𝑒
3⁄ , where 𝑅𝑒 is the radius of the 
earth, or 6.4x103 km and h is the aircraft height in km. Simplifying, the range of a ground-based 
radar to a target h feet in altitude is roughly 1.2315√ℎ nautical miles. The table below lists the 
line-of-sight distance, both visual and radar, for multiple aviation altitudes. 
 
Table 10.1. Ground-based Line of Sight Ranges to Airborne Aircraft 
Altitude (feet AGL) 
Visual Line of sight distance 
(nm) 
RADAR Line of sight 
distance (nm) 
500 22.4 27.5 
1500 38.7 47.7 
3,000 54.8 67.5 
5,000 70.7 87.1 
10,000 100 123 
15,000 123 151 
18,000 (~ FL180) 134 165 
30,000 (~ FL300) 173 213 
40,000 (~ FL400) 200 246 




Referring to the table above gives insight to the subcases (a)-(d) considered in this study. If 
aircraft are operating at 3000’ AGL, these aircraft would need to be located within about 67 miles 
of the surveillance radar site to be seen by that radar. The simple model used here does not 
account for terrain and radar/ground station shadowing and attenuation effects of nearby 
obstacles. In practice, these line-of-sight ranges may be much smaller or bigger than predicted in 
the table above. It can be assumed that ADS-B transmissions from a ground station antenna to a 
participating aircraft would have a similar range, although the ADS-B ground station antennas 
are typically located on cellular phone towers, or short towers located at airports. More accurate 
data for participatory aircraft with surveillance radar and ADS-B network could be obtained from 
operational NAS data. 
The hazard subcase (a) would be the situation where both aircraft are operating at sufficiently 
high altitude and within sufficiently close range to ATCRBS (ARTCC and TRACON sites) and 
approximately 600 ADS-B ground stations. This would clearly be the case when aircraft are 
operating at high altitudes, and/or in reasonably close proximity to large population centers in the 
US.   
Subcase (b) would correspond to both aircraft operating near surveillance radar site but not 
within range of an ADS-B ground station. Given that ADS-B ground stations are far more 
numerous and geographically distributed in the US, subcase (b) would be a much rarer situation. 
This subcase scenario would occur at low altitudes near an radar site when the locale has no 
nearby ADS-B ground stations. Subcase (c) could also occur in locations and altitudes where the 
ATCRBS was visible and all ADS-B ground stations were blocked (shadowed) by terrain in 
between the aircraft and the ADS-B ground station antenna. 
Subcase (c) would correspond to both aircraft operating near ADS-B ground station antenna but 
at locations and altitudes where the aircraft is not visible to an ATCRBS site. Given that ADS-B 
ground stations are far more numerous and geographically distributed in the US, subcase (c) 
would be more common than subcase (b). During weekday daylight hours, regional or terminal 
radar approach control (TRACON) facilities would provide a good coverage of the US. On 
weekends, holidays, or during nighttime operations, many TRACON are closed and surveillance 
radar responsibilities default to ARTCC. Less equipped aircraft (fair-weather VFR flyers) tend 
not to fly at night, but would likely fly more on weekends and holidays. In the case of darkened 
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TRACON facilities, it is more likely that low-flying aircraft are operating beyond ARTCC sites 
and not detected by ATCRBS radar. However, ADS-B equipped aircraft would be participating in 
the ADS-B network, but and visible to ATC through the ADS-B network. Similar to above, 
subcase (c) could also occur in locations and altitudes where the one or more ADS-B ground 
stations are visible to the aircraft, but the line of sight to all ARTCC and TRACON active radar 
are blocked (shadowed) by terrain in between the aircraft and the radar antenna. 
Subcase (d) would correspond to both aircraft operating out of range or sight of all ATCRBS 
sites and ADS-B ground stations. Once again refereeing to the ADS-B ground stations coverage 
map, this situation is most likely for aircraft at that are located at a distance from ATCRBS and 
ADS-B ground stations and at lower altitudes. With the distributed ADS-B ground station 
antenna network, this scenario is not greatly impacted by TRACON closures on weekends, 
holidays, and at night, since ADS-B coverage is typically the limiting factor. In the remote 
regions of the intermountain western US, line of sight to all ARTCC/TRACON radar and ADS-B 
ground stations may be blocked (shadowed) by terrain in between the aircraft and the antenna 
sites. 
The special cases wherein each aircraft have difference services (ATCRBS and/or ADS-B) 
available to them, or are operating in difference ATC sectors has not been considered, as these 
scenarios would have lower likelihood due to the small spatial volumes in which they could 
occur. A fuller analysis and verification of this assumption which is beyond the scope of this 
preliminary study, would need to be made going forward. For the purpose of the hazard event 
tree analysis, the percentage of time that each class of intruder aircraft (TCAS, ADSB, Mode C, 
and no transponder) spend in each ATC services region is estimated.  Estimates are based on an 
average 2h flight with a “cross-country” mission to reasonably high altitude taking advantage of 
ATC services (flight following/IFR/etc)., and gross estimates of the flight characteristics of each 
aircraft class. The extents of coverage of ADS-B are based on the FAA ADS-B coverage maps, 
and assume that aircraft are equally likely to be at any location in the US NAS. This assumption 
is overly pessimistic and patently false as more air traffic would be located around population 
centers. A better estimate of percentage of time without ADS-B coverage would be based on a 
time-weighted average of real NAS data. However, this calculated estimate would be optimistic 
because it would not account for aircraft operating outside of ATC’s view.  Another error in the 
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estimates here is that time spent outside of ATCRBS and ADSB network coverage will likely be 
much higher for mode C and no transponder intruders. These aircraft would be the mostly likely 
to be local pleasure flights rather than cross-country flights. 
 
Table 10.2. Time spent in ATC services airspaces by manned aircraft on cross-country 
mission 
 ATCRBS + ADSB ATCRBS ADSB None 
TCAS-equipped manned aircraft 0.966 0.014 0.180 0.0025 
ADSB-equipped manned aircraft 0.855 0.055 0.638 0.025 
Mode C-equipped manned aircraft 0.668 0.120 0.132 0.080 
no transponder manned aircraft 0.357 0.229 0.254 0.159 
 
 
Hazard 1 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and TCAS-equipped aircraft in 
the altitudes below the flight levels. Depending on the aircraft altitude and distance form an 
ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft in close proximity in this 












Hazard 2 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and TCAS-equipped aircraft in 
the altitudes below the flight levels. Depending on the aircraft altitude and distance form an 
ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft in close proximity in this 












Hazard 3 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and an ADS-B equipped intruder 
where the intruder has a static system error – both flight instruments and transponder reported 
altitude are in agreement but differ from the actual aircraft altitude. Depending on the aircraft 
altitude and distance form an ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft 












Hazard 4 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UA and ADSB-equipped aircraft in the 
altitudes below the flight levels. Depending on the aircraft altitude and distance form an 
ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft in close proximity in this 












Hazard 5 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and a mode-C transponder 
equipped intruder where the intruder has a static system error – both flight instruments and 
transponder reported altitude are in agreement but differ from the actual aircraft altitude. 
Depending on the aircraft altitude and distance form an ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B 













Hazard 6 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and Mode-C transponder-
equipped aircraft in the altitudes below the flight levels. Depending on the aircraft altitude and 
distance form an ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft in close 












Hazard 7 examines the conflict between a DAA-equipped UAS and a no-transponder aircraft 
intruder where the intruder has a static system error – flight instruments reports an altitude 
different from the actual aircraft altitude. Depending on the aircraft altitude and distance form an 
ATCRBS site and the installed ADS-B ground network, two aircraft in close proximity in this 












Probability of error detection, RA notice, sense and avoid, and MAC are based on values 
suggested by previous studies (author year, author year, etc). Each of these probabilities could be 
improved upon with more specific details of operating modes. The results here are a very 
preliminary examination of the case of UAS and manned aircraft conflict below the flight levels 
to determine if any failure likelihoods are credible. 
Analysis could also be improved by incorporation of encounter models in the NAS. Analysis also 
does not account for time periods of varying ATC service availability, radio coverage, and 
location in NAS to account for actual ATC availability. UAS mission operating procedures in 
more challenging airspace and collision-prone scenarios would also reduce the likelihood 
measures here. 
Examination of the event trees shows that encounters between DAA does clearly lower altitude 
encounters located in more remote locales lead to higher likelihoods of NMAC and MAC. 
Operations over more populated regions (near Class B and Class B airspaces) would have greater 
ATC communication and radar coverage, and ADS-B network connectivity. Away from these 
more capable ATC sectors (>75nm from ATC radar) at lower altitudes (below 3000’ AGL) would 
challenge UAS operations because ADS-B TIS-B services would be lacking much information 
about the intruder targets. While UAS DAA could interrogate TCAS, ADS-B, and Mode C 
intruders in these low altitude, remote locations, the transponder-less aircraft would be difficult 
to identify without another mechanism. 
Preliminary Investigations on Occurrences of Altitude Reporting System Errors in the 
Installed Fleet 
Since the analysis above assumes that altimetry errors (either altimeter or transponder altimetry 
source) exist, the most obvious next step is to determine the likelihood of these sorts of errors in 
the flying fleet, and the magnitude of errors when they do occur. The FAR 91.411 requires that 
all aircraft flying IFR be inspected every two years. VFR operators would not be required to 
comply with these inspections. FAR 91.413 requires transponder inspections every two years for 
all transponder-equipped aircraft. Transponder-less aircraft, while very few in number, would 
obviously not be inspected. Also, it is believed that a number of flying aircraft have likely not 
had FAR 91.411 and FAR 91.413 inspections as required. 
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The most straight-forward method to determine the number and extents of these errors would be 
an inspection of the fleet. This would be cost- and time-prohibitive. Single-owner fleets (flight 
schools, air operators, etc) of aircraft could be inspected to determine the magnitude of altimetry 
errors; however, this measure would be biased. Fleets of this type are used in commercial 
operations for their owners, and these fleets would be arguably better and more-often maintained 
than privately-owned and non-commercial aircraft. For preliminary estimates of the altimetry 
errors in the flying fleet, avionics certified repair stations (CRS) can be surveyed as to 
observations in performing 91.411 and 91.413 inspections. Again, this measure is automatically 
biased, as it is only considering aircraft which are volunteering themselves to be inspected per 
the regulations. The very aircraft that are more likely to be less rigorously maintained are also the 
aircraft that fail to maintain their 91.411 and 91.413 certifications every two years. 
An informal survey was done of three different avionics CRS operating under three different 
FSDOs in different parts of the country. The avionics CRS – each in operation for 20 years or 
more -- were asked to report their anecdotal observations about altimeter accuracy (91.411 
inspections) and reported transponder altimetry (91.413). Admittedly, this survey has a biased 
sample population, as the preponderance of aircraft getting 91.411 inspections would be 
expected to IFR-operating aircraft.  Such aircraft would likely be better equipped, better 
maintained, and operating more frequently/regularly than more casual VFR aircraft.  All aircraft 
with a transponder are required to obtain biennial 91.413 inspections, but compliance with this 
regulation may be less thorough than desired. In either case, altimetry is not inspected as 
thoroughly in most 91.413 inspections.  
All three avionics CRS reported performing approximately or more than 75 91.411 inspections 
and approximately or more than 125 91.413 inspections annually. A summary of the avionics 
CRS responses to the survey are given below: 
Q: What percentage of aircraft inspected annually for 91.413 fail for erroneous altitude 
reporting? (Note: Avionics CRS verify for 125’ agreement between altimeter and transponder “at 
a sufficient number of test points”.) 
CRS1: A few annually… two to four planes.  (This number would correspond to about 3%.) 
CRS2: I’d say I see 10-15 failures a year.  (This number would correspond to 15-20%.) 
CRS3: Just an estimate off the top of my head: 10% 
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These avionics CRS largely agreed with the occurrence of 91.413 failures. It should be noted that 
these CRS operate in different regions of the country and with different population densities. One 
is located in very densely populated metropolitan and busy aviation corridor. Another in a more 
suburban locations with no major metropolitan areas. The final CRS is located in a sparsely 
populate mid-continent region with more recreational flying general aviation aircraft and lots of 
agricultural aviation. The third CRS reported observing several cases where aircraft with low 
annual flight times had altimeter or blind encoder diaphragms that were stiff due to lack of 
use/exercise. He reported that such errors were dynamic and varied with temperature, aircraft 
use, humidity, etc.  
Q: What percentage of aircraft inspected annually for 91.411 fail? 
CRS1: Maybe as much as one-half.  
CRS2: Oh, 80%. (This shop admitted to being very thorough in its 91.411 inspections, and most 
of these failures were static system leak-down test failures due to the aging general aviation 
fleet.) 
CRS3: Not too many 10%. 
The first two avionics CRS seemed to be answering the question with regard to initial 91.411 
failures. When queried, all CRS reported that the most common failure mode of 91.411 
inspections was system leak test. Such failures can be diagnosed and repaired quickly. The third 
CRS was referring specifically to the occurrences of 91.411 failures of the altimeter (scale or 
barometer error) itself where the altimeter could not be adjusted back into compliance. 
 
Q: In altimeter scale errors, what are the magnitudes of the errors observed? 
CRS1: These altimeter errors are dynamic. Many intermittent and often altitude dependent. Most 
errors would be as much as 300’.  I have seen as much as 700-800’.  
CRS2: Most errors are small.  Gross errors would be called out by ATC and would be addressed. 
Errors in the system are, in reality, much worse; once an altitude is out of compliance in the 411 
inspection, we stop the test and fail the aircraft. 




Transponder inspections in FAR 91.413 must be performed and equipment must comply with the 




10.2 APPENDIX B. PART 43—ATC TRANSPONDER TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 
The ATC transponder tests required by § 91.413 of this chapter may be conducted using a bench 
check or portable test equipment and must meet the requirements prescribed in paragraphs (a) 
through (j) of this appendix. If portable test equipment with appropriate coupling to the aircraft 
antenna system is used, operate the test equipment for ATCRBS transponders at a nominal rate 
of 235 interrogations per second to avoid possible ATCRBS interference. Operate the test 
equipment at a nominal rate of 50 Mode S interrogations per second for Mode S. An additional 3 
dB loss is allowed to compensate for antenna coupling errors during receiver sensitivity 
measurements conducted in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) when using portable test 
equipment. 
(a) Radio Reply Frequency: 
(1) For all classes of ATCRBS transponders, interrogate the transponder and 
verify that the reply frequency is 1090 ±3 Megahertz (MHz). 
(2) For classes 1B, 2B, and 3B Mode S transponders, interrogate the transponder 
and verify that the reply frequency is 1090 ±3 MHz. 
(3) For classes 1B, 2B, and 3B Mode S transponders that incorporate the optional 
1090 ±1 MHz reply frequency, interrogate the transponder and verify that the 
reply frequency is correct. 
(4) For classes 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4 Mode S transponders, interrogate the 
transponder and verify that the reply frequency is 1090 ±1 MHz. 
(b) Suppression: When Classes 1B and 2B ATCRBS Transponders, or Classes 1B, 2B, 
and 3B Mode S transponders are interrogated Mode 3/A at an interrogation rate between 
230 and 1,000 interrogations per second; or when Classes 1A and 2A ATCRBS 
Transponders, or Classes 1B, 2A, 3A, and 4 Mode S transponders are interrogated at a 
rate between 230 and 1,200 Mode 3/A interrogations per second: 
(1) Verify that the transponder does not respond to more than 1 percent of 
ATCRBS interrogations when the amplitude of P2 pulse is equal to the P1 pulse. 
(2) Verify that the transponder replies to at least 90 percent of ATCRBS 
interrogations when the amplitude of the P2 pulse is 9 dB less than the P1 pulse. 
If the test is conducted with a radiated test signal, the interrogation rate shall be 
235 ±5 interrogations per second unless a higher rate has been approved for the 
test equipment used at that location. 
(c) Receiver Sensitivity: 
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(1) Verify that for any class of ATCRBS Transponder, the receiver minimum 
triggering level (MTL) of the system is −73 ±4 dbm, or that for any class of Mode 
S transponder the receiver MTL for Mode S format (P6 type) interrogations is 
−74 ±3 dbm by use of a test set either: 
(i) Connected to the antenna end of the transmission line; 
(ii) Connected to the antenna terminal of the transponder with a 
correction for transmission line loss; or 
(iii) Utilized radiated signal. 
(2) Verify that the difference in Mode 3/A and Mode C receiver sensitivity does not 
exceed 1 db for either any class of ATCRBS transponder or any class of Mode S 
transponder. 
(d) Radio Frequency (RF) Peak Output Power: 
(1) Verify that the transponder RF output power is within specifications for the 
class of transponder. Use the same conditions as described in (c)(1)(i), (ii), and 
(iii) above. 
(i) For Class 1A and 2A ATCRBS transponders, verify that the minimum 
RF peak output power is at least 21.0 dbw (125 watts). 
(ii) For Class 1B and 2B ATCRBS Transponders, verify that the minimum 
RF peak output power is at least 18.5 dbw (70 watts). 
(iii) For Class 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4 and those Class 1B, 2B, and 3B Mode S 
transponders that include the optional high RF peak output power, verify 
that the minimum RF peak output power is at least 21.0 dbw (125 watts). 
(iv) For Classes 1B, 2B, and 3B Mode S transponders, verify that the 
minimum RF peak output power is at least 18.5 dbw (70 watts). 
(v) For any class of ATCRBS or any class of Mode S transponders, verify 
that the maximum RF peak output power does not exceed 27.0 dbw (500 
watts). 
Note: The tests in (e) through (j) apply only to Mode S transponders. 
(e) Mode S Diversity Transmission Channel Isolation: For any class of Mode S 
transponder that incorporates diversity operation, verify that the RF peak output power 
transmitted from the selected antenna exceeds the power transmitted from the 
nonselected antenna by at least 20 db. 
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(f) Mode S Address: Interrogate the Mode S transponder and verify that it replies only to 
its assigned address. Use the correct address and at least two incorrect addresses. The 
interrogations should be made at a nominal rate of 50 interrogations per second. 
(g) Mode S Formats: Interrogate the Mode S transponder with uplink formats (UF) for 
which it is equipped and verify that the replies are made in the correct format. Use the 
surveillance formats UF=4 and 5. Verify that the altitude reported in the replies to UF=4 
are the same as that reported in a valid ATCRBS Mode C reply. Verify that the identity 
reported in the replies to UF=5 are the same as that reported in a valid ATCRBS Mode 
3/A reply. If the transponder is so equipped, use the communication formats UF=20, 21, 
and 24. 
(h) Mode S All-Call Interrogations: Interrogate the Mode S transponder with the Mode S-
only all-call format UF=11, and the ATCRBS/Mode S all-call formats (1.6 microsecond 
P4 pulse) and verify that the correct address and capability are reported in the replies 
(downlink format DF=11). 
(i) ATCRBS-Only All-Call Interrogation: Interrogate the Mode S transponder with the 
ATCRBS-only all-call interrogation (0.8 microsecond P4 pulse) and verify that no reply is 
generated. 
(j) Squitter: Verify that the Mode S transponder generates a correct squitter 
approximately once per second. 
(k) Records: Comply with the provisions of § 43.9 of this chapter as to content, form, and 
disposition of the records. 
[Amdt. 43-26, 52 FR 3390, Feb. 3, 1987; 52 FR 6651, Mar. 4, 1987, as amended by Amdt. 43-31, 
54 FR 34330, Aug. 18, 1989] 
Altimeter system and altitude reporting equipment tests and inspections in FAR 91.411 must be 
performed and equipment must comply with the requirements Part 43. These requirements are 






10.3 APPENDIX C. PART 43—ALTIMETER SYSTEM TEST AND INSPECTIONS 
Each person performing the altimeter system tests and inspections required by § 91.411 shall 
comply with the following: 
(a) Static pressure system: 
(1) Ensure freedom from entrapped moisture and restrictions. 
(2) Determine that leakage is within the tolerances established in § 23.1325 or § 
25.1325, whichever is applicable. 
(3) Determine that the static port heater, if installed, is operative. 
(4) Ensure that no alterations or deformations of the airframe surface have been 
made that would affect the relationship between air pressure in the static pressure 
system and true ambient static air pressure for any flight condition. 
(b) Altimeter: 
(1) Test by an appropriately rated repair facility in accordance with the following 
subparagraphs. Unless otherwise specified, each test for performance may be 
conducted with the instrument subjected to vibration. When tests are conducted 
with the temperature substantially different from ambient temperature of 
approximately 25 degrees C., allowance shall be made for the variation from the 
specified condition. 
(i) Scale error. With the barometric pressure scale at 29.92 inches of 
mercury, the altimeter shall be subjected successively to pressures 
corresponding to the altitude specified in Table I up to the maximum 
normally expected operating altitude of the airplane in which the altimeter 
is to be installed. The reduction in pressure shall be made at a rate not in 
excess of 20,000 feet per minute to within approximately 2,000 feet of the 
test point. The test point shall be approached at a rate compatible with the 
test equipment. The altimeter shall be kept at the pressure corresponding 
to each test point for at least 1 minute, but not more than 10 minutes, 
before a reading is taken. The error at all test points must not exceed the 
tolerances specified in Table I. 
(ii) Hysteresis. The hysteresis test shall begin not more than 15 minutes 
after the altimeter's initial exposure to the pressure corresponding to the 
upper limit of the scale error test prescribed in subparagraph (i); and 
while the altimeter is at this pressure, the hysteresis test shall commence. 
Pressure shall be increased at a rate simulating a descent in altitude at the 
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rate of 5,000 to 20,000 feet per minute until within 3,000 feet of the first 
test point (50 percent of maximum altitude). The test point shall then be 
approached at a rate of approximately 3,000 feet per minute. The 
altimeter shall be kept at this pressure for at least 5 minutes, but not more 
than 15 minutes, before the test reading is taken. After the reading has 
been taken, the pressure shall be increased further, in the same manner as 
before, until the pressure corresponding to the second test point (40 
percent of maximum altitude) is reached. The altimeter shall be kept at 
this pressure for at least 1 minute, but not more than 10 minutes, before 
the test reading is taken. After the reading has been taken, the pressure 
shall be increased further, in the same manner as before, until atmospheric 
pressure is reached. The reading of the altimeter at either of the two test 
points shall not differ by more than the tolerance specified in Table II from 
the reading of the altimeter for the corresponding altitude recorded during 
the scale error test prescribed in paragraph (b)(i). 
(iii) After effect. Not more than 5 minutes after the completion of the 
hysteresis test prescribed in paragraph (b)(ii), the reading of the altimeter 
(corrected for any change in atmospheric pressure) shall not differ from 
the original atmospheric pressure reading by more than the tolerance 
specified in Table II. 
(iv) Friction. The altimeter shall be subjected to a steady rate of decrease 
of pressure approximating 750 feet per minute. At each altitude listed in 
Table III, the change in reading of the pointers after vibration shall not 
exceed the corresponding tolerance listed in Table III. 
(v) Case leak. The leakage of the altimeter case, when the pressure within 
it corresponds to an altitude of 18,000 feet, shall not change the altimeter 
reading by more than the tolerance shown in Table II during an interval of 
1 minute. 
(vi) Barometric scale error. At constant atmospheric pressure, the 
barometric pressure scale shall be set at each of the pressures (falling 
within its range of adjustment) that are listed in Table IV, and shall cause 
the pointer to indicate the equivalent altitude difference shown in Table IV 
with a tolerance of 25 feet. 
(2) Altimeters which are the air data computer type with associated computing 
systems, or which incorporate air data correction internally, may be tested in a 
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manner and to specifications developed by the manufacturer which are acceptable 
to the Administrator. 
(c) Automatic Pressure Altitude Reporting Equipment and ATC Transponder System 
Integration Test. The test must be conducted by an appropriately rated person under the 
conditions specified in paragraph (a). Measure the automatic pressure altitude at the 
output of the installed ATC transponder when interrogated on Mode C at a sufficient 
number of test points to ensure that the altitude reporting equipment, altimeters, and ATC 
transponders perform their intended functions as installed in the aircraft. The difference 
between the automatic reporting output and the altitude displayed at the altimeter shall 
not exceed 125 feet. 
(d) Records: Comply with the provisions of § 43.9 of this chapter as to content, form, and 
disposition of the records. The person performing the altimeter tests shall record on the 
altimeter the date and maximum altitude to which the altimeter has been tested and the 
persons approving the airplane for return to service shall enter that data in the airplane 













TOLERANCE (+/- FEET) 
−1,000 31.018 20 
0 29.921 20 
500 29.385 20 
1,000 28.856 20 
1,500 28.335 25 
2,000 27.821 30 
3,000 26.817 30 
4,000 25.842 35 
6,000 23.978 40 
8,000 22.225 60 
10,000 20.577 80 
12,000 19.029 90 
14,000 17.577 100 
16,000 16.216 110 
18,000 14.942 120 
20,000 13.750 130 
22,000 12.636 140 
25,000 11.104 155 
30,000 8.885 180 
35,000 7.041 205 
40,000 5.538 230 
45,000 4.355 255 








Case Leak Test ±100 
  
Hysteresis Test:  
First Test Point (50 percent of maximum altitude) 75 
Second Test Point (40 percent of maximum altitude) 75 
After Effect Test 30 
 
Table 3 Friction Tolerances 

















Table 4 Pressure-Altitude Difference 












 (Secs. 313, 314, and 601 through 610 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1354, 1355, 
and 1421 through 1430) and sec. 6(c), Dept. of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(c))) 
[Amdt. 43-2, 30 FR 8262, June 29, 1965, as amended by Amdt. 43-7, 32 FR 7587, May 24, 1967; 
Amdt. 43-19, 43 FR 22639, May 25, 1978; Amdt. 43-23, 47 FR 41086, Sept. 16, 1982; Amdt. 43-






10.4 APPENDIX D. ADS-B IN DEVICE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS REPORT BY 
SIMULYZE  
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ADS-B IN is one of the surveillance technologies that will be a factor for UAS operations, whether 
ADS-B OUT is used on UAV’s or just for surveillance of manned aviation that uses ADS-B OUT 
per the FAA ADS-B mandate.  Working with ADS-B IN as a surveillance technology for situational 
awareness in support of UAS operations, Simulyze® has observed potential differences in aircraft 
reporting from different ADS-B IN devices.  These observations have led us to work with the 
ASSURE A6 Surveillance Critically Study to perform an initial, quick look study comparing the 
surveillance performance of four ADS-B IN devices. 
 
STUDY PARAMETERS 
This is an initial study to do a quantitative first look at ADS-B IN device performance for 
surveillance supporting UAS operations.  The purpose of the study is to get a quantitative 
assessment of the value in performing a more detailed study of ADS-B IN devices for surveillance.  
This study is focused on assessing the reporting of ADS-B OUT transmissions that should be 
received by all the devices.  This was accomplished by limiting the coverage area to 1 statute mile 
ground radius from the receivers/antennas.  Another study of actual comparative receiver and 
antenna performance may be beneficial.  For this study, four commercially available ADS-B IN 
devices that receive both the 1090 MHz and 978 MHz frequencies were selected.  Simulyze’s 
Mission Insight software was used to process the data from each of the devices.  Each of the 
devices output a different data format.  The 4 ADS-B IN devices are the Clarity from Sagetech, 
the Stratus 2 from Appareo, the PingUSB from uAvionix, and the PingBuddy from uAvionix.  They 






All devices except the Stratus 2 used the device’s fixed antenna.  The Stratus used an external 
antenna.  The test was a ground based test.  The devices were placed within a 1 square foot area 
approximately 7 feet off the ground.  The test was performed from 16:55 – 22:15 GMT on 11/13/16 
about 5 miles west of Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) in Virginia. 
 
OVERALL RESULTS  
The results of this quick look study reveal a significant variation in reporting by each of the various 
devices.  None of the devices provided reporting on all the aircraft, although one device did not 
report on only one aircraft.  ADS-B OUT aircraft report once a second.  There was variability in 
the reporting frequency from the devices. 
 
This initial study indicates that a more rigorous study should be performed with ADS-B IN devices 
to assess the difference between various devices and to assess the timing performance of ADS-IN 
to support surveillance in support of UAS operations.  Also, ground based versus aerial based 
performance may also be of interest.   
 
ANALYSIS and RESULTS 
A top level look at the overall number of aircraft reported by each of the devices is the starting 
point for the analysis.  This is a top level parameter as the reporting will vary based on the device’s 
antenna and receiver sensitivities as well as the ordering and processing of the different messages 
that can make up an ADS-B OUT broadcast to identify the aircraft (Registration number/”N” 
number, call sign, ICAO address).  The following set of tables will include the number of aircraft 
reported from the specific device as well the total number of aircraft reported from the combined 
outputs.  The total number of aircraft reported by each device will be provided for five ranges from 
the location of the devices.   
All aircraft reported, no range from device filter 
Device Number of aircraft reported 
All devices in a combined dataset 432 
uAvionix PingUSB 419 
Appareo Stratus 2 w/ external antenna 345 
Sagetech Clarity 264 







Aircraft reported within 35 statute miles from the devices 
Device Number of aircraft reported 
All devices in a combined dataset 378 
uAvionix PingUSB 366 
Appareo Stratus 2 w/ external antenna 325 
Sagetech Clarity 257 
uAvionix PingBuddy 188 
 
Aircraft reported with 15 statute miles from the devices 
Device Number of aircraft reported 
All devices in a combined dataset 329 
uAvionix PingUSB 321 
Appareo Stratus 2 w/ external antenna 279 
Sagetech Clarity 231 
uAvionix PingBuddy 178 
 
Aircraft reported with 5 statute miles from the devices 
Device Number of aircraft reported 
All devices in a combined dataset 276 
uAvionix PingUSB 271 
Appareo Stratus 2 w/ external antenna 233 
Sagetech Clarity 196 
uAvionix PingBuddy 142 
 
Aircraft reported with 1 statute miles from the devices 
Device Number of aircraft reported 
All devices in a combined dataset 206 
uAvionix PingUSB 204 
Appareo Stratus 2 w/ external antenna 164 
Sagetech Clarity 147 
uAvionix PingBuddy 86 
 
From a range and reporting perspective, the uAvionix PingUSB had the best overall reporting 
followed by the Appareo Stratus 2 and then the Sagetech Clarity.  The uAvionix PingBuddy had 
the shortest range and fewest reported tracks.  It is unknown if any of the devices have limits on 
the number of aircraft and/or reports that can be handled, although any device used for surveillance 




In an attempt to reduce the receiver and antenna sensitivity variation, the next level of analysis was 
done on aircraft reporting within one statute mile ground radius from the devices.  The expectation 
being that aircraft in close proximity to any device should be received and reported.  The last table 
above listed the aircraft reported by each device in the one statue mile radius from the devices.  
There was variability in the total aircraft reported.  The PingUSB performed the best.  The Stratus 
and the Clarity were second and third with the PingBuddy a distant fourth.  
 
The devices were located in proximity to Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) and 
Leesburg Executive Airport (KJYO).   15 aircraft were reported in more than one contiguous time 
period as well as multiple aircraft squawking 1200.  For the purposes of this quick look report, 
those aircraft were eliminated from the analysis.  
 
The table below does a comparison between each pair of devices based on the number of aircraft 
reported.   Looking at each column, the values are how many more aircraft were reported by the 
device in the column heading than by the device in each row heading.  The percentage is the 
percentage of aircraft received by the device in the column that were not received by the device in 






Sagetech Clarity uAvionix 
PingBuddy 
uAvionix PingUSB - 1 (0.01%) 0 0 
Appareo Stratus 2  38 (20%) - 6 (0.4%) 
 
2 (0.03%) 
Sagetech Clarity 54 (29%) 23 (15%) - 0 
uAvionix 
PingBuddy 
112 (59%) 77 (51%) 58 (43%) - 
 
None of the devices reported all the aircraft.  The PingUSB did not report on only one aircraft 
reported by the Stratus.  The Stratus reported 23 aircraft the Clarity did not report but the Clarity 
reported 6 aircraft the Stratus did not report.  The PingBuddy reported significantly fewer aircraft 
than all others, although it did report on two aircraft that the Stratus did not report.  The PingBuddy 
was the only device that did not report any aircraft further than 35 miles. 
 
Although the study is not intended to assess the respective receiver and antenna performance, it 
seems interesting that the two uAvionix devices provided the best and the worst reporting in this 
initial study.  Their receiver characteristics listed on the uAvionix website are the same.  The 




PingUSB Technical Specifications-Receiver 
Specification Value 
MTL 1090MHz –84dBm 
Dynamic Range -81 to -0dBm 
MTL 978MHz -93dBm 
Dynamic Range -90 to -3dBm 
 
PingBuddy Technical Specifications-Receiver 
Specification Value 
MTL 1090MHz –84dBm 
Dynamic Range -81 to -0dBm 
MTL 978MHz -93dBm 
Dynamic Range -90 to -3dBm 
 
Below is a table of more detailed reporting parameters.   It is grouped into 4 sections.  The first is 
the overall aircraft count.  The second is statistics about the number of reports received for each 
aircraft.  The third is statistics about the time period that reports were received for each aircraft.  






 Overall uAvionix 
PingUSB 
Appareo 





Number of aircraft reported 190 189 152 135 77 
      
Average number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 26.9 8.9 14.9 16.0 
Median number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 19 7 11 10 
Minimum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 4 1 1 1 
Maximum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 138 50 93 102 
      
Average time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 41 sec 49 sec 33 sec 21 sec 
Median time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 34 sec 42 sec 29 sec 14 sec 
Minimum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 3 sec 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 4 min 34 sec 4 min 38 sec 4 min 21 sec 1 min 56 sec 
      
Average time between 
reports per aircraft 
 2 sec 7 sec 3 sec 1 sec 
Median time between reports 
per aircraft 
 2 sec 6 sec 2 sec 1 sec 
Minimum time between 
reports per aircraft 
 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time between 
reports per aircraft 
 5 sec 29 sec 18 sec 5 sec 
 
There is variability in these parameters for each device.   The performance ordering of the four 
devices remains the same, except the Clarity generally reported more frequently than the Stratus 
on the aircraft the Clarity received.  The PingBuddy also reported more frequently than the other 
three devices on the aircraft it did report, although it reported significantly fewer aircraft overall. 
 
For a quick look to see if there was different reporting based on altitude, the two tables below 
provide the same data from above for aircraft below 18000 feet and at or above 18000 feet altitude.  
Although the ADS-B OUT frequency is not identified in all the feeds, these tables gives a high 
level approximation for the guideline 1090 MHz and the 978 MHz operating altitudes.   
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Below 18000 feet altitude 
 Overall uAvionix 
PingUSB 
Appareo 





Number of aircraft reported 83 82 69 58 32 
      
Average number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 30.1 10.0 14.0 16.3 
Median number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 21.5 8 12.5 19 
Minimum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 4 1 1 1 
Maximum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 131 37 44 43 
      
Average time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 46 sec 52 sec 35 sec 20 sec 
Median time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 37 sec 47 sec 30 sec 20 sec 
Minimum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 3 sec 4 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 4 min 34 sec 4 min 38 sec 4 min 21 sec 0 min 52 sec 
      
Average time between 
reports per aircraft 
 2 sec 7 sec 3 sec 1 sec 
Median time between reports 
per aircraft 
 1 sec 6 sec 3 sec 1 sec 
Minimum time between 
reports per aircraft 
 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time between 
reports per aircraft 


















At or above 18000 feet altitude 
 Overall uAvionix 
PingUSB 
Appareo 





Number of aircraft reported 107 107 83 77 45 
      
Average number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 24.4 8.0 15.6 15.7 
Median number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 14 6 11 8 
Minimum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 4 1 1 1 
Maximum number of reports 
per aircraft reported 
 138 50 93 102 
      
Average time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 37 sec 45 sec 31 sec 22 sec 
Median time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 30 sec 39 sec 28 sec 10 sec 
Minimum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 4 sec 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time period of 
reports per aircraft 
 2 min 25 sec 2 min 32 sec 2 min 16 sec 1 min 56 sec 
      
Average time between 
reports per aircraft 
 2 sec 8 sec 2 sec 1 sec 
Median time between reports 
per aircraft 
 2 sec 6 sec 2 sec 1 sec 
Minimum time between 
reports per aircraft 
 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 1 sec 
Maximum time between 
reports per aircraft 
 5 sec 29 sec 18 sec 3 sec 
 
From the tables above, it does not appear that there was a significant difference in each individual 
device’s reporting performance in the two operating regimes when in close proximity (1 mile) of 
the devices.  It did not change the relative performance between the devices. 
 
From a surveillance perspective, there are number of topics to consider.  Each device did not report 
all aircraft.  The PingUSB came closest only missing one that the Stratus reported.  The average 
time between reports was 1 – 7 seconds.  Only the PingBuddy average of 1 second reports matching 
the ADS-B OUT frequency of 1 per second, although it reported around 50% fewer aircraft.  The 
others had median reporting of 2-6 seconds.  The longest time between reports ranged from 5-29 
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seconds.  If this timing is confirmed in a more detailed study, that would need to be assessed in 
terms of detect and avoid algorithms if they assume 1 second reporting of positions consistent with 
the ADS-B OUT reporting requirements.  
 
SUMMARY 
This quick look analysis indicates that it would be valuable to perform a detailed study of ADS-B 
IN devices.  This initial study indicates there is potentially a significant variance in the aircraft 
reported and the reporting frequency for the aircraft reports from different ADS-B IN devices.     
 
It does indicate that ADS-B IN can provide valuable surveillance data.  If a more rigorous follow-
up study confirms that there is significant variability in the aircraft reported and the reporting 
intervals, the variability will need to be factored into surveillance metrics and detect and avoid 
algorithms.   Devices may need to meet a minimum capability threshold or be certified to be used 






10.5 APPENDIX E: LITERATURE REVIEW 
ADS-B 
1. Cook, E. (2015, August). ADS-B, Friend or Foe: ADS-B Message Authentication for 
NextGen Aircraft. In High Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC), 
2015 IEEE 7th International Symposium on Cyberspace Safety and Security (CSS), 
2015 IEEE 12th International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems 
(ICESS), 2015 IEEE 17th International Conference on (pp. 1256-1261). IEEE. 
This paper outlines the lack of security measures in place within current ADS-B devices 
to provide authenticity and integrity as well as presents a method for ADS-B message 
authentication. A public key infrastructure to verify all ADS-B signals from FAA 
registered aircraft that uses an asymmetric cryptography to exchange a session key to 
validate data authenticity is suggested as a means of securing ADS-B devices in the NAS. 
 
The evaluation of the current security issues that makes ADS-B open to spoofing as well 
as a possible methodology to provide integrity and authenticity to ADS-B messages 
provides insight into possible failure modes of ADS-B in terms of external spoofing. 
 
2. Costin, A., & Francillon, A. (2012). Ghost in the Air (Traffic): On insecurity of ADS-
B protocol and practical attacks on ADS-B devices. Black Hat USA, 1-12. 
This paper analyzes the security of ADS-B in regards to both passive (eavesdropping) 
and active (message jamming) attacks on the system. By using a commercial off the shelf 
software defined radio (SDR) to transmit attacker controlled messages to an ADS-B 
receiver Costin, Andrei, and Francillon were able show various types and severities of 
ADS-B attacks. This study outlines some of the fundamental architecture and design 
problems of ADS-B that have not been addressed in prior security experiments in an 
attempt to raise awareness to the liability of current ADS-B systems. 
The results of this paper on ADS-B insecurity provides viable research into the 
possibilities of ADS-B attacks as well as outlines some of the security concerns and 
design flaws within the architecture of ADS-B. These flaws could provide useful to input 
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well-clear violations and evaluates the distribution of distances between aircraft at a well 
clear violation in high-altitude enroute airspace. 
 
Updated Literature Review Documents 
1. Circular, F.A. 20-165B, “. Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out Systems. 
This Advisory Circular provided an overview of the installation requirements for ADS-B 
out in aircraft. Specifically it provides clear insight into some of the required performance 
characteristics of ADS-B as well as a system overview. The performance requirements of 
ADS-B were useful in creating and building a preliminary hazard assessment of a DAA 
system with ADS-B out included. 
 
2. Circular, F. A. 23.1309-1E, “. Equipment, Systems, and Installation in Part, 23. 
This advisory circular detailed a functional hazard assessment for 14 CFR Part 23 IFR 
Aircraft. Additionally it provided an appendix of aircraft functions and their associated 
classification of failure condition. This was used to inform the failure tree for the 
preliminary hazard assessment as well as verify the failure classifications provided by 
various TSO’s. Finally, this advisory circular provided the failure classification of the 





3. Circular, F.A. 43-6C, “. Altitude Reporting Equipment and Transponder System 
Maintenance and Inspection Practices. 
This advisory circular mainly points to several key TSO’s for the altimeter and ADS-B 
systems. The acknowledgement of the TSO’s for altimeter and ADS-B systems led to 
failure classifications of several important DAA components. 
 
4. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, Washington, DC Special Committee 
135. (1990). Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment. 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 
RTCA published this document to provide a set of standards for the environmental test 
procedures for Airborne Equipment. These standards provide a sense of the overall 
performance standards for all airborne equipment. By having the test procedures for all 
airborne equipment outlined in this DO, it was possible to understand how detect and 
avoid equipment needed to function in order to pass the environmental testing. Overall, 
this RTCA paper provided insight into the functioning of detect and avoid systems as well 
as the design assurance levels. 
 
5. DO, R. (2011). 178C. Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 
This document published by RTCA outlines the design standards for software used in 
airborne systems. The rapid increase in the use of software in airborne systems required a 
standard for software development and implantation. This document provides the 
necessary airworthiness process for software. In particular this document gives the 
descriptions of the failure condition categories for software failure in airborne systems. 
The descriptions outline the worst case outcome for each failure category from 
Catastrophic to No Safety Effect. 
 
6. DO, R. (2011). Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Air Traffic Control 
Radar Beacon System/mode Select (ATCRBS/modes) Airborne Equipment. Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 
The MOPS for ATCRBS/Mode S outlines the performance standards of both commonly 
used transponder systems. These performance standards were critical in developing the 
failure modes of Mode S transponders as well as how the system performs in typical use 
cases. This document in particular was helpful in determining the specifics of how Mode 
S transponders work and interact with other detect and avoid systems. DO-181E outlines 
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everything from system performance to data link communications and the specifics of 
Mode S transponder messaging. 
 
7. DO, R. (2008), Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System II (TCAS II). Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is outlined completely in this document by 
RTCA. The minimum performance standards of TCAS were used to develop the failure 
modes and characteristics of TCAS. Overall the MOPS gave enough information to 
understand TCAS on a system level. Particularly the information regarding how the 
TCAS unit handles transponder failures as well as transponder misleading information 
was useful for the preliminary hazard assessment. Additionally the system overview and 
performance characteristics provided an understanding of the overall TCAS equipment. 
8. DO, R. (2004), Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics. 
The minimum aviation system performance standards (MASPS) for ADS-B specify 
operational characteristics that help designers and users gather an understanding of the 
aviation standards associated with ADS-B. This document provides a view of the system-
wide operational use of ADS-B, but does not describe a specific technical implementation 
or design architecture meeting the operational and technical characteristics. Overall this 
document was useful in determining the operational use cases for ADS-B as well as the 
failure conditions. 
 
9. DO, R. (2000), Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware. Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics. 
This RTCA document provided guidelines to the failure condition classifications for 
electronic hardware. The failure conditions were outlined and described according to how 
the failure would affect the system as whole as well as what the failure would mean for 
the continued operation of an aircraft. The description of the failure conditions provided 
insight on how to classify the failures researched in the preliminary hazard assessment.  
 
10. DO, R. (2011), Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 1090 MHz 
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic 





The ADS-B 1090 MHz Extended Squitter MOPS outlined the specific performance 
standards of Extended Squitter ADS-B as compared to UAT ADS-B. In particular this 
document discussed how a Mode S transponder works with ADS-B as well as the 
specifics of GPS NIC, NAC, and SIL together with ADS-B. As 1090 ES ADS-B was the 
primary ADS-B system analyzed, this document was useful in determining how 1090 ES 
works as well as how it works with other systems necessary for detect and avoid. 
12. DO, R. (2011), Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). 
Radio Technical Commission of Aeronautics. 
The MOPS for UAT ADS-B provided details on the working and performance standards 
of Universal Access Transceiver ADS-B. UAT is a multi-purpose aeronautical data link 
intended to support not only ADS-B but also Flight Information Service – Broadcast 
(FIS-B), and Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B), and if required in the 
future, supplementary ranging and positioning capabilities. Overall this document was 
useful in outlining how UAT ADS-B, FIS-B, and TIS-B function together in the national 
airspace. 
 
13. DO, R. (2003), Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Aircraft 
Surveillance Applications (ASA). Radio Technical Commission of Aeronautics. 
This paper provided several examples of fault trees and how they can be used in a 
preliminary hazard assessment. In particular Appendix C of this paper gives multiple 
fault tree examples for collisions under VFR conditions in the national airspace. These 
failure trees given in this paper provided example for designing the failures of the detect 
and avoid system as well as an indication of how to connect each failure into an 
overarching tree. Finally DO-289 gave insight into developing an operational hazards 
chart and how to present hazards, safety concerns, and mitigations from a failure tree. 
 
14. DO, R. (2014), Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Aircraft 
Surveillance Applications (ASA) System. Radio Technical Commission of 
Aeronautics. 
The MOPS for the ASA System contains requirements for processing, control and display 
of traffic and ownship information for use by flight crews in performing airborne 
applications. In particular, this document takes a look into the math behind developing 
performance standards for ASA systems. It was useful to see how the Aircraft 
Surveillance Applications System works and how that can be modeled similarly to a 




15. DO, R. (2014), Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirement Document for 
Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts (TSAA). Radio Technical Commission of 
Aeronautics. 
This document defines and allocates the set of minimum requirement for the end-to-end 
operational, safety, performance, and interoperability aspects for implementation of the 
TSAA application. In addition this document provides guidance to determine the levels of 
design assurance and performance that are needed for each element (aircraft, operator, 
and Air Navigation Service Provider to support the TSAA application. DO-348 was 
useful in providing additional examples of fault trees and an in depth preliminary hazard 
assessment for the TSAA application. These examples provided an opportunity to learn 
about failure tree as well as reference to determine content and structure. 
 
16. "Introduction to TCAS II Version 7.1." (n.d.): 1-50. FAA.gov. Federal Aviation 
Administration, 28 Feb. 2011. Web. 28 Feb. 2016. 
This document describes different early avoidance systems, TCAS evolution, its 
components and functions. It also includes collision avoidance concepts, CAS logic 
functions, performance monitoring of the system. Primarily this paper was used to 
determine the overall performance of TCAS as well as the system level components and 
architecture involved with the TCAS system. In particular it was useful to determine how 
the individual components of TCAS affect the performance of the system. The document 
goes through and outlines how TCAS responds to incorrect data and system level 
failures. 
 
17. TCAS on UAS Team. “Evaluation of Candidate Functions for Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) On Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).” 
FAA Aviation Safety (2011): n. pag. Web. 
This paper provided a baseline for the preliminary hazard assessment performed on detect 
and avoid system for unmanned aircraft. The system level hazard approach was helpful in 
determining the approach and development of the analyzing detect and avoid systems. In 
particular the risk assessment and hazard assessment for the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System was helpful by providing a baseline for the analysis. Additionally this 
paper provided a template to follow in the writing of the final report. 
18. Kuchar, J. E., & Drumm, A. C. (2007). The traffic alert and collision avoidance 
system. Lincoln Laboratory Journal, 16(2), 277. 
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This paper discusses the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System and how is has been 
a success in reducing the risk of mid-air collisions. Additionally this paper looks at the 
previous data from TCAS implemented systems around the world in an attempt to 
determine how the algorithms could be improved as well as how the entire system could 
be improved. The paper also addresses the possibility and functioning of TCAS on 
unmanned aircraft. This is particularly useful to this project as it gives insight into the 
shortcomings of TCAS on unmanned aircraft as well as some of the possible mitigations. 
 
19. Panken, A. D., Harman, W. H., Rose, C. E., Drumm, A. C., Chludzinski, B. J., Elder, 
T. R., & Murphy, T. J. (2012). Measurements of the 1030 and 1090 MHz environments 
at JFK international airport (No. ATC-390). Spring Field: Lincoln Laboratory. 
This paper is a report on the 1030/1090 MHz frequency using a ground based 
omnidirectional receiver near the JFK International Airport. This report includes the overall 
analysis of the 1030/1090 MHz environments, the analysis of TCAS air-to-coordination 
process, an examination of the 1090 MHz ES ADS-B, and the assessment of the extent and 
impact of TCAS operation on the airport surface. Overall this paper provides several key 
aspects to the DAA final report for UAS. The analysis of TCAS and 1090 ES ADS-B were 
valuable in understanding possible failure modes as well as the operation of both system 
in the real world. 
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11 Simulation Environment Architecture Description 
In order to design a successful surveillance analyzing simulation environment, accurate Flight 
Dynamic Models (FDM) of the UAS aircraft, as well as an autopilot capable of steering the 
aircraft safely and securely are essential. Two distinct UAS aerodynamic models have been 
developed for this project. A Predator class RQ1 UAV aircraft and a Global Hawk model of 
RQ4A have been modeled using JSBSim aerodynamic modeler. The FDMs were integrated with 
the Flight Management System (FMS) capable of storing flight plans using 3D waypoint 
trajectories (latitude, longitude, altitude), as well as spawning multiple simulated real-time 
aircraft. Flight plan trajectory can be provided for autonomous navigation of an aircraft.  
The FDMs are developed based on the publicly available aircraft operational data and 
limitations. In order to test the aircraft in various flight scenarios, a test autopilot has been 
developed, maintaining the horizontal, vertical, and lateral balance of the aircraft as well as the 
speed (autothrottle) and altitude.  
The FDM and autopilot were designed and implemented in JSBSim. JSBSim is an open-source 
M&S software incorporating equations of motion in aerodynamics, as well as ideal 
“Proportional-Integrative-Derivative” (PID) control loop feedback mechanisms implemented in a 
C++ simulation engine supported by an xml model-definition language. JSBsim uses a discrete-
time base that computes the forces acting in the six degrees of freedom at each time-step. 
Therefore, the entire state of the aircraft including all of the equations of motion is recomputed at 
each time step. This allows for accurate estimation of the aerodynamic behavior of the aircraft as 
well as its heading and attitude. Flight control laws, stability augmentation systems, autopilots, 
and arbitrary aircraft systems (avionics, electrical systems, etc.) can be modeled in JSBSim by 
creating chains of individual control components. A suite of configurable components in JSBSim 
includes gains, filters, switches, PIDs, and more, enabling implementation of various dynamics 
in the FDM and autopilot.  
The two UAS models were provided with autopilots designed in JSBSim, composed of three 
directional stability (yaw, pitch, and roll) as well as heading and speed control (autothrottle). 




This simulation-based framework allowed for cost-effective and risk-free prototyping, verifying, 
and validating future DAA concepts and integration with NAS. The FDMs were designed and 
developed with a constraint of minimal complexity and cost such that it can be used by academia 
while reducing software complexity and verification efforts compared to commercial systems. 
The project uses a cloud-based distributed flight-simulator. This architecture is capable of 
simulating many simultaneous aircraft in high fidelity, each with configurable transponder 
capabilities and instrument displays. The simulation engine is composed of a frontend 
visualization engine as well as a backend simulation engine control that spawns and controls 
JSBSim instances for each aircraft. The outputs of the real-time JSBSim FDM engine for each 
aircraft is interfaced with the simulation engine over TCP sockets where the input commands to 
the control surfaces, autopilot, and the throttle are transferred as well as the outputs of the 
simulation are received from the JSBSim. JSBsim outputs are then transferred to the 
visualization engine as well as the transponder, DAA, and TCAS components.  
Simulated flights are created using the NEAR Flight Operations (NFO) software, allowing the 
user to generate a Flight Object Information Exchange v3 (FIXM3) compliant flight plan. Once 
the user files the flight, the system then extracts the aircraft type, route of flight, equipage, and 
other details in order to generate a matching simulated flight.  
The visualization engine displays and all instruments are rendered in the web-browser, allowing 
for flexibility in configuring the simulation environment. Each simulation station can switch 
freely between available aircraft using the control display that is paired with the Primary Flight 
Display (PFD) (Figure 11.1). By default, the autopilot is active in waypoint tracking mode, 
however it can be overloaded via the physical controls. The Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI) (shown in bottom right of Figure 11.1) produces Traffic Advisory (TA) 
alerts and Resolution Advisory (RA) alerts for supported modes of operation as well as rendering 
own-ship position and heading, the route of flight, and any other aircraft within several nautical 
miles ahead. The DAA alerts have been overlayed on the ADSB display (shown in bottom left of 
Figure 11.1), displaying the DAA Preventative, Corrective, and Warning alerts that are computed 




Figure 11.1. Visualization engine and aircraft control displays 
 
Figure 11.2 shows the desktop simulation console that was used as pilot station for UAV. During 
the testing, the cockpit window displays were turned off to emulate a UAV flight.  
 
Figure 11.2. Simulation station 
Other visual displays such as Air Traffic Control (ATC) displays (Figure 11.3) and aircraft chase 




   
Figure 11.3. ATC views 
 
 




12 Hazard Assessment Data Sets 
Tables in Section 12 
 
Table 12.1. Class A 2v2  
Table 12.2. Class A 1v2  
Table 12.3. Class A 1v1  
Table 12.4. Class B 2v2  
Table 12.5. Class B 1v2  
Table 12.6. Class B 1v1  
Table 12.7. Class C 2v2  
Table 12.8. Class C 1v2  
Table 12.9. Class C 1v1  
Table 12.10. Class D 2v2  
Table 12.11. Class D 1v2  
Table 12.12. Class D 1v1  
Table 12.13. Class D 2v1A  
Table 12.14. Class D 1v1A  
Table 12.15. Class D 2v0  
Table 12.16. Class D 1v0  
Table 12.17. Class E>10k, 2v2  
Table 12.18. Class E>10k, 1v2  
Table 12.19. Class E>10k, 1v1  
Table 12.20. Class E<10k, 2v2  
Table 12.21. Class E<10k, 1v2  
Table 12.22. Class E<10k, 1v1  
Table 12.23. Class E<10k, 2v1A  
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Table 12.24. Class E<10k, 1v1A  
Table 12.25. Class E<10k, 2v0  
Table 12.26. Class E<10k, 1v0  
Table 12.27. Class G 2v2  
Table 12.28. Class G 1v2  
Table 12.29. Class G 1v1  
Table 12.30. Class G 2v1A  
Table 12.31. Class G 1v1A  
Table 12.32. Class G 2v0  




Table 12.1. Class A 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and can use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class A airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 12.2. Class A 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class A airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 12.3. Class A 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class A airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Mode-S.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. ADS- B still 
provides lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 52.4. Class B 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class B airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table1 12.5. Class B 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class B airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 6.6. Class B 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class B airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Mode-S.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. ADS- B still 
provides lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 72.7. Class C 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class C airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 82.8. Class C 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In classC airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. ADS- B still provides 
lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 12.9. Class C 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class C airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Mode-S.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. ADS- B still 
provides lateral separation information. 
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 92.10. Class D 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of Separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.  Radar and ATC provide separation. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance 
algorithm and ATC. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B. Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude and Mode-S. TCAS and ADS-B 
still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of Separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar,  
separation by ATC and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means of separation. 
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of Separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages.  
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC.  
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC.  




Table 102.11. Class D 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead to the 
loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore failure of the 
TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-B systems have the 
capability to identify an invalid altitude report and opt to using 
GPS altitude for its intruder calculations. ATC and radar still 
provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of Separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering. Radar and ATC provide separation. 
Major Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS. 
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system for ADS-
B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies on barometric 
altitude and Mode-S, TCAS and ADS-B still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of Separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and See-
and-avoid are primary means of separation. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of Separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and ADS-B. 
Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate corrupted 
messages.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, ADS-B still operational providing target tracking, 
radar and see-and-avoid separation still possible. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Radar failure does not affect 
performance of ADS-B or TCAS systems, DAA still fully 
functional. 




Table 112.12. Class D 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.  Radar and ATC provide separation. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Radar.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. 
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar, visual 
separation by ATC and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means of separation. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar, 
visual separation by ATC and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 122.13. Class D 2v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation:  An altimeter failure will lead to the 
loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore failure 
of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-B 
systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering. Radar and ATC provide separation. 
Major Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS. 
Minor Medium Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by barometric 
altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. 
Minimal Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm. ADS-B still operational providing target 
tracking. Radar and DAA separation still possible. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 12.14. Class D 1v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation:  An altimeter failure will lead to the 
loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, ADS-B 
systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. ATC and radar still provide 
separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering. Radar and ATC provide separation. 
Major Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Radar.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B. Altitude separation provided by barometric 
altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. 
Minimal Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 12.15. Class D 2v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
NMAC: ATC and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is 
primary means of separation. 




Table 12.16. Class D 1v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
NMAC: ATC and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is 
primary means of separation. 




Table 12.17. Class E > 10k, 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks and is separating all IFR traffic. Additionally, the 
GPS geometric altitude available from the ADS-B system 
provides a reference for detection of a misleading 
altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. 
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar, ATC 
provide separation. 
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 12.18. Class E > 10k, 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by ATC and TCAS.  
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and TCAS. 
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and 
ATC provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of TCAS and 
ADS-B. Radar and ATC provides separation. Receiving 
transponder error correction routines can identify and 
mitigate corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and radar 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, ADS-B, and TCAS 
still functional. Additional separation assistance 
provided by ATC. 




Table 12.19. Class E > 10k, 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and use GPS altitude for intruder 
calculations. ATC and radar still provide separation 
assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Radar.  
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Altitude separation provided by 
barometric altitude, ATC, and Mode-S. 
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and ATC 
provides separation.  
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: Possible corruption of ADS-B. Radar 
and ATC provides separation. Receiving transponder 
error correction routines can identify and mitigate 
corrupted messages. 
Major High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. Additional separation assistance provided 
by ATC. 




Table 12.20. Class E < 10k, 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, the 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify a loss of 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations.  ATC, radar, and see-and-avoid by 
the intruder still provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance 
algorithm and ATC. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude provides a backup 
system for ADS-B. Altitude separation provided by DAA 
relies on barometric altitude and Mode-S. TCAS and 
ADS-B still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and see-and-
avoid are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance recommendations or 
incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar and see-and-avoid 
by intruder aircraft are primary means separation.  
Radar and ADS-B tracks are non-correlated and may 
provide two targets for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS  1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, ADS-B still operational providing target 
tracking. Radar and see-and-avoid separation still 
possible. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Radar failure does not affect 
performance of ADS-B or TCAS systems. DAA still fully 
functional. 




Table 12.21. Class E < 10k, 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. ATC, radar, and see-and-avoid by 
the intruder still provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter.   
Major Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance 
algorithm and ATC. 
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude and Mode-S, TCAS and ADS-B 
still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and See-and-
avoid are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar 
and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary 
means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, providing two targets for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, ADS-B still operational providing target 
tracking, radar and see-and-avoid separation still 
possible. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Radar failure does not affect 
performance of ADS-B or TCAS systems, DAA still fully 
functional. 




Table 13. Class E < 10k, 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. ATC, radar, and see-and-avoid by 
the intruder still provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading 
information. In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude 
checks. Additionally, the GPS geometric altitude 
available from the ADS-B system provides a reference 
for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by ATC and Radar. 
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B. Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude. Mode-S and ADS-B still fully 
operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of ADS-B functionality. Radar and see-and-
avoid by intruder aircraft are primary means of 
separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar 
and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary 
means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, possibly providing two targets for 
avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Both aircraft are transponding 
and ownship DAA is still operating. 




Table 12.23. Class E < 10k, 2v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance:  An altimeter failure will lead to the loss 
of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore failure of the TCAS 
avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-B systems have the capability 
to identify an invalid altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude 
for its intruder calculations. ATC, radar, and see-and-avoid by the 
intruder still provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading information. 
In class E airspace, ATC provides altitude checks. Additionally, the 
GPS geometric altitude available from the ADS-B system provides 
a reference for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance algorithm and 
ATC. 
Minor Medium Risk 6E-07 6E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system for ADS-B, 
Altitude separation provided by DAA relies on barometric altitude 
and Mode-S, TCAS and ADS-B still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of ADS-B and TCAS functionality. Radar and see-and-
avoid by intruder aircraft are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Transponder wrong  1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering. Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are 
primary means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, possibly providing two targets for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm, 
ADS-B still operational providing target tracking, radar and see-
and-avoid separation still possible. 
Minor Low Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Both aircraft are transponding and 
ownship DAA is still operating. 




Table 12.24. Class E < 10k, 1v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance:  An altimeter failure will lead to the loss of 
Mode S reporting credibility. However, ADS-B systems have the 
capability to identify an invalid altitude report and opt to using GPS 
altitude for its intruder calculations. ATC, radar, and see-and-avoid 
by the intruder still provide separation assistance. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong  1.00E-09 
Loss of separation: Altitude is providing misleading information. In 
class E airspace, ATC provides altitude checks. Additionally, the GPS 
geometric altitude available from the ADS-B system provides a 
reference for detection of a misleading altimeter. 
Major Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system failure. 
Separation ensured by ATC and Radar. 
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system for ADS-B, 
Altitude separation provided by DAA relies on barometric altitude 
and Mode-S. 
Minimal Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft 
are primary means of separation. 





NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering. Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are 
primary means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, possibly providing two targets for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Both aircraft are transponding and 
ownship ADS-B is still operating and providing DAA. 




Table 12.25. Class E < 10k, 2v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
MAC: See-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is primary 
means of separation.  




Table 12.26. Class E < 10k, 1v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
MAC: See-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is primary 
means of separation.  




Table 12.27. Class G 2v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-
B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. Radar, and see-and-avoid by the 
intruder still provide separation. 
Minor Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
NMAC: Altitude is providing misleading information to 
the transponder and ADS-B system, may result in DAA 
system providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering.  Radar, 
see-and-avoid are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous Medium Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, radar, and see-and-avoid 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-09 2E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude and Mode-S, TCAS, and ADS-B 
still fully operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 8E-15 8E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and see-and-
avoid are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar 
and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary 
means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, possibly providing two tracks for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, ADS-B still operational providing target 
tracking, radar and see-and-avoid separation still 
possible. 
Minor Low Risk 3E-12 3E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, TCAS and ADS-B 
still functional. 




Table 12.28. Class G 1v2 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead to 
the loss of Mode S reporting credibility and therefore 
failure of the TCAS avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-B 
systems have the capability to identify an invalid altitude 
report and opt to using GPS altitude for its intruder 
calculations. Radar, and see-and-avoid by the intruder still 
provide separation. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
NMAC: Altitude is providing misleading information to 
transponder which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.   Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are still functional means separation.  Radar and 
ADS-B tracks may be non-correlated, possibly providing 
two tracks for avoidance. 
Hazardous Medium Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B 
system failure. Separation ensured by TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, radar, and see-and-avoid. 
Minor Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system for 
ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies on 
barometric altitude and Mode-S, TCAS, and ADS-B still fully 
operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of TCAS and ADS-B. Radar and See-and-avoid 
are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect 
pilot maneuvering. Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means separation.  Radar and ADS-B 
tracks may be non-correlated, possibly providing two 
tracks for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm.  ADS-B still operational providing target 
tracking.  Radar and see-and-avoid separation still possible. 
Minor Low Risk 5E-15 5E-19 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, TCAS and ADS-B still 
functional. 




Table 12.29. Class G 1v1 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance:  An altimeter failure will lead 
to the loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, 
ADS-B systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. Radar, and see-and-avoid by the 
intruder still provide separation. 
Minor Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
NMAC: Altitude is providing misleading information to 
transponder which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.   Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are still functional means separation.  Radar and 
ADS-B tracks may be non-correlated, possibly providing 
two tracks for avoidance. 
Hazardous Medium Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Loss of separation: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. Transponder still reporting, so DAA still possible. 
Radar and see-and-avoid of intruder still possible as 
well. 
Hazardous High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B. Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude and Mode-S and ADS-B still fully 
operational.  
Minimal Low Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
 NMAC: Loss of ADS-B functionality and reporting. 
Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are 
primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar 
and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary 
means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks may be non-
correlated, possibly providing two tracks for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 2E-12 2E-16 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional. 




Table 12.30. Class G 2v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation:  An altimeter failure will lead to the loss of 
Mode S reporting credibility and therefore failure of the TCAS 
avoidance algorithm. However, ADS-B systems have the 
capability to identify an invalid altitude report and opt to using 
GPS altitude for its intruder calculations. Radar, and see-and-
avoid by the intruder still provide separation. 
Major High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Altimeter wrong  1.00E-09 
NMAC: Altitude is providing misleading information to 
transponder which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.   Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft 
are still functional means separation.  Radar and ADS-B tracks 
may be non-correlated, possibly providing two tracks for 
avoidance. 
Hazardous Medium Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
Degraded performance: GPS failure results in ADS-B system 
failure. TCAS tracking still fully functional, as well as radar and 
see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft. 
Minor Medium Risk 6E-07 6E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system for 
ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies on 
barometric altitude and Mode-S, TCAS and ADS-B still fully 
operational. 
Minimal Low Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of ADS-B and TCAS functionality. Radar and see-
and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary means of 
separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Transponder wrong  1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect 
pilot maneuvering. Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means separation.  Radar and ADS-B 
tracks may be non-correlated, possibly providing two tracks 
for avoidance. 
Hazardous High Risk 1E-09 1E-13 
TCAS 1.00E-07 
Degraded Performance: Failure of the TCAS avoidance 
algorithm, ADS-B still operational providing target tracking, 
radar and see-and-avoid separation still possible. 
Minor Low Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded Performance: Transponder, TCAS ADS-B still 
functional. 




Table 12.31. Class G 1v1A 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Altimeter fail 1.00E-03 
Loss of separation:  An altimeter failure will lead to the 
loss of Mode S reporting credibility. However, ADS-B 
systems have the capability to identify an invalid 
altitude report and opt to using GPS altitude for its 
intruder calculations. Radar, and see-and-avoid by the 
intruder provide separation. 
Major High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Altimeter wrong 1.00E-09 
NMAC: Altitude is providing misleading information to 
transponder which may result in DAA system providing 
incorrect avoidance recommendations/incorrect pilot 
maneuvering.   Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder 
aircraft are primary means separation.   
Hazardous Medium Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
GPS (Horizontal) 1.00E-05 
NMAC: GPS failure results in ADS-B system failure. 
Radar and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are 
primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 4E-07 4E-11 
GPS (Vertical) 1.00E-05 
Minimal effect: Geometric altitude is a backup system 
for ADS-B, Altitude separation provided by DAA relies 
on barometric altitude and Mode-S.  
Minimal Low Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder fail 1.00E-03 
NMAC: Loss of ADS-B. Radar and see-and-avoid by 
intruder aircraft are primary means of separation. 
Hazardous High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Transponder wrong 1.00E-05 
NMAC: Transponder errors could result in DAA system 
providing incorrect avoidance 
recommendations/incorrect pilot maneuvering. Radar 
and see-and-avoid by intruder aircraft are primary 
means separation 
Hazardous High Risk 9E-10 9E-14 
Radar 1.00E-03 
Degraded performance: Transponder and ADS-B still 
functional.  




Table 14. Class G 2v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
MAC: See-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is primary 
means of separation. 




Table 12.33. Class G 1v0 
Failure Likelihood Effects Criticality Severity RLGE RLRE 
Radar 1.00E-03 
MAC: See-and-avoid by intruder aircraft is primary 
means of separation. 
Catastrophic High Risk 1.E-01 1.E-05 
 
 
